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Preface
This book is in honour of  Professor Peter Drysdale. It commemorates his
academic and personal contributions after a lifetime of commitment to his
vision for Australia and the Asia Pacific region and to his many students and
friends throughout the world.
Peter Drysdale has been a powerful force for change for nearly four decades.
With his mentors, Sir John Crawford of  Australia and Dr Saburo Okita of
Japan, he mapped out the vision and strategies needed to mobilise the diverse
economies of  the Asia Pacific region as an engine of  growth.
With like-minded academics from the region, he established and nurtured
the cooperation mechanisms that have given the region’s governments,
businesses and academic communities the confidence to pursue economic
integration. With his colleagues in Australia, he has shaped the policy
environment under successive governments, enabling Australia to build a
comprehensive economic and political relationship with the Asia Pacific
region.
Relatively unheralded among Peter’s many valuable contributions is his
mentoring role as a teacher and advisor to his many hundreds of  students
and friends in Australia and the region. They have become Prime Ministers
and Ministers, captains of  industry, prominent academics and fellow agents
of  change working in many walks of  life. They are armed with his academic
work and his practical insights and ensure that his vision is carried forward in
the decades ahead.
Peter Drysdale has pursued his mission with a special intensity of  purpose
and focus that will remain one of  his hallmarks. Whether dealing with senior
government officials, diplomats, fellow academics or potential funders,
everyone knows that Peter Drysdale will not lose an opportunity to engage
them on a strategic piece of  the jigsaw for his vision. He is tough with those
who he believes are wasting energy or departing from his journey. And he
commands respect and loyalty from those who have been co-opted, not letting
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them forget that they have entered a long-term contract. He keeps his band
of  former students and associates together through prodigious networking
and a strong generosity of  spirit, caring as much about their welfare as their
achievements.
In his academic work, Peter Drysdale has always held a dynamic view of
the world focused on growth and opportunity. This is his context of  the
Australia-Japan relationship that has been a central part of  his research through
the Australia-Japan Research Centre at the Australian National University.
He saw how the emergence of  Japan could provide vast opportunities for
Australia if  it could be a reliable supplier of  raw materials. And he saw that
Japanese growth depended on exports to the United States. This in turn
cemented his view that engagement across the Pacific with the United States
was paramount to economic prosperity as well as security for the whole region.
He applied the same dynamic paradigm to the growing Northeast Asian and
Southeast Asian tigers and expanded his research and networks to include
them.
Ahead of  the times, he has fostered engagement with an emerging China
and saw how the economic might of  such a large and resource and technology
hungry economy could bring prosperity to Australia and the rest of  the region.
But in these formative times, he knew that economic complementarity
within the region was not enough to drive change. There were layers of  long-
standing political, cultural and historical diversity and vast differences in
economic development that had to be bridged if  the region was to integrate.
These growing economies needed to shape and develop a shared vision and
to exercise clear-headed political leadership to bring down the barriers to
trade and investment. Peter’s seminal 1989 work on international economic
pluralism in the East Asia and the Pacific provided the insights and agenda
for this.
 In addressing this challenge, Peter Drysdale and his colleagues started
with the region’s thinkers and academics and formed the Pacific Trade and
Development Conference to build a shared approach by encouraging an Asia
Pacific research agenda.
In 1980, with the strong support of  the Prime Ministers of  Japan and
Australia, he and his colleagues embarked on a bolder plan. They formed the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference that informally brought
representatives of  governments together with their counterparts from
business and academia to discuss how the region should be shaped. And
later, he helped bring China, Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong into this group
giving all the key players of  the region a seat at one table for the first time.
APEC acknowledges that it could not have been formed in 1989 without
these foundations.1
Amid this broad picture, Peter Drysdale was very focused about his own
research agenda and that of  his students. His dynamic vision provided the
backdrop for a specific view of  industries, sectors and the economy as well
as the political and economic linkages that brought them together.
This volume itself  is testimony to the extraordinary breadth and scope of
Peter Drysdale’s career. It showcases the work of  some of  his former students
who, with their own established expertise and in their own way, reflect the
insights, context and forward-looking nature that Peter has always encouraged.
Typically, Peter Drysdale has not stopped his life’s work despite retiring
formally in 2002. He maintains an unflagging pace of  public commentary,
contributions to conferences, and strategic inputs to institution-building,
always looking forward.
Finally, we acknowledge the support of  the Crawford School of  Economics
and Government of  the Australian National University, publishing assistance
from Asia Pacific Press, and a grant from the Publications Subsidy Committee
of  the Australian National University, as well as the tireless editorial efforts
of  Peter’s longtime friend Trevor Wilson. Without such assistance and
support, this publication would not have been possible.
Christopher Findlay and David Parsons
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1 See Chairman’s Summary statement from the first APEC Ministerial Meeting, Canberra,
November 1989. Text available at http://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/
annual_ministerial/1989_1st_apec_ministerial/chair_summary.html.
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1THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
The fifteen years until 2005—the post-bubble period—was a challenging
one for the Japanese economy. It is almost as if history had played a trick
on Japan. At the end of the 1980s, Japan had been riding on the crest of
a bubble economy. The stock market and land prices had soared, real
GDP had averaged close to 5 per cent year-on-year for the previous five
years (and nominal growth more than 6 per cent), and the coming ‘Pacific
century’ appeared to be Japan’s for the taking. By 2005, the stock market
was less than 40 per cent of its end 1989 peak and official land prices were
still falling, trailing five-year average real GDP growth was less than 2 per
cent (and nominal growth slightly negative), and Japan had ceded the
economic limelight—if not future economic leadership in Asia—to China.
How did this happen? I believe that Japan’s prolonged deflation in the
post-bubble period was largely a ‘policy story’ and that the answer to that
question lies in understanding the policy challenges and how, in my view,
they were largely mishandled. Understanding this is also the key to
formulating an informed view of what may lie ahead for the Japanese
economy. Will the economy remain in a prolonged quasi-deflationary state
or will it fully normalise and resume vigorous non-deflationary growth?
1 THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: WHERE  IS
IT LEADING IN THE ASIA PACIFIC?
ANATOMY OF AN ABNORMAL ECONOMY
AND POLICY FAILURE
Paul Sheard
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Lurking below the policy story there may well be a more fundamental
political story, but I will leave that to others to tell.
Japan’s abnormal economy
As of 2005, the Japanese economy was in an abnormal state of affairs.
There are three related ways in which Japan was not a ‘normal economy’,
and these abnormalities all can be traced to the bubble economy and how
its unwinding was mishandled.
The first abnormality is that deflation reigned in Japan. The second is
that the government continued to prop up the banking system. The third
is that the central bank operated monetary policy at the zero interest rate,
bound under a policy of ‘quantitative easing’. In a normal economy, there
is moderate inflation, banks stand on their own feet, and the central bank
targets interest rates. Japan enjoyed none of these features.
The three abnormalities were closely inter-related. To boil down the
story of how they came about, the bursting of the asset bubble of the
1980s wreaked havoc on financial and corporate balance sheets and
rendered inoperable the bank credit transmission mechanism. Monetary
policy was slow to react and poorly coordinated with fiscal policy (and
other policies) and the economy slipped into deflation, undermining the
potency of monetary policy. To stave off a run on the banking system, the
government guaranteed all bank deposits and this slowed down the
necessary balance sheet adjustment process, which in turn further stymied
the effectiveness of monetary policy. The Bank of Japan kept easing
monetary policy, but eventually cut interest rates as far as they could
go—that is, to zero—after which it adopted a policy of quantitative easing,
supplying progressively more reserves to the banking system than was
needed for a zero interest rate. This is how Japan ended up with deflation,
a protected banking system, and quantitative easing.
There is an irony here, because the ‘abnormal’ conditions had been in
existence for so long that they had become ‘normal’ features of the
contemporary Japanese economic landscape. Take deflation. The GDP
had been falling in year-on-year terms since the second half of 1994
(adjusting for the impact of the 2 per cent increase in the consumption
tax in fiscal 1997). By the second quarter of 2004, it was –1.6 per cent
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year-on-year. The Bank of Japan focused on the core CPI as the important
measure of inflation in conducting its monetary policy: the year-on-year
rate of change in the core CPI had been below 1 per cent since May 1994
and had been below zero for most of the period.
The government had been using extraordinary guarantees to prop up
the banking system since June 1995. Under the legal framework at the
time, only small-lot deposits were automatically guaranteed by deposit
insurance, but as an emergency measure the government announced that
all bank deposits would be guaranteed until the end of March 2001. In
the event, the government decided in December 1999 to extend the blanket
guarantee on large-lot demand deposits until the end of March 2003 and
then decided again in October 2002 to extend the guarantee until the
end of March 2005. Even then, zero-interest-bearing large-lot demand
deposits continued to be fully guaranteed permanently, and a framework
existed that automatically guaranteed all deposits whenever the government
judged that there was a threat to the maintenance of financial stability. In
other words, the abnormal situation of the government guaranteeing the
claims of large creditors on the banking system, rather than the banks
using their own capital to do so, appeared to be a permanent feature of
the regulatory landscape in Japan.
As for abnormal monetary policy, this was also virtually a decade-long
phenomenon. The Bank of Japan operated quantitative easing regime for
five years from March 2001 to March 2006. However, except for a short
period (August 2000–March 2001) when a clear policy error was
committed, the Bank of Japan operated monetary policy at the zero interest
rate bound for the seven years (since February 1999). And for the three
and a half years before then, the Bank of Japan targeted the extraordinary
low rate of 50 basis points or less.
The three abnormalities are also closely related in terms of the logic of
why the conditions persisted in this way. Again I will boil down the story.
Because deflation continued, monetary policy was tighter than the Bank
of Japan would like it to be, given that real policy rates were positive and
could not be pushed into negative territory (unlike what the Fed has been
able to do in the United States twice in the past decade or so). Because
banks have been given years to work through their balance sheet problems
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slowly, the credit transmission mechanism remains impaired and the
banking system did not create credit, undermining the effectiveness of
monetary policy. And because deflation continued, the asset values in the
banking system continued to erode. Meanwhile, to strengthen its policy
stance, the Bank of Japan committed to maintain quantitative easing for
as long as deflation (as measured by the core CPI) continued. Deflation,
impaired banks needing government support, and zero interest rates/
quantitative easing all formed a mutually reinforcing set of equilibrium
conditions.
Anatomy of the policy response to the bursting of
the bubble
Let us delve a little more into how the Japanese economy got to this state
by focusing on how policymakers responded to the unwinding of the
bubble of the 1980s. That can be summarised in one word: forbearance.
Japan’s asset price bubble of the 1980s, weighted by the size of the
Japanese economy, may have been the biggest bubble in recorded financial
history (Figure 1.1). The broadest index of land prices in Japan more
than doubled from the start of the 1980s to when it peaked, and
Figure 1.1 Japan’s real estate price bubble, 1956–2006 (index, Q1
1956=1)
Sources: Bloomberg; Japan Real Estate Institute; Cabinet Office.
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 06
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subsequently has almost halved (Table 1.1). The real estate price bubble
was most acute for commercial property in the major urban areas: the
index of commercial land prices in the six major urban areas increased
more than six-fold in the 1980s and has fallen by 87 per cent since the
peak. Notwithstanding some signs of bottoming in parts of Tokyo, all
major land price indexes in Japan are still falling in year-on-year terms.
Even after fourteen years, real estate prices in Japan continued to deflate.
The bursting of the stock market and real estate price bubble had the
predictable effect of throwing the economy into recession in the early
1990s. Industrial production—to quote one statistic—fell by 14.4 per
cent from its peak in mid–1991 to its trough at the beginning of 1994.
Thus began a period of prolonged low growth, deflation, and financial
system problems, which continued for more than a decade (Figures 1.2
and 1.3). In the ten years to 2005, real GDP growth in Japan averaged
1.2 per cent year-on-year while nominal GDP growth has averaged just
0.2 per cent (the GDP deflator fell by 1.0 per cent on average). In the
Table 1.1 Japanese land prices: measuring the size of the bubble
Q1 04 Q1 04 Increase Q1 04 as Q1 04
(% change (% change from 1980  % of peak level
h-o-h) y-o-y) to peak (x) lowest since
Nationwide
All land –4.1 –8.4 2.09 50.3 Q3 80
Commercial –5.0 –10.2 2.28 33.7 Q1 73
Residential –3.2 –6.4 2.07 64.8 Q1 84
Industrial –4.4 –8.7 1.88 62.7 Q1 82
Six urban areas
All land –3.4 –7.4 4.29 24.5 Q3 80
Commercial –2.3 –6.0 6.26 12.9 Q1 73
Residential –2.6 –5.9 3.72 34.5 Q1 84
Industrial –5.5 –10.9 3.32 32.3 Q1 81
Tokyo (23 wards) –0.8 –2.7 n.a. 17.5 n.a.
Osaka (13 cities) –5.0 –10.2 n.a. 23.5 n.a.
Nagoya (11 cities) –3.4 –6.7 n.a. 53.3 n.a.
Non-big-6 urban –4.2 –8.5 n.a. 51.2 n.a.
Sources: Japan Real Estate Institute; Bloomberg.
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Figure 1.2 Japan’s real GDP growth, 1982–2006 (per cent year-
on-year, four-quarter moving average)
Sources: Cabinet Office; Consensus Economics.
Figure 1.3 Japan’s nominal GDP growth and GDP deflator,
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prior five years, economic performance had been particularly dismal: real
GDP in Japan grew on average by 1.3 per cent year-on-year, but nominal
GDP actually fell by 0.1 per cent (the GDP deflator fell by 1.3 per cent
on average). This is a far cry from the second half of the 1980s (let alone
the earlier ‘high growth period’) when real GDP growth averaged 4.8 per
cent year-on-year while nominal GDP growth averaged 6.3 per cent (the
GDP deflator rose by 1.7 per cent on average).
A more serious consequence of the unwinding of the bubble than an
initial nasty recession was the impact that the loss of asset values had on
the banking system: thus began the non-performing loan (NPL) problem
(Figure 1.4) and the ongoing process of debt de-leveraging in the corporate
sector (Figure 1.5). Bank lending growth decelerated sharply and bank
lending began to fall in 1996, and the stock of outstanding bank lending
was down 150 trillion yen (28 per cent, or equivalent to 30 per cent of
GDP) since that time. The Bank of Japan started cutting the official
discount rate in 1991, after it had raised it progressively to 6 per cent
from June 1989 to August 1990 in order to ‘prick’ the bubble, taking it
to 0.5 per cent by September 1995. However, with the banking system
sitting on a dramatically escalating, but as yet undisclosed, asset
impairment problem, despite the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy actions,
the economy slipped into deflation: the domestic corporate goods price
(then the domestic wholesale price index) started falling in year-on-year
terms at the end of 1991, the GDP deflator in the third quarter of 1994,
and, on a sustained basis, the core CPI in the second half of 1998
(Figure 1.6).
By the end of the 1990s, deflation was entrenched (and real estate
prices were continuing to fall), the banking system was propped up by
the government but was dysfunctional in creating credit, monetary policy
was stretched to its conventional limits, and the fiscal finances were
deteriorating steadily; to boot, periodic bouts of a strong yen threatened
to make matters worse, the export sector being the strongest pillar in the
economy.
How did Japanese policymakers respond to the bursting of the bubble
and the collateral damage that this caused to the financial system and to
the economy? With a mixture of reactive crisis management and policies
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Figure 1.4 Official non-performing loans of all banks, 1992–2005
(yen trillion)
Source: Financial Services Agency.
Figure 1.5 Corporate debt to nominal GDP, 1970–2000 (per cent)























aimed at helping the economy to grow slowly out of the problems, taking
as much time as necessary. The two key planks of post-bubble policy were
blanket government guarantees of bank deposits and easy monetary policy,
which was later implemented as ‘quantitative easing’. Having put in the
necessary policy planks to buy time, the government did implement some
proactive policies aimed at promoting growth: as discussed further below,
monetary policy was used as the growth-stimulating policy of choice; fiscal
policy was used intermittently to try to spur growth (but in a flawed
way); and there was ongoing deregulation both in the private sector and
the public sector, which supported growth over time.
The single most important policy, in my view, for understanding the
course of Japan’s economy in the post-bubble period, is the government
guarantee of bank deposits, as innocuous a policy as this may sound to
many observers. Real estate prices began falling in 1990, as policymakers
successfully ‘pricked’ the bubble, and small banks and credit unions began
to fail shortly after. However, it was not until the fallout from the failure of
two Tokyo credit unions at the end of 1994 (and the dramatic rise in the
Figure 1.6 Measures of deflation, 1990–2006 (index; levels)
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yen and collapsing stock market in early 1995) focused the minds of
policymakers on the fallout of the bursting of the bubble that the issue
came to be addressed as a systemic one. On 8 June 1995, the Ministry of
Finance made a momentous announcement: all bank deposits, not just
those covered by the existing deposit insurance system, would be
guaranteed by the government, and a five-year plan (later set to end at
the end of March 2001) would be implemented to ‘cope with the non-
performing loan problem’ (Ministry of Finance 1995). Forbearance policy
had moved from implicit to official policy.
The decision by the government to stand behind all bank deposits was
by no means inevitable. The deposit insurance system guaranteed ‘small-
lot deposits’, that is, deposits up to 10 million yen per depositor per
bank, which comprised about half of all bank deposits in total (Figure
1.7). The blanket guarantee extended this guarantee to large-lot depositors,
who in legal terms at that point were unsecured creditors on the banking
system, or creditors who relied on the strength of bank capital to secure
their claims. No bank depositor had lost money in the postwar period,
Figure 1.7 Evolution of the government guarantee on bank
deposits, 1992–2007 (per cent of total deposits)



















































notably in the first half of the 1990s during which period seven institutions
had already failed: the government always engineered a rescue merger,
and since 1991 these deals were sweetened by the Deposit Insurance
Corporation providing financial assistance to the rescuing bank.
The situation was so bad by 1995, however, that, had the government
not announced that all bank deposits, not just small-lot deposits, would
be fully guaranteed, a run on the banking system and a financial crisis
would have surely ensued sooner or later. Policymakers never seem to have
contemplated the option of not extending a blanket guarantee to all bank
deposits. Some sort of banking system ‘crisis’ would have ensued in that
case, as non-secured investors in the banking system realised that the asset
backing for their deposits had gone up in smoke with the collapse in asset
values and that the government was not going to step in kindly to make
them whole. Policymakers would have needed to have been on their toes
to prevent a full-fledged melt-down of the financial system (Table 1.2).
But a ‘financial crisis’ can be one way of bringing balance sheets into
line with economic realities and of confronting and dealing with underlying
financial system problems. A decision not to guarantee all deposits would
have been a decision to allow the losses from the bursting of the bubble to
have fallen where they lay—on the direct and indirect owners of the assets.
It would have been a decision to confront, rather than delay, the recognition
and resolution of the underlying asset market and balance sheet problems.
It would have been the financial system equivalent of letting water flow
downhill.
 The June 1995 decision was crisis management, but little else. The
decision obviated the need for depositors to withdraw deposits from the
banking system, but the assets that had been lost were not going to come
back. No government wants a financial crisis on its hands, so one can have
some sympathy with the government’s decision to guarantee all bank
deposits. But all this did was to buy time to deal with the underlying
problems, and it did so by transferring any contingent losses of bank
depositors to the government, that is, to taxpayers. The government’s
decision meant that taxpayers were bailing out bank depositors in order
to secure financial stability in the face of a massive impairment of assets in
the banking system. This was a legitimate (and, most observers argued,
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compelling) policy decision, but the ramifications—that the lost assets
were unlikely to come back and that somebody, presumably the
government, would have to foot the bill—should have been better
understood and acted upon. The government should have followed up its
momentous decision to guarantee deposits with a commensurate injection
of public funds into the banking system to make bank balance sheets
whole. This could have been done through a carve-out of NPLs at or close
Table 1.2 Current cyclical upswing compared with previous two
post-bubble recoveries, 1993, 1999 and 2002
(a) Contribution of components to real GDP growth (ppp) purchasing power parity
                                                Through of recovery cycle Last three
Q3 93 Q1 99* Q1 02 quarters
GDP 4.6 5.3 8.2 3.9
Final private domestic demand 3.6 4.0 5.4 2.0
Consumption 3.3 1.6 2.5 1.5
Business investment 0.2 2.1 3.0 1.5
Residential investment 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Inventory investment 0.3 0.9 1.6 0.3
Public demand 1.9 0.3 –1.0 –0.3
Net exports –1.2 0.2 2.2 1.0
Reference: GDP deflator –0.7 –3.6 –6.0 –2.4
(b) Contribution of components to nominal GDP growth (ppp) purchasing power parity
                                               Through of recovery cycle Last three
Q3 93 Q1 99* Q1 02 quarters
GDP 4.0 1.5 1.7 1.4”
Final private domestic demand 2.9 1.7 1.8 1.6
Consumption 3.2 0.2 0.7 0.9
Business investment –0.3 1.2 1.1 0.8
Residential investment 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Inventory investment 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.0
Public demand 1.9 0.0 –2.0 –.05
Net exports –1.2 –1.0 0.7 0.3
Reference: Worker compensation 3.2 0.1 –2.8 0.0
* This recovery lasted for just eight quarters
Source: Cabinet Office.
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to face value to a ‘resolution and trust corporation’-style entity, or by
injecting a large amount of common equity, that is, equity not required
to be re-paid: the government did neither (although much later pale
versions of these policies were implemented).
A major flaw in banking system policy in Japan in this period is that
policymakers have never accepted, or even acted as if they realised, that
guaranteeing bank deposits to head off a financial crisis and injecting
fiscal funds are two sides of the same policy coin. Moreover, in a classic
circular argument, because the blanket guarantees succeeded in preventing
financial instability (particularly a run on bank deposits), policymakers
were consistently able to deny the need to inject public funds, on the
grounds that were was no crisis.
The government did not want a financial crisis—that is, a market-
based resolution to the fact that market values of assets were way below
their book values—but it did not want to foot the bill for a bailout either,
although this would have allowed the whole episode of the bubble and
its aftermath to have been assigned to the history books relatively quickly.
That just left forbearance as their underlying policy: playing for time and
banking on growth to eventually heal balance sheet wounds.
Notwithstanding some stop-start attempts to use fiscal policy to stimulate
growth, policymakers clearly looked to monetary policy to be the mainstay
of macro stimulus. The Bank of Japan dropped policy interest rates from
1.75 per cent at the start of the year to 50 basis points by September of
1995, a level of rates seen at the time as ‘extraordinary’. However, by the
time that the ‘financial stabilisation five-year plan’ had been put in place,
the economy had already slipped into deflation, meaning that the Bank
of Japan had lost the opportunity to give the economy a shot in the arm
by experiencing negative real rates, and land prices were continuing to
plummet. In fact, exemplifying another inconsistent cross-current in policy,
the official policy goal of bringing down land prices—adopted at the
start of the decade—continued to be in place until the Cabinet announced
a new land policy in February 1997. This meant that for a period of
about twenty months, one arm of policy was operating to impose more
losses on banks while another arm sought to transfer these (contingent)
losses to the government’s balance sheet.
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More to the point, it made little sense to rely on monetary policy to
deliver growth if the main transmission mechanism of monetary policy—
credit transmission through the banking system—was inoperable, and
likely to remain so for a number of years as the government gave the banks
time to repair their balance sheet wounds slowly. This was a policy
contradiction in terms. In effect, the implicit policy in Japan for a decade
was to rely on a ‘broken’ banking system as the primary transmission
channel (of monetary policy) for fixing itself. No wonder the economy
floundered!
What could, and should, the government have done instead? In short,
the government should have implemented a coordinated and strategic
package of macro and micro policies, centring on three elements. At the
macro level, the authorities should have announced that macro-level
deflation would not be tolerated and implemented a sustained and
coordinated fiscal and monetary expansion to be continued until the
economy emerged from deflation. Bridging the macro and micro levels,
the authorities should have fixed the banking system by injecting enough
fiscal funds into the banking system to enable banks expeditiously to clear
away bubble-era excess corporate debt and recapitalise themselves.
Conceptually, this capital injection could be thought of as the government
‘marking to market’ its guarantee of deposits since by fully guaranteeing
bank deposits the government became the contingent owner of any residual
losses in the banking system associated with the balance sheet cleanup
after bank equity was wiped out. At the micro level, the government should
have pursued an aggressive program of deregulation and public sector
reform (rather than a slow and piecemeal one) so to open up
new consumption and investment opportunities and raise the potential
growth rate.
The policy framework in existence in 2005 rested on the same principles
and embodied the same flaws. Under the policy framework as re-defined
by the Koizumi administration, the economy was envisaged as being in
the final year of a 3–4 year ‘intensive adjustment period’. The aim during
this time was to ‘complete the resolution of the non-performing loan
problem’ and establish the conditions for the economy to exit from
deflation. The Bank of Japan was committed to maintaining its
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extraordinary quantitative easing regime until it was ‘convinced’ that the
economy would not slip back into deflation (as measured by the core
CPI). The government continued to fully guarantee large-lot demand
deposits (some 31 per cent of total bank deposits) and, in effect (via the
financial crisis response framework in the deposit insurance system) to
fully guarantee all bank deposits. In short, the economy had not yet
emerged from its post-bubble deflationary path and policy was still in
post-bubble deflation-fighting, financial system-stabilising mode.
The authorities continued to use two central planks of policy—financial
stabilisation policy centring on guarantees of bank deposits, and monetary
policy—to ‘play for time’ and ‘bank on growth’. The problem is that, as
in the past, these policies were unlikely to deliver an end to deflation and
a transition to sustainable growth. Japan is by no means out of the post-
bubble deflationary woods, notwithstanding the recent impressive-looking
real growth rates (Table 1.3).
First, take bank guarantees. The government continued, in effect, to
fully guarantee all bank deposits. Initially the blanket government
guarantee on bank deposits was supposed to expire at the end of March
2001, after which time only small-lot deposits would be automatically
guaranteed by the deposit insurance system (what the Japanese refer to as
‘the pay-off’ system). However, the government extended the guarantee
on large-lot time deposits to the end of March 2002, and the guarantee
on large-lot demand deposits (‘large-lot’ being deposits above 10 million
yen per depositor per bank) first to the end of March 2003 but then later
to the end of March 2005. On paper, the government allowed the blanket
guarantee on large-lot time deposits to expire at the end of March 2002.
This change in formal guarantee status had the predictable effect: it
triggered a huge shift in deposits from time deposits to demand deposits,
since under quantitative easing (zero interest policy) these deposits were
almost perfect substitutes, other than in their guarantee status, which
clearly favoured demand deposits (Figure 1.8).
A key choreography of policy in Japan was that the remaining
government guarantee on large-lot bank deposits would expire at the end
of March 2005, ushering in the era of the ‘full pay-off regime’. If only
that were the case! This portrayal is, at best, wishful thinking, at worst
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Table 1.3 Japan’s banking system workout framework, 2004
Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) and   Maximum  Amount Amount
Industrial Revitalisation Corporation (IRC) amount used available
loan guarantees (yen tr)
Depositor protection 19.00 5.01 13.99
NPL purchases by RCC 14.00 4.56 9.44
RCC losses/recapitalisation 6.00 0.81 5.19
Financial crisis response 17.00 1.96 15.04
‘Old’ bank recapitalisation 1.00 0.01 0.99
‘New’ bank recapitalisation (planned from FY04) 2.00 0.00 2.00
DIC investment in IRC 0.15 0.15 0.00
DIC sub-total 59.15 12.49 46.66
IRC funds 10.00 0.51 9.49
Total 69.15 13.00 56.15
Sources: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan; Industrial Revitalisation Corporation of
Japan; Nikkei newspaper.
Figure 1.8 Shift in large-lot time deposits, triggered by removal of
guarantee, 1995–2007 (per cent year-on-year)






disingenuous. True, under sunset legislation, the blanket guarantee on
large-lot demand deposits expired at the end of March 2005, and the
authorities did not extend this guarantee for a third time. This deadline
coincided (purposely) with the target date for the completion of the
government’s ‘financial revival program’ (the so-called ‘Takenaka plan’)
unveiled at the end of October 2002 (Japan, Financial Services Agency
2002).
However, there were two loopholes relating to this change in the status
of the government guarantee of bank deposits. One is that, under legislation
passed in December 2002, deposits earning a zero interest rate (so-called
‘settlement deposits’) continued to be fully guaranteed. There was no ‘pay-
off’ for these deposits, which at the time represented about 21.1 per cent
of large-lot demand deposits and 6.5 per cent of total deposits. This created
a loophole in the removal of the government guarantee, as interest rates at
the time were so close to zero that it hardly mattered (0.001 per cent):
accepting a zero interest rate would mean giving up just 100 yen of interest
income on a minimum-size large-lot deposit (10 million yen). This meant
that, should there be lingering concerns about the strength of bank balance
sheets or should such concerns re-surface, there could well have been a
shift from non-zero large-lot demand deposits to zero demand deposits,
analogous to (although likely not on the same scale as) the shift from time
to demand deposits triggered by the removal of the automatic guarantee
on the former (Figure 1.8).
A second loophole was more systemic: even when the blanket guarantee
expired, a state of affairs that was tantamount to a full government guarantee
on bank deposits continued to exist. The ‘financial crisis response’
framework, which came into existence in April 2001, can be used whenever
‘it is feared that, should measures not be implemented, very severe obstacles
would arise in the maintenance of orderly credit [conditions] in the country
or in the region where the financial institution in question operates’ (Deposit
Insurance Law, Article 102). This framework has been invoked on two
occasions, to provide a capital injection to Resona Bank and to nationalise
Ashikaga Bank. It is designed in such a way that, whenever it is invoked,
the deposits of the financial institution concerned are fully guaranteed.1
The blanket guarantee was introduced in 1995 in order to head off a
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financial crisis; the thrust of the framework that replaces it is that deposits
will continue to be fully guaranteed after the event if that is necessary in
order to maintain financial stability. Put another way, the blanket guarantee
is to be removed, but only in those cases in which is not needed.
A policy critique of forbearance
Japanese policymakers appear to take it as self-evident that it is sound
policy for the government to fully guarantee bank deposits. After all, as
long as the market retains confidence in the sovereign credit, it is a sure-
fire way to prevent a run on bank deposits and to maintain financial stability.
And it is cheap—as long as the guarantees are not called in, there is no
overt fiscal cost.
However, as a policy tool, government guarantees of bank deposits have
a serious drawback: they serve to slow down the whole bank resolution
process and impose a high cost on the economy in terms of lost growth
and the ultimate fiscal costs incurred. In fact, the very thing that makes
government bank deposit guarantees so potent in putting out financial
system fires—the removal of the balance sheet pressure on banks and of
the need for depositors to worry about the safety of the principal they have
invested in the banking system—creates a bias in this direction. This can
be counter-productive in the long run, however, as by virtue of the success
of the deposit guarantees, the underlying problems are prevented from
surfacing, and hence are slow to be addressed.
Disclosure, and credibility of the regulatory framework, also suffer under
a policy of forbearance, the more so the bigger the scale of the underlying
problem. The decision to take what on any official reckoning would be
almost ten years from the official recognition of the problem (which I date
to June 1995) to its aimed-for resolution (March 2005) to restore balance
sheets to sufficient health for banks to operate without being propped up
by the government implies that full information about the ‘true’ (such as
that can be ascertained at all) underlying state of bank balance sheets can
only be revealed gradually over time. This is because, had the ‘true’ state
of bank balance sheets been revealed at the start of the process, the market,
political, regulatory, and popular pressures for dealing more quickly with
the problems would have forced immediate policy action, contradicting
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the underlying assumption of forbearance. Incremental and minimalist
action goes hand-in-hand with incremental disclosure. However, enormous
damage is inflicted on the credibility of the regulatory framework, as each
incremental bank failure puts the spotlight on how much has been covered
up in the past and for how long.
More generally, the use of extraordinary deposit guarantees, after the
event, to deal with a banking crisis involves a trade-off. By converting
increasingly risky claims on bank assets into safe claims on the government,
such guarantees prevent a damaging financial crisis from erupting, but at
the same time they serve to impede the recognition of losses and the
necessary balance sheet adjustment process. This suggests that ex post
guarantees and forbearance work best when the damage to bank assets is
small and/or temporary. The extraordinary guarantee then serves to bridge
the inherent asset/liability mismatch in a banking system’s balance sheet.
But if the assets have permanently disappeared, as in Japan’s case (see
Figure 1.1), there is little to be gained in ‘playing for time’ in the hope
that asset values will be restored, whereas the long-term costs of not
recognising and reacting to such a fundamental change in balance sheet
circumstances are high. Given Japan’s situation, where the banking problem
clearly involved a one-off monumental loss of asset value rather than a
temporary one which could be expected to reverse itself with time,
forbearance has offered a particularly poor benefit-cost trade-off.
The second plank of policy, complementing the use of government
bank deposits guarantees, was the easing of monetary policy. Three years
after the Bank of Japan cut official interest rates to 50 basis points in
September 1995, the Bank had to start to cut rates even further,
culminating in an unprecedented policy of zero interest rates in February
1999. Following an abortive and controversial attempt to raise rates in
August 2000, the Bank of Japan abandoned interest rate targeting in
March 2001 and moved to ‘quantitative targeting’ (or ‘quantitative easing’),
implying zero overnight interest rates but going well beyond that in terms
of the provision of reserves to the banking system (Figure 1.9). According
to the Bank of Japan, it ‘decided to implement these policy measures
with firm determination with a view to preventing prices from declining
continuously as well as preparing a basis for sustainable economic growth’.2
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Figure 1.9 Bank of Japan quantitative easing: current account
balances targets, 2001–2006 (yen trillion)
Source: Bank of Japan.
According to economic theory, easing monetary policy when the
economy is on the verge of, or actually in, deflation is definitely the right
policy. However, there has to be a transmission mechanism. The credit
transmission mechanism, through the banking system, is the natural
candidate, particularly in an economy such as Japan’s with its dominant
banking system. However, if the corporate sector has a huge overhang of
excess debt on its balance sheets due to the bursting of a massive real-
estate price bubble, and if the banking system does not have the capital to
take quick action to clean up both its and the corporate sector’s balance
sheets, then monetary policy may not be effective in getting the economy
out of deflation and onto a sustainable growth path. This has been the
case in Japan.
As Figure 1.10 shows, bank lending had been falling since about 1996,
and particularly sharply since 1998. In terms of stimulating the economy,
banking system policy had been working at cross-purposes to monetary
policy. Monetary policy had been relied upon, rather than a more sensible
coordinated fiscal-monetary policy, as the principal anti-deflation tool in
the forbearance policy framework. Yet there has been a glaring contradiction
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After adjustment
Figure 1.10 Bank lending growth: headline, adjusted for special
factors, 1995–2007 (per cent year-on-year change)
Note: ‘Special factors’ include NPLs and so on.
Source: Bank of Japan.
the credit transmission process of a banking system to help rescue a banking
system that had been deflating. A damaging policy circularity is thus
created: the banking system is given time to help it ‘grow out of’ its
problem, but without a sound banking system, strong and sustained
growth is difficult.
Figure 1.11 shows the conundrum at work. After quantitative easing
began, base money increased by a cumulative 64 per cent, driven by the
policy-induced increase in current account balances (mainly bank reserves),
but bank lending fell by a cumulative 16 per cent during this period
(March 2000–March 2004). Monetary policy was unable to gain traction
through the banking system, and nominal GDP fell by 2 per cent over
the period before finally rising after March 2006.
There are other transmission channels. Monetary economists focus
particularly on the expectations channel.3 By communicating a strong
message that deflation will not be tolerated and by taking aggressive
monetary policy action aimed at achieving that goal, a central bank may
be able to change private sector expectations, and hence consumption and
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fulfilling prophesy.4 However, the Bank of Japan consistently eschewed
reliance on, or belief in the potential efficacy of, the expectations channel,
on the grounds that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy was
impaired and therefore the means by which monetary policy could operate
upon expectations was lacking.
There are two responses to this kind of claim. One is that it is wrong,
accepting that ‘one can argue that monetary policy works mostly (entirely?)
through its effects on expectations’ (Blanchard 2000:191).5 In that case,
however, the damage is done because the denial by the Bank of Japan that
it could influence expectations is tantamount to a declaration not to rely
on this channel. Ironically, such beliefs by a central bank will be self-
reinforcing. Another is to accept the logic, but to argue the obvious point
that, if the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is ‘broken’, then
it should be ‘fixed’ as a matter of the highest policy priority. Policymakers,
time and time again in Japan, have appeared to accept this logic, and have
appeared to be in the process of developing plans to fix the banking system,
only to disappoint by failing to execute policy.
 One could point in particular to: the 1996 ‘financial stabilisation five-
year plan’, which purported to have the aim of ‘bringing the non-
Figure 1.11 Monetary aggregates and nominal GDP, 2000–2007
(index, March 2001=100)

















performing loan problem under control by the end of FY00’; the 1998
‘finance Diet’ which produced the 60 trillion yen bank work-out plan
(whose successor is outlined in Table 1.4) (Financial System Council 1995);
the April 2001 ‘emergency economic package’ that pointed to ‘the existence
of excessive corporate debt’, the ‘delay in balance sheet adjustments
[imposing] a heavy burden on economic growth’, and the fact that ‘without
a quick resolution of this issue, [firm] progress towards economic recovery
cannot be expected’, thus (to paraphrase) ‘the critical importance of solving
such structural issues still present in the asset markets for the Japanese
economy to achieve dynamic growth’ (Ministerial conference 2001); the
June 2001 blueprint document laying out the Koizumi structural reform
agenda, whose starting point aim was to ‘resolve the non-performing loans
problem within two or three years’ (Council on Economic Fiscal Policy
2001); and the October 2002 ‘financial revival program’ (the so-called
‘Takenaka plan’), which took as its starting point the ‘need to solve the
non-performing loan problems of the major banks’ by focusing on ‘making
asset evaluations stricter, bolstering capital levels, and strengthening
governance’. Notwithstanding the no doubt well-intentioned policy
rhetoric and the numerous associated schemes introduced, official non-
performing loan levels, fell from March 2002 peak levels, but remained
almost as high as they were at the start of the official work-out in 1996
(Figure 1.4), and there were no signs of the banking system becoming an
effective transmitter of monetary policy (Figures 1.10 and 1.11).
Table 1.4 Foreign exchange intervention, 1999–2003 (yen
trillion)
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
1Q 3.039 1.385 0.000 4.016 4.612
2Q 2.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.876
3Q 1.634 0.000 0.000 2.387 7.551
4Q 1.558 0.144 3.211 0.000 14.832
Total 8.628 1.529 3.211 6.403 32.870
Per cent yen/ 12.4 –12.4 –7.4 10.5 9.3
dollar appreciation*
* using March averages
Source: Ministry of Finance.
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It is a similar story with the Bank of Japan, when it comes to fixing the
banks. When the Bank of Japan implemented ‘zero interest rate policy’ in
February 1999 it stated that: ‘In order to bring [the] Japanese economy
back to a solid recovery path, it is important not only to provide support
from monetary and fiscal sides but also to steadily promote financial system
revitalisation and structural reforms. The Bank of Japan strongly hopes
that the decision to make money market operations more accommodative
will, combined with various efforts made by the parties concerned,
contribute to surmounting the economic difficulties we face’ (Bank of
Japan 1999). When the Bank introduced quantitative targeting in March
2001, it similarly stated
In order to make this monetary easing fully effective in restoring Japan’s
economy on a sustainable growth path, progress in structural reforms
with respect to the financial system, for example, resolution of the non-
performing asset problem, as well as in the area of economy and industry
is essential. Structural reform may be accompanied by painful adjustments.
Without such adjustments, however, neither improvement in productivity
nor sustainable economic growth can be obtained. The Bank of Japan
strongly hopes that decisive actions be taken to address fundamental
problems both with a clear support of the nation for structural reform
and under a strong leadership of the government of Japan (Bank of Japan
2001, point 5).
In September 2002, the Bank of Japan announced a ‘new initiative
towards financial system stability’, unveiling a ‘course of action to facilitate
resolution of the non-performing loan problem and to secure financial
system stability’. The Bank argued that ‘in order to resolve the overall
problem, a comprehensive and is needed, centring on a more appropriate
evaluation of non-performing loans, the promotion of their early disposal,
and efforts toward higher profitability on the part of both firms and financial
institutions’. The Bank pledged to ‘conduct a comprehensive review of the
non-performing loan problem and publish the result’ (Bank of Japan 2002)
and the next month announced that it would take the extraordinary step
of buying up to 2 trillion yen of equities held by banks (increased to 3
trillion yen in March 2003) (Bank of Japan 2002). At the time, this was
widely regarded as a case of the Bank of Japan having thrown the central
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bank equivalent of a hand grenade at the banking authorities. However,
judged by ultimate results, which is what counts, the results were
disappointing.
Things appeared to have taken a serious turn for the good in March
2003, when, virtually immediately upon assuming office, the new governor
of the Bank of Japan, Toshihiko Fukui, called an extraordinary monetary
policy meeting, at which he ‘instructed Bank staff to examine a wide
range of issues related to the enhancement of monetary policy transparency
and the strengthening of the monetary policy transmission mechanism
based on the experience of quantitative easing so far’ and ‘with respect to
specific measures, …particularly instructed Bank staff to explore possible
measures to strengthen the transmission mechanism of monetary easing
in the areas of corporate finance and money market operations’ (Bank of
Japan 2003). However, what came out of this initiative in terms of measures
aimed at strengthening the transmission mechanism was an anticlimax: a
scheme to purchase by March 2006 up to 1 trillion yen of asset-backed
securities (mainly) of small and medium-sized enterprises. But 1 trillion
yen is equivalent to only 0.2 per cent of Japan’s GDP or 1 per cent of
monetary base, and is only a drop in the macro bucket when it comes to
getting the credit transmission mechanism working in Japan. Actual
implementation of the scheme has been even more modest, with the Bank
currently holding only 192 billion yen of asset-backed securities under
this scheme an amount equivalent to less than 0.2 per cent of monetary
base (Figure 1.12).
The government had a well-articulated (albeit flawed) framework for
carrying out a banking system work-out (Table 1.3). Aggressive use of
this framework, to give the banks directly or indirectly enough capital to
remove the corporate debt overhang, would have helped to establish the
pre-conditions for the credit contraction process to be brought to an early
end, and for monetary policy to start to gain traction through the banking
system. It still could have. However, notwithstanding the recapitalisation
of the fifth largest banking group and the nationalisation of the tenth
largest regional bank in 2003, the Bank of Japan persisted with its deep-
seated reluctance to use the framework to expedite a work-out rather than
as a tool of forbearance.
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If actions speak louder than words, the transmission channel that the
authorities are really prepared to use is the exchange rate. Japan conducted
unprecedented foreign exchange intervention in the FY 2003, selling 32.87
trillion yen of domestic currency to buy (overwhelmingly in US dollars)
an amount equivalent to about twice Japan’s annual current account surplus
(Table 1.4). As a result, Japan’s foreign exchange reserves increased to
US$806 billion at the end of March, an increase of 69 per cent year-on-
year (Figure 1.13). In the course of accumulating so many foreign reserves,
the Ministry of Finance literally ran out of money, running up against its
Diet-authorised borrowing limit by the end of 2003. Not to be deterred,
the Ministry of Finance temporarily ‘borrowed’ the central bank’s balance
sheet, by entering an agreement with the Bank of Japan on 26 December
to purchase up to 10 trillion yen of the Ministry’s foreign exchange reserves
(which it did in the first two months of 2004). Moreover, the authorities
signaled to the market that they would be prepared to continue with this
policy on even a larger scale if necessary. The Ministry increased the total
budget available to raise intervention funds from 79 trillion yen in FY2003
to 140 trillion yen in FY2004 (in two stages, 21 trillion yen in the FY2003
supplementary budget and 40 trillion yen in the FY2004 Budget).
Figure 1.12 Purchases of asset-backed securities by the Bank of
Japan, 2003–2006
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Source: Ministry of Finance.
While massive foreign exchange intervention backed up by monetary
easing has its merits as a policy to overcome deflation, there are a number
of problems. One, the idea seems to be at odds with policymakers’ own
diagnosis and prescription for countering deflation, as laid out in numerous
policy documents. Two, and related, the policy stimulus would appear to
be poorly directed, because the export sector arguably is already strong
and the transmission mechanism from an export-led recovery to domestic
demand appears to be weak. Three, policy implementation has been poor,
in that the authorities have not communicated a strong and coordinated
anti-deflation message between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of
Japan, such as could have had a significant impact on expectations.
Conclusion: what may lie ahead
Despite the recently improved sentiment towards Japan, surveying the
economic landscape in 2005 it appeared that neither the government nor
the market was expecting the economy to resume robust growth any time
soon. One of the casualties of the post-bubble period has been bullish
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medium-term fiscal and economic plan, under the scenario in which the
government successfully discharges its reform plans during the ‘intensive
adjustment phase’ after which the economy achieves sustainable growth,
real growth would average 2 per cent over the next five years (and only 2.1
per cent in FY2008) and nominal GDP growth 1.9 per cent. According
to the Consensus Economics numbers of major market forecasters at the
time, the market consensus was that growth would be 4.2 per cent in
2004, but would decelerate to 1.8 per cent in 2005. Thus the consensus
appeared to be forecasting that this third post-bubble recovery would
stay within the post-bubble trend of low-growth, deflationary cyclical
ups-and-downs.
While Japanese policymakers talked about the need to put an end to
deflation and get the economy on a sustainable (domestic demand-led)
growth path again, they did not appear to have a credible policy framework
in place to bring that about, and it was unlikely to happen autonomously.
The most likely scenario was that policy ‘muddling-through’ would
continue, based on defensive and open-ended deflation-fighting policies,
with intermittent periods of more aggressive policy responses triggered by
market (crisis) events, and this is what occurred.
As of mid 2007, Japan is on the road to becoming a ‘normal’, albeit
lower growth, economy again. The listed banking sector, adequately
capitalised by a more than trebling of its market capitalisation since its
April 2003 trough, is largely able to stand on its own feet again, and the
Bank of Japan has started to move policy rates into positive territory for
the first time in seven years. However, deflation is not fully vanquished in
Japan, as evidenced by both the GDP deflator and the core CPI being in
slight negative territory in year-on-year rate of change terms (–0.3 per
cent and –0.1 per cent respectively).
As long as Japan remains trapped in a quasi-deflationary twilight zone,
and assuming that China can keep on its current high-growth course—
reminiscent in many ways of Japan’s own high-growth period—the
relentless slide in Japan’s relative standing as an economic powerhouse in
Asia looks set to continue. This prospect does not augur well for Japan to
exercise an economic leadership role in Asia commensurate with its
economic responsibilities and potential.
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Notes
1 Even if a bank is nationalised, and even when there is no ex ante guarantee on large-lot
deposits (that is, the ‘pay-off’ is in effect), there is no way within the framework to
impose a ‘haircut’ on depositors. Thus, when Ashikaga Bank was nationalised, it was
immediately announced that all depositors would be guaranteed. Few observers seemed
to comment on the apparent inconsistency of this automatic ex post guarantee with the
‘partial pay-off’, in effect from 1 April 2002.
2 Bank of Japan, ‘New Procedures for Money Market Operations and Monetary Easing’,
19 March 2001.
3 To quote Michael Woodford on the general topic: ‘Not only do expectations about
policy matter, but, at least under current conditions, very little else matters’ (Interest and
Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
2003:15).
4 This was clearly the strategy employed by the Federal Reserve in 2003 when Chairman
Alan Greenspan and Governor Ben Bernanke, particularly the latter, pointed in public
speeches or comments to the implausibility of a central bank with a fiat currency and a
‘printing press’ not being able to counter deflation.
5 See Olivier Blanchard, 2000: ‘Bubbles, liquidity traps, and monetary policy’, in Ryoichi
Mikitani and Adam S. Posen (eds), Japan’s Financial Crisis and its Parallels to US Experience,
Washington, DC:185–93.
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2 AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND THE REGION
THE WEST NEW GUINEA DISPUTE, 1952–1962
David Walton
Indonesian and Dutch claims over West New Guinea in the period 1949
to 1962 presented one of the first opportunities for regional dialogue in
post-war Australia-Japan relations. The aims of this chapter are to chart
changes in the Australian attitude towards Japan’s role in regional affairs
and to examine how dialogue on West New Guinea assisted in laying the
foundations for further regional cooperation and consultation between
the two countries. The chapter examines the beginnings of post-war
consultation between Australia and Japan. It is argued that the diplomatic
intrigues involving the West New Guinea dispute (1952 to 1962) led to
a substantial effort by Australian officials to bring Japan into closer
alignment with Australian foreign policy objectives. As part of this initiative,
regular meetings between Australia and Japan resulted in the relatively
rapid development in the quality and scope of discussions and exchange
of information on regional issues. Accordingly this chapter provides
evidence of the formative processes towards institutionalising regular
bilateral consultation and exchange of sensitive political information on
regional issues. Regular diplomatic consultation on regional issues was
important as it provided a basis for broadening the structure of the bilateral
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relationship and improved both countries’ understanding of contemporary
bilateral relations.
Overview of the West New Guinea dispute
The political landscape of early post-war Asia was dominated by the notions
of nationalism and demands for independence from European colonial
powers. In the case of Indonesia, Indonesian nationalists proclaimed
independence in August 1945 prior to the return of the Dutch colonial
administration. The desire for independence led to a protracted and armed
struggle against the Dutch in the ensuing four years. After intervention
by the United Nations and considerable negotiation, a resolution was
reached through The Hague Round Table discussions, which took place
in October and November 1949. The result was the transfer of power to
Indonesian nationalists led by Sukarno in late December 1949. Dutch
withdrawal and international recognition of the Indonesian Republic took
place early in the following year. Importantly, the fate of West New Guinea
(hereafter WNG)1 was not decided at the 1949 Round Table conferences.
Instead, the WNG question was deferred for 12 months while negotiations
took place and the territory of WNG was excluded from the transfer of
sovereignty.2 This led to over thirteen years of episodic discussions between
the Netherlands and Indonesia, which served only to inflame passions on
both sides.
The WNG dispute went through three essential phases before its
resolution in August 1962: 1949–1954, 1954–1957 and 1958–62. From
1949 to 1957 the WNG dispute was negotiated through bilateral
discussions and appeals to the United Nations General Assembly. Four
attempts were made by the Indonesians through the General Assembly of
the United Nations to resolve the dispute.3 By late 1957, however,
Indonesian strategy had changed. This was mainly due to the failure to
gain sufficient support within the United Nations and a hard-line Dutch
position that rejected Indonesian claims. A more forceful approach was
subsequently adopted by Indonesia, involving a ‘Contest of Power’ with
the Dutch. In 1960 Indonesia formerly severed diplomatic ties with the
Netherlands and several small-scale clashes occurred in WNG. India’s use
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of military force to reclaim Goa from the Portuguese in December 1961
offered a precedent for the Indonesian Government to engage in direct
military conflict. At this stage the Dutch Government, due to domestic
pressure and the paucity of international support, became more willing to
negotiate. On 15 August 1962, Dutch representatives reluctantly agreed
to an international trusteeship for WNG.
The resolution to the dispute came after negotiations in early 1962.
Ellsworth Bunker (a retired United States diplomat) acted as a mediator
during these proceedings at the request of acting UN Secretary General U
Thant. Known as the Bunker Plan, the resolution involved: the transfer of
the administration of WNG to a United Nations Temporary Executive
Authority (UNTEA) established by and under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary General; a United Nations appointed administrator who would
have the discretion to transfer all or part of the administration to Indonesia
at any time after 1 May 1963; and exercising their right of self
determination by the inhabitants of WNG before the end of 1969.4
Early Australia-Japan dialogue on regional issues:
differences on West New Guinea
Australia-Japan dialogue on regional issues in the early post war years was
on an ad hoc and infrequent basis. The process towards more regular
discussions began in 1957 as Australian officials applied considerable
pressure on the Japanese Government to support the Dutch position on
the WNG dispute. The Japanese had supported Indonesian claims until
late 1957 and then pursued a policy of neutrality. It is not clear what
impact, if any, Australian pressure had on the policy shift in Tokyo. The
burgeoning trade relationship may have had some influence on the
outcome. Nonetheless, Japanese negotiations with Indonesia on reparations
and the United States position on neutrality were of far greater significance
to overall Japanese foreign policy. The change in Japanese policy, however,
allowed for smoother relations between Australian and Japanese officials.
From this period the focus of discussions became broader due, in part, to
shared interests as staunch US allies and regular consultation on regional
matters.
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In an assessment of Australian discussion with Japan on WNG and
broader regional issues, three distinct periods are evident: 1952 to 1957,
the year 1957 and 1958 to 1962.
1952–57: blundering through
The first few years after diplomatic relations were restored were awkward.
From an Australian perspective there was a considerable amount of tension
in public perceptions of Japan. Diplomatic activities were taken up with
establishing embassies and receiving the credentials of diplomats in
Canberra and Tokyo. It was not until August 1954 that the Menzies
Cabinet made a serious effort to develop the bilateral relationship. The
change in policy was also reflected in the decision to support Japan’s
involvement in international forums such as the United Nations.
The softening of Australian attitudes toward Japan was a pragmatic
decision. It fitted into the regional objectives of the United States and the
United Kingdom and suited Australian interests as a potentially lucrative
bilateral trade relationship was starting to emerge. Normalising relations
and the co-sponsorship of Japan into several international organisations
also began the process of regional dialogue. Most pressing from an
Australian perspective was the need to thwart attempts by Indonesia to
gain United Nations support on the question of sovereignty of WNG.
Consultation with Japan on WNG, which was part of the overall strategy
to offset Indonesian plans, began in December 1954. Arthur Tange (the
Secretary of the External Affairs Department) invited the Japanese
Ambassador Haruhiko Nishi to discuss a number of issues of which WNG
was the first on the agenda. Tange took a soft line in discussions with
Ambassador Nishi but nonetheless made it clear that the Department
had been concerned over WNG. As a means to influence the Japanese
approach, Tange discussed the Indonesia election. The Secretary expressed
the hope that as a result of the election, the Indonesians would not bring
the WNG issue up again in the United Nations.5 The meeting ended on
a cordial note and although no direct pressure was applied on Japan, Tange’s
intentions were made abundantly clear: Australia expected Japan to support
the Dutch in international forums either now or in the near future. In
many respects the Tange-Nishi discussion marked the beginning of a
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campaign within the External Affairs Department to influence Japan on
this issue through an ongoing process of consultation. Australia had
provided considerable support for Japan at international forums and
External Affairs officials intended to use this as leverage to pressure Japan
to support the Dutch position.
In April 1955 Masayoshi Kakitsubo (Embassy Counsellor) called into
the Department of External Affairs upon his return to Australia from a
Japanese diplomatic representatives meeting in Karachi. In his discussion
with James Plimsoll (a senior official and later Secretary of External Affairs),
Kakitsubo discussed the forthcoming Bandung Conference and the issue
of Japan’s stance on WNG as a foreign policy dilemma. He noted that the
final recommendation at the Japanese diplomatic meeting was that Japan
would remain neutral and try to avoid any specific issue such as WNG
ever coming on the Bandung agenda.6 Kakitsubo’s information was
corroborated by a cablegram sent by Ronald Walker (Australian
Ambassador to Japan, June 1953–December 1955) in early April 1955.
In a discussion with Mr Tani from the Japanese Foreign Office, Walker
reported that based on procedure, which had already been submitted to
the conference on the first day, the Japanese representatives felt it was
unlikely that specific controversial issues such as Formosa or WNG would
be raised.7
However Indonesia raised WNG at the Bandung Conference. According
to Ambassador Saburo Ohta (then Japanese Ambassador to Burma and
later to Australia) the Arab delegation raised the issue of Palestine and this
gave the Indonesians the opportunity to discuss WNG. Ohta spoke
disparagingly about Indonesia as hosts and said several countries including
Japan had been rather embarrassed by the discussion of WNG.8
The decision by Japan to support Indonesian claims at Bandung caused
some consternation in Canberra. There was concern about the reliability
of information being received from the Japanese Government and the level
of influence that Canberra could exert on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Annoyed that Japan chose Iran and Peru rather than Australia to sponsor
her into the United Nations General Assembly, Australia’s Ambassador to
Japan Alan Watt expressed concern that Japan was ‘fobbing off ’ Australia.
In a memo to Arthur Tange in December 1956, Watt stated ‘If however,
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they [Japan] learn in some polite but firm way that their words are not
deceiving us, it would help them to understand that international
friendship depends upon acts rather than words’.9 Watt’s concerns about
Japanese foreign policy and approach to WNG were highlighted in a letter
to External Affairs Minister Casey the following day. Watt commented on
Japan’s entry into the United Nations and how this was a turning point in
Japanese foreign policy. He noted that Japanese policy was most likely to
be cautious, restrained and opportunistic with care being taken not to
antagonise the Afro-Asian bloc. In short, Australia could expect little or
no support on colonial issues.10
Despite these concerns, consultation between Australian and Japanese
officials continued to develop and was further refined in 1957. Frequent
discussions on WNG took place throughout the year. Japan’s support for
Indonesia at the eleventh and twelfth sessions of the General Assembly in
1957 led to pro-active effort by Australia to change thinking in Tokyo.
Voting at the General Assembly was very tight and Australian activities
formed part of an overall strategy to thwart Indonesian efforts to gain a
two-third majority support for a Good Offices Commission to examine
the dispute. Given the signing of the Agreement of Commerce between
Australia and Japan in July, the WNG offensive by External Affairs signalled
the beginnings of the practice of frequent consultations on regional issues
between the two countries.
1957: Australia intensifies pressure on Japan to
support its WNG policy
1957 was a landmark year in bilateral relations. Events during the year
included the signing of the Agreement on Commerce Treaty; the first
exchange of prime ministerial visits by Robert Menzies and Nobusuke
Kishi; ministerial meetings; and dialogue among senior bureaucrats.
Notably, nine major consultations were held on WNG in Canberra and
Tokyo. During the year substantial pressure was placed upon Japan by
Australia to support the Dutch position or to abstain. Australian pressure
was based on the strong support that had been given to Japan to enter
international bodies and on the goodwill that now existed between the
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two countries. Expressions of gratitude came from a wide range of Japanese
diplomats and the new Foreign Minister and soon-to-be Prime Minister
Nobusuke Kishi.
The Australian lobbying on WNG took a number of forms, but central
to all efforts was the request that Japan carefully reconsider its position. In
January 1957 James Plimsoll began the year with renewed pressure on
Japan to revise its WNG policy. In a meeting with Japanese Counsellor
Uyama, Plimsoll restated the Australian position and emphasised that
Australia had a defence interest in the security of WNG. He made it very
clear to Uyama that Australia hoped Japan would not support Indonesian
claims at the forthcoming session at the General Assembly.11
The tempo of Australian pressure began to intensify in February 1957
as Indonesia planned to invite the Assembly President to exercise ‘good
offices’ either personally or through a committee on WNG for the March
session. Watt actively sought to ensure that Japan was aware that this was
the first step to strengthening the legal claim that sovereignty already
belonged to Indonesia. The Australian position, as Watt reminded Japanese
officials, was that a political assembly should not settle legal issues.12 As a
follow-up, Watt also attempted to check Japan’s policy for the upcoming
session of the General Assembly. Domestic affairs (Prime Minister Ishibashi
was about to resign due to ill health) had preoccupied Foreign Minister
Kishi so that no firm or positive Japanese line on the issue had been taken
in Tokyo.13 Four days later (27 February) Kishi became Prime Minister.
Despite support for abstention at the Foreign Office level, Kishi personally
intervened to ensure that Japan voted in support of Indonesia at the United
Nations. Watt expressed his surprise at this decision, as this was contrary
to informal advice he had received and the Department expressed its
disappointment. The official reason given by Mr Ohno (Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs) was that ‘Japan must give special consideration to political
and economic cooperation with neighbouring Asian countries’.14 No doubt
a contributing factor in Kishi’s decision was his personal business interests.
The new Prime Minister had close ties with Kinoshita Trading Company,
which had the largest share of reparation contracts with Indonesia.15
Watt was annoyed by Japan’s vote, which he saw as part of a growing
pattern of empty UN resolutions urging members of the UN engaged in
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disputes to resolve the problem. In this context Watt argued that Australia
must be more forceful with Japan. In particular, Watt wrote
[i]t is unwise to let pass without registering polite disapproval Japanese
actions which we feel are open to criticism.… So far as I am aware however,
the only comment made to Mr Suzuki in Canberra on this issue was a
statement that Australia had been glad to help in any way Japan desired.
I fear that such an attitude will merely encourage Japan to ignore Australian
interest or Japanese obligations to Australia whenever she finds this
convenient.16
Watt’s memo appeared to have triggered a major offensive by External
Affairs in April. Plimsoll, in registering Australian displeasure at Japanese
voting in the UN and countering the response that questions of sovereignty
were best solved in the United Nations, made the point to Ministry of
Foreign Affairs official Nara that
…surely he would not maintain that any country, by simply raising a
claim to somebody else’s territory, could have it considered by the General
Assembly? What would Japan say if the representative of Korea suddenly
laid claim to Tsushima?17
This was followed up by an attempt to develop a strong line within the
department on this issue. Indicative of this was the departmental brief for
Prime Minister Menzies’ historic visit to Japan in April 1957. The brief
stated that it was essential that Prime Minister Kishi be made aware of the
value of the relationship with Australia and that Australian interests and
reactions were of importance to Japan. In part, according to the brief, this
lack of awareness by Kishi explained why Japan voted against Australia on
WNG, which was contrary to the advice given on the likely Japanese
policy.18 The paper argued that there were three reasons why Japan should
support the Australian position on WNG: the first was the unjustified
nature of the Indonesian claim; the second was the danger of submerging
its identity in the Afro-Asian bloc regardless of the merits of the issue; and
third that Japan had a more friendly reception from Australia than from
most countries in South and Southeast Asia.19
Menzies, no doubt due to the importance of overall bilateral relations
and the upcoming trade agreement in particular, did not pursue the
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External Affairs recommendation while in Japan. He did, however, raise
the issue with Kishi on the last day of the visit. In a rather oblique message
Menzies said that ‘Australia had played a big part in getting Japan into
the UN and it was up to Japan to do something for Australia’.20
After some lobbying by Australian officials in the first few months of
1957, WNG did not figure prominently in discussions until after the
Agreement on Commerce was signed in July. From available evidence it is
not clear whether this was a policy decision or was affected by the ebb and
flow of the WNG debate in international forums. However the debate
and Australian pressure re-emerged in July after the trade issues had been
sorted out. Clearly this suggested that there was a co-ordinated policy
orchestrated from Canberra to ensure a start to the new trade relationship
that was as smooth as possible. Within the political sphere, however, the
WNG issue remained a key area of disagreement. In July Arthur Tange
invited Tadakatsu Suzuki (the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador) to
the Department for discussion. Tange first raised the issue of strong
Australian support for Japan’s candidature at the Security Council of the
United Nations. The next topic was WNG. Without directly linking the
two issues, Tange made it clear that he hoped that the Japanese delegation
to the next session of the General Assembly would take into account the
Australian position when formulating its approach on WNG.21
In late July Watt reported on a discussion with Foreign Minister
Fujiyama and Miyazaki (Director, International Cooperation Bureau) on
WNG. Fujiyama made clear to Watt that Japan had its hands tied by the
Bandung communiqué. Watt commented that it was
…unlikely Japanese will in the foreseeable future modify their attitude...
[the] Japanese Government is preoccupied with economic questions and
a major effort will be made to secure agreement with Indonesia on
reparations before Kishi’s visit in November.22
This did not deter further attempts at lobbying. In August Australian
Foreign Minister Richard Casey began increasing pressure on the WNG
issue. Casey put forward to Ambassador Suzuki that the WNG issue was
causing difficulties in the relationship. To emphasise this point, Casey
told Suzuki that Japanese support for Indonesia was seen as opposition to
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Australia and that this could affect the bilateral relationship. In an
uncompromising statement Casey warned that a vote for Indonesia
…could have a bad effect on Australian public opinion and the campaign
amongst Australian manufacturers against the trade agreement might
well be intensified if Japan should cast a vote unfavourable to Australia.23
Interestingly, the lure of trade and investment in a Dutch-controlled
WNG was also considered by some Australian officials as a means of
influencing the Japanese Government. The notion was rejected within
the Department however, on the basis that it would not guarantee a change
in Japan’s position.24
In the following month (September), a departmental paper reviewing
the bilateral relationship was the first indicator of a more sanguine approach.
The report stated that by adopting its 1954 position Australia had
developed a cooperative approach to Japan and as such had assisted in
keeping Japan in the ‘Free World’ and had encouraged the forces of
moderation within Japan. In doing so Australia accepted some
disadvantages for a greater good. Japan’s policy of voting in support of the
Indonesian position on WNG was seen in the report as a source of
embarrassment for Australia. In its conclusion the report stated that Japan
would continue to make demands on Australia as the country would ‘suffer
the attraction of Asian policies promoted through the Afro-Asian bloc’.25
In November, as part of the continuing campaign, Casey again presented
Suzuki with the issue of voting on WNG in the UN. Casey pointed out
that the resolution went further than last year and that Japan might find
it easier to abstain. He also pointed out that a number of Asian and other
countries had already indicated their intention to abstain on the Indonesian
proposals. Moreover, Casey added that Kishi’s visit to Australia scheduled
for December would be spoiled by this issue.26 However, by this stage it
was clear to Watt (based on numerous discussions with Japanese officials
and in swapping notes with Dutch officials in Tokyo) that pressure on
Japan was not effective. According to Watt, the Japanese position was not
based on the soundness of the Indonesian claim but rather on their recent
membership of the Afro-Asian bloc and by reparation negotiations with
Indonesia. Indeed, Watt wrote to the Secretary to inform him that too
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much pressure and insistence could weaken rather than strengthen the
Australian WNG cause.27
Despite sustained Australian efforts Japan did vote for the Afro-Asian
resolution in the UN. The change in Japan’s position on the territorial
claims to one of neutrality in November 1957, though, did have an impact
on the process of consultation. In November, reparation agreements with
Indonesia were completed and this offered the Japanese Government a
greater degree of flexibility on regional matters. Indonesia, for strategic
and economic reasons, was a critical factor in Japanese post-war planning.
As well, the importance of resolving the reparation negotiation with
Indonesia should not be underestimated. Negotiations had been bogged
down for several years and in the end the Japanese Government made
major concessions. As a result of the agreement Kishi was able to stabilise
the Indonesian economy, enhance his own prestige and also Japan’s image
in Asia.28
The extent to which Australian pressure affected Japanese policy towards
WNG is difficult to gauge. Lobbying by Australians was influential, but
the issue should also be seen in the context of American neutrality and the
completion of reparations agreements with Indonesia. The sustained actions
by Australian officials nonetheless allowed for regular contact through
frequent and increasingly familiar discussions that offered opportunity for
closer relations. Dr Ronald Walker (Australian representative at the United
Nations and former Ambassador to Japan), for example, reported that the
Japanese delegation to the United Nations attempted to take a moderate
role and was possibly toning down the expression of anti-colonialist and
related prejudices on WNG.29 Another example was the decision by
Ambassador Suzuki to inform Tange of the Japanese decision to support
Indonesia prior to the commencement of the 12th Session of the General
Assembly. Suzuki told Tange that the Japanese delegation had made a
commitment and would find it difficult to abstain this time.30 The
information gave the Australian Government advance warning of Japan’s
voting on the proposed resolution in the General Assembly and an indicator
of possible change in Japan’s position. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s
visit to Australia in December 1957 marked the end of an aggressive
Australian campaign. During the visit a noticeable lowering of intensity
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on WNG was evident in Australian policy and in discussions with senior
Japanese representatives.31
Throughout 1957 Australian officials monitored the UN General
Assembly votes on WNG. In this context Japan was viewed by the
Australians as a nation that was supporting Indonesia, but susceptible to
pressure to change its stance (to abstention or even a pro-Dutch position).
The decision in Tokyo to abstain from voting removed an important barrier
to the improvement of bilateral relations with Australia. During the year
both External Affairs and Foreign Affairs officials used bilateral consultations
to maintain dialogue on WNG. The information passed on by both sides
served to highlight the importance of the relationship and the growing
awareness of the usefulness of maintaining regular ad hoc discussions on
regional issues. In many respects these developments represent an important
turning point. Trade discussions were supplemented by political dialogue
on regional matters and as such the bilateral relationship was becoming,
albeit slowly, multidimensional. Clearly this marked the beginning of a
new framework for consultations and established an environment in which
External Affairs officials and Japanese counterparts would consult and share
information on a wider range of political matters over the next few years.
Towards closer consultation 1958–1962
Indonesian policy of direct action on the WNG dispute from late 1957 to
1962 and the PRRI–Permesta rebellion (1958) was the next set of issues
discussed. Officials from Australia and Japan, who were concerned by the
security implication of these developments, conveyed interest in discussing
Indonesia and regional issues on a more regular basis. Foreign Minister
Casey met with Ambassador Suzuki on several occasions in early 1958 to
discuss the Sumatran rebellion and domestic developments in Indonesia.
Moreover the habit of consultations became more entrenched during this
period. For example, while in Jakarta on a short visit in March 1958,
Suzuki also liaised with Laurence McIntyre (Australian Ambassador to
Indonesia 1956–59) about the domestic development in Indonesia.32
Evidence of closer relations was the sending of parliamentary delegations
by Australia and Japan in 1958. The general upgrading of political relations
43AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND THE REGION
and the importance of bilateral relations in general can also be seen in
increased contact at the highest levels. Ambassador Watt, in a Ministerial
dispatch to Casey, noted that Kishi made the point of attending the farewell
dinner for the Australian delegation despite the budget session in the
Diet, problems within his own faction and President Sukarno’s recent
arrival.33
Within External Affairs a marked increase in the importance of Japan as
a regional actor was also noticeable. One example was the debate generated
by the exclusion of the Tokyo Mission from the 1958 Heads of Mission
meeting. Gordon Jockel (Head of Pacific and Americas Branch) wrote to
Plimsoll (now Assistant Secretary) and documented reasons why the Tokyo
Mission should attend. His argument included the following
Japan represents a non-communist influence in competition with
communist China in Southeast Asia in many fields
Japan has made Southeast Asia an area of major Japanese interest for vital
political and economic reasons, and
Japanese reparations are an important element in the economy of certain
Southeast Asian countries. 34
The importance of Japan within the Department was emphasised by
the decision to broaden relations through enhanced political dialogue. By
1959 Japan was increasingly important to Australia as a trading partner
and as an emerging regional power. Walter Crocker’s comments on Japan
and its growing importance were indicative of Australian thinking. He
wrote: ‘a regional conference which omits an expert assessment of a Japan
perspective is seriously incomplete’.35 There was, however, residual
annoyance at Japan’s tendency to support the Afro-Asian stance on WNG.
It was clear that senior officials saw US neutrality as a decisive factor in
Japan’s relative freedom in policy. Alan Watt reported on domestic
developments in Japan and made the following suggestion for discussion
at the next ANZUS Council meeting (September 1958).
Since the last elections Japan has seemed to stress her position as an Asian
nation disproportionately to her association with the free world countries
and even her support for the United Nations. The strongest evidence of
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this is her attitude towards the Middle East crisis. The United States is
more likely to be sensitive when Japan acts as an Asian nation in the
Middle East, than when she acts as an Asian nation in regard to the
WNG question. Australia is entitled to relate the two problems and to
claim that the United States indifference towards WNG question has an
unintended effect of encouraging Japan to apply the Asian approach to
other questions, including the Middle East.36
Although the issue received limited attention at the ANZUS Council,
the use of United States influence was still central to plans to change
Japanese views. In February 1959 there was a flurry of press reports in
Japan that the Prime Minister had expressed Japan’s readiness to take up
the question of WNG in the United Nations at some stage. These
developments led Watt to discuss the matter with United States
Ambassador MacArthur on the basis that MacArthur could, due to his
regular contact with Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama, influence their
way of thinking.37
 Richard Casey’s visit to Japan in March 1959 and discussion with
Foreign Affairs Minister Fujiyama, was an important development in the
exchange of political information. Notably, WNG and Indonesia’s stance
were key issues on the agenda. Both Foreign Ministers expressed concern
about United States policy on Indonesia. Casey was of the opinion that
United States policy was now more sensible after private pressure from
Australia. On WNG Casey discussed Dr Subandrio’s recent visit to Canberra
that had relieved some tension in bilateral relations with Indonesia but
had not resolved the problem of WNG. He noted that Japan, as a member
of the Afro-Asian group, did not automatically support the Afro-Asian
position and hoped that Japan would exercise a calming influence and
continue to look at problems in the United Nations on their merits.38
The exchange of information on WNG and on regional issues more
generally was becoming a feature of bilateral relations. The original objective
was part of a strategy between the United States and the allies to bring
Japan closer to ‘Free World’ countries. However there was already a sharp
distinction between Australian and British views of Japan. Australian
officials noted with interest a British Foreign Office report on Kishi’s visit
to London in July 1959. Branch Head Herbert Marshall commented for
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example, ‘[o]ne can’t escape a sense of distance in the UK approach to
Japan. I would think there is evidence that the UK does not see Japan-free
world relations with the sharpness that we and the US do’.39
The tempo of exchange of information increased after Casey’s visit. The
Australians were able to monitor President Sukarno’s activities while in
Tokyo through contacts in the Japanese Foreign Office. Watt was able to
ascertain the extent, if any, of Indonesian pressure on Japan. Watt reported
on the Sukarno visit to Tokyo (6–19 June) which included an entourage
of 29, that there was no reference to WNG at all or the wider dispute with
the Netherlands. Japanese contacts stated that from 11 June the purpose
of Sukarno’s visit was for unofficial relaxation and, interestingly, expressed
concern about Sukarno embarrassing himself and hosts.40
The Karel Doorman affair 1960
The Karel Doorman affair was the first real test of Japanese neutrality on
WNG. The Karel Doorman was a Dutch aircraft carrier on a ‘friendly visit’
in the Pacific with planned visits to Australia, New Zealand and Japan
before returning to the Netherlands. The proposed visit to WNG waters
in August 1960 led to Indonesia severing diplomatic ties with the Dutch
Government.41 The reaction in Jakarta was a reflection of the highly charged
atmosphere by now openly evident between the Indonesia and the Dutch
Governments over WNG. For Indonesians this was a particularly emotional
period as sustained efforts in the United Nations General Assembly had
not been successful. Another source of Indonesian concern was the Dutch
Government decision to pursue a policy of granting independence to the
people of WNG within ten years. Combined, the two issues ignited
Indonesian passions.
The planned visit by the Karel Doorman to Yokohama Port between 8
and 12 September severely tested Japanese relations with Indonesia.
Eventually, fierce pressure from Jakarta forced the Japanese Government
into the embarrassing position of cancelling the visit. The diplomatic back-
down by the Ikeda Cabinet came at a particularly sensitive time given the
forced cancellation of President Eisenhower’s visit to Japan in June.42
Moreover, the visit of the Karel Doorman to Japan was originally intended
as part of commemoration of the 350th anniversary of Dutch-Japanese relations.
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From an Australian perspective the Karel Doorman affair demonstrated
an improved understanding of domestic constraints on Japanese foreign
policy. Although there was a mixture of empathy and annoyance with the
manner in which Japanese officials dealt with the problem, the final decision
to cancel did not come as a surprise. External Affairs Departmental coverage
of the Karel Doorman affair was extensive and was assisted by an
improvement in understanding of domestic politics in Japan. In this sense,
reporting from relevant posts such as The Hague, Washington and Jakarta
clearly supplemented Tokyo reports on Japanese difficulties with
appropriate policy. Indeed McIntyre’s coverage of Japanese domestic
constraints and departmental concerns over domestic issues such as the
Security Treaty issue, led to considerable attention being placed on the
Karel Doorman affair.
There were, from an External Affairs perspective, a number of positive
outcomes from the incident. In particular, the lines of diplomatic contact
and communication with Japan, enhanced since 1957, were used during
this period. The familiarity between Australian and Japanese counterparts
allowed for fairly extensive and frank discussions to take place and
importantly this ensured that External Affairs was aware of the difficulties
being faced in Japan and prepared for the reversal in policy. Nonetheless
there was disappointment and annoyance within the department that
Japan’s decision was a blow to the success of the Karel Doorman as a Dutch
public relations exercise.
Towards resolution 1961–62
The Karel Doorman affair raised concerns in Canberra about the seeming
irrationality of Indonesian policy. The Indonesians appeared willing to
risk important trade and investment with Japan over this issue and there
was concern that such perceived ‘erratic behaviour’ might lead to a major
conflict. Such fears began to escalate after 1961, as Indonesia pursued a
policy of small-scale conflict with the Netherlands. India’s use of military
force to reclaim Goa from the Portuguese in December 1961, moreover,
was an important landmark. The Indian decision to resort to military
conflict after negotiations had failed created an international precedent.
The Goa precedent also ensured that any solution on WNG would favour
Indonesian claims. The Bunker Plan, which was agreed upon in August
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1962, with ongoing small-scale Indonesian infiltration of WNG and
preparations for a large-scale invasion of Biak, essentially recognised
Indonesian claims to WNG.
During this period the level of contact between Australian and Japanese
officials specifically on WNG diminished. WNG was raised in bilateral
discussions but not with the intensity of earlier meetings. To a certain
extent this was understandable as Japan consistently maintained a policy
of neutrality on this issue in international forums. The Karel Doorman
affair, moreover, had been an embarrassment to the Japanese Government
and there was a sense of caution in policy making and a tendency to keep
a low profile on regional issues.
From an Australian viewpoint, Japan was not central to resolving the
WNG dispute, but became increasingly useful as a source of information
on developments in Indonesia. Through the close connections Japanese
officials and businessmen had established in Jakarta, Australians received
a variety of information on Sukarno and domestic issues in Indonesia.
By 1962, with the end of Dutch control of WNG in sight, the issue of
establishing trust with Japanese officials and tapping into their information
on regional issues became an important objective for Canberra. By February
1962 there was considerable debate within the Department of External
Affairs about developing a regular exchange of information with Japan. By
the middle of the year broad agreement appears to have emerged about
implementing this process within the Department, subject to security
checks. Indicative of this view was the information provided for the
preparation of Garfield Barwick’s visit to Japan in June 1962. Barwick
received two briefs from the department. The first, in late May, was a
special brief written by W. D. Forsyth (Assistant Secretary Division 2) on
developing closer political ties with Japan. Forsyth advocated the need to
build an atmosphere of trust that included passing selected political
information gathered by Australians in order to receive information from
the Japanese on areas of special interest to Australia.43 In the departmental
brief written in June, Barwick was provided with the key issues affecting
bilateral relations such as Article 35 of GATT. He was also advised to
gather Japanese views on Chinese representation in the UN, developments
in Korea and the situation in Laos and Vietnam.44
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Barwick met with Japanese Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka a few days
later. The Tokyo leg of the Foreign Minister’s visit (9–15 June, 1962)
appears to have had a profound impact on Barwick. He cabled Canberra
on his last day in Japan to urge the amendment of article 35 of GATT and
to raise the idea of a regular Japan-Australia ministerial conference.45
Neither issue was new but the Barwick’s cable suggested that he was
impressed with the level of interaction with Japanese officials and the
overall importance of Japan to Australian national interests.
Events in Indonesia turned Australian and Japanese attention back to
WNG. In July and August of 1962 as negotiations were being finalised,
Indonesian troops were involved in infiltration of WNG and there still
existed considerable tension due to the possibility of outright conflict. In
late July this concern was sufficient for Japanese Ambassador Ohta to call
in to the Department and suggest closer consultation and cooperation on
Indonesia. Ohta was reported as saying
…in the long term there was likely to be need for particularly close
consultation and cooperation between Australia and Japan, for both of
whom relations with Indonesia were of a very great importance, in their
policies towards that country.46
The development of closer consultation on Indonesia took several forms
and continued throughout 1962. In mid August, as an agreement on
WNG was finally reached between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the
Japanese were relieved and publicly expressed satisfaction with the result.
Yet there were serious concerns within the Foreign Ministry. In discussions
with Deputy Vice Minister Shigenobu Shima in late August, McIntyre
reported on Japanese unease with the nature of the agreement and the
way the settlement was reached.47 It was a clear indication of Japanese
unease with Indonesian policy. Undoubtedly this was welcomed in
Canberra where such Japanese sentiment had been noticeable in discussions
since the Karel Doorman incident two years previously. In order to encourage
closer alignment in regional policies, officers were instructed that they
could draw on, with discretion, material such as fortnightly summaries
from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in discussing Indonesia with the
Japanese Ministry.48
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Conclusion
The WNG dispute signified the beginning of regular close consultation
between Australia and Japan on regional matters and the process of
exchange of political information. Discussion moved from the narrow issue
of voting in the UN to a broader set of concerns about regional security
and a pooling of political information.
The dispute, moreover, was a catalyst for the development of Australia-
Japan political relations. From an Australian perspective, the Japanese
sympathetic position towards Indonesia would have been perplexing and
frustrating. At this stage there was only limited first-hand knowledge of
Japanese foreign policy objectives. Moreover there was limited appreciation
in Canberra of the bonds forged between Japanese and Indonesians during
the Japanese occupation of Java. Indeed the pro-active style adopted by
External Affairs officers on the dispute would also suggest a degree of
annoyance at Japan’s unwillingness to comply with Australian pressure to
support the Dutch position.
Despite this low-level tension, there were compelling reasons for political
consultation; both countries were firmly anchored in the US strategic
alliance, were beginning to enjoy a highly profitable trade relationship,
and shared the view that Indonesia was of critical importance to regional
stability. In essence these shared interests were the basis for regular
consultations on other regional matters. Notably the frequency of dialogue
and the gradual increase in the range of issues discussed continued despite
the change in personnel on both sides. Clearly senior officials in Canberra
and Tokyo supported the new engagement and were looking at new
initiatives to further develop bilateral relations.
A notable feature of regular consultation on WNG was a sense of
familiarity not readily evident in earlier meetings. A useful working
relationship developed between key senior officials. Casey and his
Departmental Head Arthur Tange encouraged this process and offered
strong leadership. Watt and McIntyre in Tokyo and their Japanese
counterparts in Canberra (Ambassadors Suzuki, Narita and Ohta) actively
strove to pursue these goals and were entrepreneurial in their efforts. Within
External Affairs, moreover, senior officers such as Plimsoll, Shaw, Forsyth
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and McNichol had prior personal and professional experience of Japan:
Shaw and McNicol had both been posted to the Tokyo Embassy in the
1940s; Plimsoll was at one time Australia’s representative on the Far East
Commission. As such, officers in the Department were searching for ways
to expand regional dialogue. An example was Departmental support for
the reciprocal exchange of political information in 1962. The regular
exchange of information offered increasingly valuable information on
developments in Indonesia.
Clearly the WNG dispute and political issues in Indonesia had a longer-
term effect on bilateral relations. Regular dialogue on Indonesia offered
the opportunity and the disposition for policymakers to exchange views
and work towards a more collaborative environment on regional matters.
This was a mutually beneficial process and led to a heightened
understanding of foreign policy objectives in both countries. However
Australia was not ultimately successful in influencing Japanese policy on
WNG as this regular dialogue had only minimal impact on Japanese policy.
What is significant was the increased appreciation and awareness within
Canberra of Japanese policies and Japan’s potential as an emerging regional
economic power.
An examination of Australia-Japan dialogue on WNG also adds to an
understanding of how Australia dealt with the WNG issue. Understandably
research on WNG has concentrated on the major players: Indonesia, the
Dutch, the United States and Australia. From an Australian perspective
the impact of the dispute on regional diplomacy and overall Australian
foreign policy has also been examined. However, the case study adds a
new dimension to the existing literature. The dialogue between Australia
and Japan highlights the proactive style of diplomacy pursued by
Australians, particularly from 1950 to 1959, and offers insight into
Australian efforts to monitor closely voting patterns in the United Nations
General Assembly. Japan was not a key player in the dispute; nonetheless
the Australian initiatives to influence Japanese policy reveals how
determined the Australian Government was during the period. Although
the chapter focuses on the development of dialogue on political issues
between Australia and Japan, the case study underlines the importance of
Indonesia in Australian policy and how this served to foster closer bilateral
relations between Australia and Japan.
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3 THE JAPAN-AUSTRALIA PARTNERSHIP
IN THE ERA OF THE EAST ASIAN
COMMUNITY
CAN THEY ADVANCE TOGETHER?
Takashi Terada
Australia’s engagement with East Asia and the Pacific was widely perceived
to be its overriding foreign policy priority during the 1980s and 90s,
especially when Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating were in power.
Australia was actively engaged in regional economic diplomacy. The
partnership with Japan functioned successfully as part of Australia’s strategy
through their joint initiatives in establishing regional economic institutions
such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980 and
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989, each serving
as catalysts in promoting Australia’s regional engagement at that time.
These regional institutions were designed to promote economic
cooperation with member states and, more symbolically, to nurture
togetherness with them by tackling common problems and pursuing
shared goals such as trade liberalisation in the region. Sharing a view with
Australia that the stability and prosperity in East Asia and the Pacific was
a vital national interest, Japan—Australia’s largest trading partner—
consistently supported Australia’s engagement policy. The significance of
Japan’s supportive role in Australia’s engagement was fully acknowledged
by Australia, as declared in Australia’s first Foreign and Trade Policy White
Paper that ‘the partnership with Japan will have a decisive bearing on
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Australia’s overall standing in East Asia and [Australia’s] degree of
participation in regional affairs’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997:60).
However, the foreign policy priorities and approaches of the Howard
government were perceived to be distinctive from those of the Hawke and
Keating governments. Conspicuous differences stemmed from Howard’s
deliberate design and implementation of his foreign policy which placed
a higher priority on security issues, attached more significance to relations
with the United States and the United Kingdom, and promoted bilateral
trading arrangements in lieu of regional institutions. Enormous changes
emerged in East Asia after Howard came into power in 1996. The Asian
financial crisis, the aftermath of continued economic and political
uncertainty, especially in Southeast Asia, the historic transition to
democracy and decentralised rule in Indonesia, and East Timor’s
independence movement were all intermingled in the articulation of his
foreign policy. For domestic political reasons, Howard also displayed
indifference to the feelings of Southeast Asians, as seen in his ‘pre-emptive
strike’ statement made in December 2002, which indicated that he was
prepared to order pre-emptive strikes in Southeast Asia to prevent terrorists’
attacks against Australia. These characteristics helped create a general
impression in East Asia that Australia had turned away from engagement
with the region, despite the Howard government’s frequent statements
about Australia’s continuing interest in strengthening relations with East
Asia. This foreign policy approach under Howard can be characterised as
‘inconsistent engagement’, representing a divergence between foreign policy
statements and actual implementation.
One of the most striking features of this ‘inconsistent engagement with
East Asia’ was that there was no regional institution that Australia could
utilise to promote its foreign policy. Australia’s exclusion from ASEAN+3—
which in recent years became more institutionalised—and the declining
significance of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC)
highlighted the absence of a useful foundation for Australia’s further
engagement with East Asia, and at once symbolised Australia’s growing
isolation in the region. This also meant that Japan and Australia lacked a
common foreign policy grounding in regionalism, an essential component
that had characterised the Australia-Japan partnership over several decades.
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With Japan as a major player in East Asian regionalism, Australia’s increasing
indifference towards East Asian affairs and its declining presence could be
seen as detrimental to the Japan-Australia partnership.
Since winning a fourth term in October 2004, however, Howard has
directed his foreign policy focus towards forging closer relations with East
Asia by vigorously pursuing bilateral and regional diplomacy. This is
evidenced by Australia’s improved relations with Indonesia and Malaysia,
two Southeast Asian countries that had a history of overt criticism of
Howard’s regional policy approaches. Even his former political rivals such
as John Hewson (Australian Financial Review, 3 December 2004) and
Paul Keating (Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 2005) acknowledge the
achievements Howard made through his later diplomacy in East Asia,
including the announcements on the launch of free trade agreement (FTA)
negotiations with ASEAN and China.
This chapter aims to examine the implications of the rise of East Asian
regionalism for the Australia-Japan partnership. In particular, it investigates
whether both nations can sustain their partnership, which evolved around
regionalism over a number of decades, exploring the upsurge of Japan’s
interest in East Asian regionalism and examining Australia’s foreign policy
under the Howard Government. A clear regionalist approach was missing
during the Howard government’s first three terms (1996–2004), but his
government demonstrated a keener interest in furthering relations with
East Asian countries and promoting East Asian regionalism since late 2004.
The change in Australia’s stance on East Asia was well accepted by the
region, allowing Australia to participate in the first East Asian Summit,
held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005.
Rise of East Asian regionalism
Regionalism is a concrete manifestation of regional consciousness perceived
by members because it needs a boundary to differentiate insiders (members)
from outsiders (non-members). A regional concept that establishes a
particular geographical boundary is necessary for any instance of
regionalism. The concept of East Asia as a region is relatively new. Until
the appearance of the abortive East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) idea,
which was put forward by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia in the
57THE JAPAN-AUSTRALIA PARTNERSHIP
early 1990s, there was no strong conceptual framework for regionalism in
East Asia as a whole. What was significant in Mahathir’s EAEC proposal
was that he introduced the concept of East Asia, integrating Northeast
Asia and Southeast Asia into one regional unity. Most of these countries
had previously been involved in ‘Asia Pacific’, ‘Southeast Asian’, or ‘Pacific’
regional institutions for economic cooperation, including APEC, the Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), or ASEAN. It was difficult for
regional countries to accept the ‘East Asia’ concept initially because other
regional institutions, especially APEC, were prominent as useful regional
institutions during the 1990s. Many countries in East Asia thus found it
unnecessary to rush into the creation of East Asian regionalism. This was
the case in Japan, whose attitude to the EAEC was lukewarm, despite
Mahathir’s strong expectations of its leadership role (Terada 2003).
A major reason for Japan’s unsupportive stance was that Japan did not
view ‘East Asia’ as a concept for regional cooperation. Japan instead adhered
to the concept of ‘Asia Pacific’, which includes the Pacific nations such as
the United States and Australia, as a basis for promoting regional economic
cooperation. In fact, it was Japan and Australia that exercised coordinated
leadership in the establishment of APEC in 1989 (Terada 1999). Japan’s
refusal at that time to become involved in the formation of East Asian
regionalism meant that there was insufficient critical driving force towards
creating East Asian regionalism. Yet later it was to be Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2002a) who started urging regional countries
to ‘act together and advance together’, envisaging the creation of an East
Asian community in a major speech in Singapore in January 2002.
Koizumi’s insistence on the creation of a community in East Asia triggered
other East Asian leaders to follow Japan’s initiative. This is partly because
Japan, previously non-committal towards the EAEC, now became one of
the most enthusiastic supporters of East Asian regionalism and even
displayed its readiness to lead the creation of an East Asian community.
A regional institution around which the community in East Asia is
expected to revolve is the ASEAN+3 framework established in 1997 in
Kuala Lumpur, as Koizumi suggested in his Singapore speech, to make
‘the best use of (ASEAN+3) to secure prosperity and stability’ in East
Asia. As in Europe, institutionalisation of ASEAN+3 is expected to be
crucial to successful community building and coordinated management
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of a variety of emerging regional problems in East Asia. Japan’s strong
involvement in the ASEAN+3 process and its advocacy of an East Asian
community have been milestones for East Asian regionalism, given Japan’s
initial hesitation to become involved in the EAEC. Regional cooperation
on the ASEAN+3 basis is now extending to such areas as an emergency
communications network among the energy ministers, the creation of an
East Asian rice reserve system, a framework action plan to prevent and
control SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), and a new oil reserve
system to prepare for possible petroleum shortages arising from instability
in the Middle East. Japan has found the development of these cooperative
schemes in East Asia useful as vehicles encouraging the establishment of
an East Asian community. The crux of the argument lies in the fact that
Australia was excluded from these emerging regional cooperation schemes
in East Asia, underlining the lack of an effective regional mechanism where
Japan and Australia would exercise policy coordination for regional
cooperation as they did in the case of PECC and APEC.
The Australia-Japan partnership and APEC
The history of the development of Asia Pacific economic cooperation is
important in the evolution of Australia-Japan relations. Regional economic
cooperation was a significant national interest for both countries, and both
were encouraged to cooperate in building new institutions in the region.
Major regional economic institutions such as the Pacific Trade and
Development Forum (PAFTAD), the Pacific Basin Economic Council
(PBEC), PECC, and APEC were the products of initiatives taken jointly
by Japanese and Australians. Although the interests of both countries in
promoting regional economic cooperation were distinctive, certain elements
drew the two countries together in these institution-building endeavours.
The most conspicuous element was diplomatic complementarity between
the two countries. Japan’s attempt to conquer the Asia Pacific region in
World War II and its subsequent rapidly growing economic presence were
obstacles to its involvement in regional economic diplomacy. Australia’s
traditional ties with Britain and its ‘White Australia’ policy initially made
it difficult for Australia to be accepted by other regional countries. These
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historical and cultural disadvantages led Australia to strive all the more in
its regional diplomacy, while Japan’s economic presence and its cultural
and historical closeness to other Asian countries were useful to Australia’s
regional diplomacy. On the other hand, Australia’s non-threatening middle-
power status, underpinned by its lesser economic presence, and its active
and dexterous diplomacy, compensated for Japan’s more muted regional
diplomatic role. This partnership—wherein each compensated for the
other’s shortcomings—functioned well in the establishment of PECC and
APEC (Terada 2000).
When APEC emerged as a major regional institution in 1989, it
represented the achievement of maturity and success in the Australia-
Japan relationship because Japan and Australia had played key roles in its
establishment. APEC has adequately proven the viability of a ‘merger’
between two distinct nations, which complemented each other to overcome
their national shortcomings. Together they represented a formidable
regional force, particularly as both countries continued to cooperate in
the development of the APEC process. The APEC Leaders’ meeting, the
highest level meeting within the APEC framework, stemmed from ideas
floated by Australian Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating, which Japan
strongly supported.1 Describing an episode where the United States urged
Australia to join a movement for encircling Japan with ‘a network of free-
trade arrangements’ in 1992, Keating (2000:33–4) clearly stressed that
this option was not in Australia’s interest and wrote ‘we did not benefit
from approaches that discriminated against Japan’, due in part to Australia’s
trade surpluses with Japan. Even though this rejection invited bitter
reactions from the United States, it was based on Keating’s desire to convey
a message to Australia and the region that ‘there was a shift in our approach
to Asia’, a symbol of which was Australia’s keener engagement in regionalism
such as APEC. At the 1995 APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Osaka, Japan and
Australia were in conflict over the inclusion of areas like agricultural
products for achieving the Bogor Declaration, but they reached a
compromise in the course of bilateral meetings convened to resolve the
problem; the meeting between Prime Minister Keating and Minister for
International Trade and Industry Hashimoto was especially critical in
achieving this (Terada 2000).
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However, APEC is perceived to have lost its functional momentum
after the Asian financial crisis and its failure to advance the Early Voluntary
Sectoral Liberalisation (EVSL) program. A view has emerged that APEC
has failed to deliver on its core trade liberalisation goal (Ravenhill 2001),
although the targets for trade liberalisation are still down the track and
there is some time before they have to be met. Japan managed to entice
some ASEAN countries to support its stand on ruling out the inclusion of
agriculture in EVSL by offering substantial aid in the wake of the Asian
financial crisis at the 1998 APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Australia’s
Trade Minister Tim Fischer was ‘underwhelmed at the Japanese failure’
(The Australian, 16 November 1998). These developments reflected the
increasingly distinctive Australian and Japanese approaches to trade
liberalisation, especially over the treatment of agricultural products. They
also foreshadowed that the Australia-Japan partnership might eventually
be frustrated over regional economic cooperation, especially over trade
liberalisation projects.
Howard’s indifference to East Asia in his foreign policy and his sporadic
regional commitments had the effect of undermining the viability of APEC
and its ability to exercise regional economic leadership. All Australian
prime ministers from the early 1970s—Whitlam (1981), Fraser (1984),
Hawke (1994) and Keating (2000)—displayed a special interest in regional
economic institutions and took decisive steps to give effect to this interest.
Australia’s leadership in regional institution building was, historically, a
positive signal of Australia’s engagement with East Asia and the Pacific,
both to the region and at home. Former foreign minister Percy Spender
(1969:195) commented that ‘our future to an ever-increasing degree
depends upon the political stability of our Asian neighbours, upon the
economic well-being of Asian peoples and upon understanding and friendly
relations between Australia and Asia’. This statement epitomises what has
come to reflect Australia’s comprehensive and consistent interests in
engagement policy. Yet, as Dalrymple states, while Labor governments
tried to ‘minimise the perception of differences between Australia and
East Asia through the postulation of convergence, the Howard government
was comfortable in portraying Australia as, in effect, permanently and
irreparably separate from East Asia’ (2003:156). Simon Crean, then
Opposition Leader, targeted the inconsistency of Howard’s foreign policy
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on regional engagement: ‘the Howard Government’s decision to shift foreign
policy away from the processes on regional engagement and to focus
exclusively on bilateralism has undermined 50 years of bipartisanship in
this country’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May 2002).
It was Hawke’s and Keating’s vision that APEC would become a major
economic driving force in the region, accelerating the movement towards
regional trade liberalisation and ensuring the continual prosperity and
security of the region. But with Keating’s demise in 1996, the importance
of APEC as the symbolic organisation of Australia’s regional engagement
and the main vehicle to promote regional trade liberalisation was relegated
to the periphery in Australia’s political sphere. The Howard government’s
distancing of itself from East Asia was also strongly criticised by Australian
academics and former senior diplomats. For instance, Ross Garnaut, Peter
Drysdale and Stuart Harris, long-standing experts on politics and
economics in East Asia at the Australian National University, wrote an
article to The Australian (7 November 2001) in their joint names,
demonstrating that Australia’s relations with the region became ‘more fragile
and less productive than at any time for several decades’. Richard Woolcott,
former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, also
criticised Howard’s inability to carefully and skilfully handle Australia’s
relations with its neighbours, especially Indonesia: ‘it is painful to
encounter the extent to which Howard is widely seen in our region as a
narrowly focused domestic politician, uninterested in and uncomfortable
with Australia’s Asian and Pacific neighbours’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 6
November 2001).
From the perspective from Japan, APEC’s ineffective trade liberalisation
program in part prompted Japan to become more enthusiastic in pursuing
and formulating other regional and bilateral arrangements. The fact that
both Japanese foreign and trade ministers did not attend the 2002 APEC
Mexico meeting strengthens the perception that Japan placed more priority
on ASEAN+3 than on APEC. In short, while ASEAN+3 has become more
institutionalised and ideas for the establishment of an East Asian
community including a regional integration scheme have been more
vigorously pursued by many countries in the region, APEC—which Japan
and Australia once commonly regarded as the principal regional
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organisation—came to be widely seen to be ‘crisis-stricken, becalmed or
adrift’ (Webber 2001:339).
Trade liberalisation schemes without ‘the Pacific’
nations
One of the important implications of APEC’s ineffective trade liberalisation
program is that member states have instead promoted bilateral
arrangements to attain further trade liberalisation, a trend that involves
Japan and Australia as well. More significantly, these moves towards trade
liberalisation can also be associated with ASEAN+3 forming a kind of an
East Asian free trade agreement that excludes the Pacific nations such as
the United States and Australia. In effect, while Australia was disengaged
from East Asia, Japan, along with China, became a linchpin in the FTA
movement in East Asia by employing the so-called ‘multilayered trade
policy’, focused on the pursuit of bilateral and regional FTAs that would
complement the World Trade Organization (WTO)-based multilateral
attempts to facilitate the endeavours towards global trade liberalisation.
Symbolically, this trade policy approach of Japan triggered a domino effect
of FTAs in East Asia. For instance, China’s interest in concluding FTAs is
believed to have been spurred by Japan’s interest in an FTA with South
Korea, announced in October 1998. This move by Japan and South Korea
led China to feel isolated from the FTA movement in East Asia. China
ultimately joined this movement by proposing an FTA with ASEAN in
October 2000, which was officially agreed on in November 2001.
Koizumi’s 2002 proposal for a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement, which would include FTA elements, was a response
to the China-ASEAN FTA proposal. The Japan-Singapore Economic
Partnership Agreement (JSEPA), signed in 2002, prompted Malaysia and
Indonesia, initially the least enthusiastic about bilateral FTAs in the region,
to develop their own FTA proposals with Japan (Terada 2006). China’s
and Japan’s FTA approaches to ASEAN also contributed to South Korea’s
developing an interest in pursuing the same path when, at the 2004 ASEAN
Economic Ministers’ meeting in Jakarta, South Korea agreed with ASEAN
to complete an FTA by 2009. These developments reflected the growing
push for the completion of FTAs with ASEAN by Japan, China and South
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Korea, paving the way for the eventual establishment of an East Asian
FTA through the possible consolidation of the existing bilateral and regional
FTAs in the region.
The 2003 ASEAN+3 summit meeting in Bali witnessed a number of
statements and speeches that stressed the desirability of East Asian
cooperation, including a region-wide FTA. This seemed to represent
significant progress in the institutionalisation of ASEAN+3. Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao proposed that research be undertaken for the
establishment of a free trade area in East Asia, signifying China’s interest
in promoting greater integration between the 13 East Asian economies.
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun underscored the desirability of
further promoting exchanges of people and information in East Asia that
would encourage even wider regional integration. Singapore Prime Minister
Goh Chok Tong asked Japan and China to seek to negotiate a bilateral
FTA with a view to the creation of an East Asian FTA, reflecting a general
view in the region that the movement towards an FTA between these two
nations was a missing link in the recent proliferation of FTAs in East Asia
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 October 2003).
The ineffectiveness of APEC also led to Japan’s decision to abandon its
pursuit of ‘open regionalism’, an approach to which Japan had committed
itself over many years in line with the non-discriminatory provisions of
the GATT (Article 1). Instead, Japan developed its interest in
discriminatory bilateral and regional trading arrangements under GATT
Article 24. Japan’s commitment to open regionalism, in an attempt to
seek consistency between regionalism and multilateralism, subsequently
became the benchmark of APEC’s trade liberalisation approach. Open
regionalism is based on most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment, which
was set up within the GATT system to avoid trade discrimination against
third states by granting equal treatment to all. When a regional economic
institution fostered trade liberalisation among its members, controversy
would arise as to whether the benefits gained through liberalisation within
the region would be applied to outsiders or not. Maintaining consistency
with the non-discrimination principle of GATT Article 1 was therefore an
issue in any regional policy approach that would be considered by Japan.
Importantly, developing the concept of open regionalism was a joint
undertaking between the Japanese and Australian academics over the
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decades; the Japanese coined the term and set up the basic framework,
and Australians developed the concept with empirical research (Terada
1998). For instance, Peter Drysdale (1988:237–38), who discussed the
concept at the 1980 Pacific Community Seminar in Canberra with Saburo
Okita (former Japanese Foreign Minister and architect of Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation), had in 1968 attended the first PAFTAD meeting,
which discussed the feasibility of a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA), an
idea proposed by Kiyoshi Kojima, elaborated the concept he then called
‘regionalism without discrimination’. Drysdale justified creating an Asia
Pacific regionalism based on unconditional MFN by arguing that ‘the
concentration of Pacific countries’ trade within the Pacific is such that
most of the benefits from trade liberalisation on an MFN basis are likely
to accrue within the region’. In fact, in 1965 the ratio of intra-regional
trade among nations in Asia and the Pacific accounted for 46.8 and 51.9
per cent in exports and imports, respectively, and these figures rose to
64.6 and 62.5 per cent in 1987 (cited in Garnaut 1997:148). This is
essentially how some of the basic ideas for the subsequent creation of
APEC were conceived in Japan and Australia.
Some time later, however, Noboru Hatakeyama (1996), former Vice
Minister of International Affairs at the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) and subsequently Chairman of Japan External Trade
Organisation (JETRO), began to promote FTAs as an option for Japan’s
international trade policy, insisting that Japan should consider a trade
policy that involved bilateral and regional arrangements despite these
arrangements being discriminatory. This is an approach that Japan itself
had long criticised. While stressing that FTAs were ‘legal’ as stipulated in
GATT Article 24, Hatakeyama suggested that Japan should confront the
reality of growing bilateral and regional FTA networks in the world and
remove the ‘taboo’ surrounding Japanese trade policy over many years by
pursuing a ‘multilayered’ trade policy. Hatakeyama (1996) wrote that
Japan was not a ‘saint’, implying that Japan should also be allowed, like
other countries, to have FTAs. Hatakeyama (personal interview, 10 April
2003, Tokyo) later added that ‘it was good in the end that the multilayered
approach would allow Japan to make more options for promoting trade
liberalisation’. These propositions gradually came to be shared by many
officials in MITI after Mexico and South Korea approached Japan for FTAs
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in late 1998, at the same time as the concept of open regionalism was
gradually losing its policy relevance and validity within the Ministry.
Japan’s growing interest in the pursuit of bilateral and regional FTAs—
with their legally binding provisions for the reciprocal exchange of
preferences which discriminate against non-partner countries—marks a
distinctive departure from APEC’s approach to non-discriminatory and
globally-oriented regional integration that Japan strongly supported over
many years.
Significantly, this paradigm shift in Japanese trade policy did not
originally entail the possibility of concluding an FTA with Australia, which
also pursued FTAs vigorously. It is true that Howard was able to persuade
Koizumi to set up an FTA study group to examine the feasibility of such
an agreement when he visited Japan in May 2005. But it was believed
that an FTA with Australia, one of the world’s largest agriculture exporters,
would inevitably provoke a strong resistance from Japan’s agricultural
pressure groups and politicians, who rely on farmers’ votes for their elections
and who oppose liberalisation of key agricultural sectors such as rice, beef,
wheat, or sugar. Indeed, Japan still maintained substantially high tariffs
on those products, for example rice (778 per cent), sugar (325 per cent),
wheat (252 per cent) and beef (50 per cent) (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 7
November 2005). Even Japan’s FTA with Singapore—which hardly exports
any agricultural products to Japan—contained a provision for only a 14
per cent increase in the number of Japan’s zero-tariff commitments with
regard to agricultural products. Moreover, the content of this commitment
had already been negotiated within the WTO framework, meaning that
there were no agricultural products in the JSEPA from which Japan agreed
to remove tariffs (Terada 2006). This fact underlines the infeasibility of
the Japan-Australia FTA. As a senior official of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries stated: ‘[s]hould Japan be able to forge a FTA with
Australia, it could do so with all of the countries in the world’ (personal
interview 11 July 2002, Tokyo). This suggested that Japan and Australia,
between whom an FTA was seen as highly unlikely to materialise, would
not easily maintain their partnership in promoting regional economic
integration in East Asia, even if Australia intended to join the movement
towards the formation of an East Asian FTA.
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The Australia-Japan partnership in an East Asian
community
As a nation that was pursuing the concept of ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Pacific’
regionalism, Japan was previously uninterested in joining regional
institutions that excluded ‘Pacific’ nations. This was evident in Japan’s
strong insistence on America’s inclusion in the first APEC meeting, despite
Australia’s hesitation over the establishment of APEC (Terada 1999). Japan
supported Australia’s inclusion in East Asian regionalism, as seen in its
announcement in April 1995 that ‘it would not participate in the informal
ASEAN 7+3 meeting at Phuket unless ASEAN invited Australia and New
Zealand as well’ (cited in Leong 2000:78). Japan was also supportive of
Australia’s membership in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) that initially
comprised the then 15-member European Union and 10 Asian countries.
Prime Minister Hashimoto (1997) explicitly reiterated this position during
his visit to Canberra in April 1997: ‘[w]e should like to do our part for
that … We are taking this task on ourselves, as we would like you to join
ASEM as a member of the Asian side.’
Yet, for Japan to continue to recognise the significance of the Japan-
Australia partnership, Australia needed to be more explicitly committed
to engagement with East Asia. When Japan expressed its support for
Australia’s participation in ASEM, there was ‘uncertainty how hard
Australia wanted to push its bid’ for its ASEM membership and Australia’s
‘soft-pedalling’ approach to membership confused and concerned Japan
(Australian Financial Review, 28 April 1998). Moreover, Japan was
concerned about Australia’s declining influence in East Asia and its
deteriorating relations with Indonesia and Malaysia, the key members of
ASEAN who occasionally blocked Australia from joining regional
institutions. For instance, Malaysia was behind the exclusion of Australia
from the 1996 ASEM Bangkok summit and warned that including
Australians ‘would be like admitting Arabs to the European Union’ (Sydney
Morning Herald, 4 March 1996). Indonesia, together with Malaysia, was
pivotal in ASEAN’s rejection of Australia’s proposal of a FTA among
ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand in October 2000 (Age, 7 October
2000).
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At stake in terms of the actual organisational links between ASEAN+3
and an East Asian community that Koizumi proposed is whether Australia
as well as New Zealand should be included in any activity associated with
ASEAN+3. Koizumi said in his Singapore speech (2002a): ‘[t]hrough
this cooperation, I expect that the countries of ASEAN, Japan,
China…Australia…will be core members of such a community.’ Yet
Australia—whose relations with ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia
and Indonesia, were strained until late 2004, when the leaders of both
countries decided to visit Canberra to promote bilateral relations—was
not expected by many in the region to be a natural member of the
community. In fact, when Koizumi proposed an East Asian Community
in his trip to Southeast Asia in January 2002, he faced difficulties in
convincing ASEAN leaders, especially Prime Minister Mahathir, that
Australia should be included in the community (Australian Financial
Review, 10 January 2002). The fact that Australia has not become a member
of ASEAN+3, despite Koizumi’s advocacy, represented a discrepancy on
the point of Australia’s participation between already existing regional
institutions and an envisaged regional community. Koizumi said in his
Sydney speech in May 2002, ‘I do not believe it is always the best policy
to set up new organisations or institutions to build a community (Koizumi
2002b).’ He did not touch on ASEAN+3, the significance of which he
stressed in his Singapore speech a few months before, somewhat
contradicting his earlier approach to the establishment of a community in
East Asia. The Tokyo Declaration, launched by Koizumi and his ten ASEAN
counterparts in December 2003, mentions creation of an East Asian
Community as a significant goal, but it does not include any statement
about membership. It says, ‘to build an East Asian community which is
outward looking…upholding Asian traditions and values, while respecting
universal rules and principles [would be important].’ This may reflect a
view that, although the community is outward looking—suggesting that
any country can join it—any potential member should possess or
understand Asian traditions and values.
However, it remained questionable as to whether Australia displayed
sufficient understanding of these so-called Asian traditions and values, as
former Australian diplomat Dalrymple once argued: ‘Australia’s cultural
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differences with its neighbours would increasingly appear too manifest,
and its identification with the US and Europe too close, to be reconciled
with the forces driving East Asian regionalism’ (2003:150). In fact,
Australia’s interest in exposing itself to a debate on its understanding of
Asian political, social, and cultural values in association with the
development of East Asian regionalism had previous been clearly rejected
by Alexander Downer, the Australian Foreign Minister, in his address at
the 2000 Asian Leaders Forum in Beijing, when he sought to draw a
‘distinction between cultural regionalism and one based upon practical
considerations of trade and economic relationships’ (Straits Times, 29 April
2000). Appearing to be at odds with Australia’s long-term regional policy
approach, the central implication of Downer’s remarks was that Australia
did not see itself as belonging culturally and socially to the East Asian
regional entity and that ASEAN+3 was not useful as a way of promoting
Australia’s national interest. Regional doubts about Australia’s participation
in East Asian regionalism, partly caused by the Downer statement, lingered
as a result.
In the meantime, in Japan, the groups responsible for foreign and trade
policymaking tended to see Australia’s unfriendly relations with Southeast
Asia as detrimental to Japan’s regional policy. Japan became increasingly
interested in ASEAN+3 rather than APEC in its foreign and trade policies,
and began pursuing bilateral FTAs with major East Asian nations to
strengthen general economic relations with them. There was no policy
framework for Australia to be involved in this foreign and trade policy
approach, and this indicated that Australia’s significance in Japan’s total
foreign and trade policy was declining. It was true that Japan was still
Australia’s largest export market and the third largest foreign investor in
the early 2000s, but the relationship was perceived not to be advancing
soundly. For instance, a Japanese report, presented in the 2001 Australia-
Japan Conference in Sydney, which ‘likened the Japan-Australian
relationship to an “ageing marriage” represents a view that the bilateral
relations might become ‘one in which both are satisfied with maintaining
the status quo, while having no real interest in one another’ (cited in Rumely
2002:3). This raises the important question of why Koizumi advocated
the inclusion of Australia in his proposed East Asian community at a time
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when Australia was perceived to be detached from East Asia in its foreign
policy.
There were other policy groups in Japan who believed in the usefulness
and effectiveness of the partnership with Australia in achieving Japanese
national interests. According to a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, who declined to be named (personal interview, 9 April 2003,
Tokyo), three significant elements affect the Australia-Japan partnership
in East Asian regionalism: a tendency to fear China’s possible predominance
within ASEAN+3 and East Asia as a whole; security issues emerged as a
more significant policy area in the bilateral relations with the United States,
subsequently leading to the establishment of the trilateral defence talks
among Japan, the United States, and Australia, thus enhancing Australia’s
presence in Japan’s security policy; and the consideration that the United
States had expressed concern about the rise of China as detrimental to
American interests in East Asia. In short, the rise of China was a new
factor that reconnected Japan and Australia in more strategic and political
arenas, and the United States hope that both nations would play a checking
role against China. US concern over China derives, for instance, from
China’s military build-up, as emphasised by US Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, who believed that China’s improved ballistic missile system
would allow Chinese missiles to ‘reach targets in many areas of the
world…Since no nation threatens China, one wonders: Why this growing
investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?’
(cited in Straits Times, 5 June 2005) Importantly, such a stark view on
China’s increasing military spending as threatening the delicate security
balance in East Asia was widely shared by Japanese leaders including then
Foreign Minister Machimura and Defence Agency Minister Ohno, as was
seen in their talks at the US-Japan 2+2 Consultative Committee in May
2005.
According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official (personal interview
above), some top senior officials in the Ministry believed that Japan would
be isolated within an East Asian framework, in which most of the members
are developing countries, whereas China could be seen as the leader of this
group. Ministry officials believed that Japan would face a difficulty in
injecting considerations that reflected the perspectives of developed
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countries. For these reasons, these officials hoped that Australia would see
the need to join Japan in an attempt to be more committed to creating
better relations with Southeast Asia, with which China has also been
engaged in making cooperative relations. Hitoshi Tanaka, a Vice-Minister,
who was one of these senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
had been responsible for drafting Koizumi’s Singapore speech, commented
on Japan’s need to have Australia participate in East Asian cooperation
[i]n my heart I truly hope Australia will participate in the East Asia
summit…We have worked very hard to make it possible. We are doing
this not for Australia’s sake, but for Japan’s sake. We need you…I have a
very strong feeling about our cooperation with Australia and I have been
advocating it for a long time (The Australian, 28 May 2005).
The development of this policy stance indicates that there have been
competing views on Australia among Japanese policy makers. Asian
specialists in MOFA were said to oppose the inclusion of Australia, mainly
because Japan has been engaged in strengthening the relations with
ASEAN, as was evident in its efforts to organise the 2003 Japan-ASEAN
Commemorative Summit in Tokyo; also, the inclusion of Australia, with
its troubled relations with some ASEAN members, was considered not to
be helpful. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), whose
primary interest has revolved around an FTA with ASEAN or its individual
members, also did not welcome Australia’s involvement as a result. Initially,
METI promoted the idea of an East Asian Free Business Zone that did
not envisage Australian membership. Given these divergent views on
Australia within Japan and the region, Japan hesitated before revealing
the intended membership of the proposed East Asian community—to be
included in the Tokyo Declaration—as an agenda that Japan and ASEAN
should promote in concert. This was simply because Tokyo could predict
ASEAN’s opposition to Australia’s inclusion and thought it inappropriate
to cause problems with ASEAN in a commemorative ceremony by making
public its proposal to include Australia in the membership of an East
Asian community (personal interview with a senior METI official, 24
December 2003, Tokyo). Japan’s proposition that Australia should be a
core member of an East Asian community was based on a condition it
hoped Australia would meet, namely a fundamental transformation in
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Australia’s foreign policy orientation in order to change the negative view
of Australia held by some East Asian countries, and Koizumi’s Singapore
speech partly aimed to convey such a message to Australia. Japan had
difficulty adjusting government policy over the treatment of Australia at
home, and internationally ASEAN’s opposition to Australia’s involvement
in East Asian regionalism made it difficult for Japan, the first nation that
proposed Australia’s inclusion in the East Asian community, to make a
strong push in this direction.
New developments in Australia’s engagement
policy
Since winning his fourth election in October 2004, Howard seems to
have focused on East Asia more directly. Howard can already claim some
achievements, including improving the previously strained relations with
Indonesia and Malaysia through his swift and generous rescue packages
for the Indonesians who suffered from the earthquake and tsunami in
December 2004, and also through Indonesian and Malaysian leaders’ visits
to Canberra in April 2005. The achievements also include reaching
agreements on the launch of FTA negotiations between Australia, New
Zealand and ASEAN, as well as launching several bilateral FTA
arrangements, including one with China. These foreign policy
developments in Australia’s relations with East Asia created a new
opportunity for Japan to forge a stronger partnership with Australia in
community building in East Asia.
Australia’s involvement in the FTA networks in East Asia—given that
Australia had already concluded the trading arrangements with Singapore
and Thailand—could help Australia’s entry into the movement towards
the creation of an East Asian community. In a practical sense, FTAs can
integrate markets, facilitate investment, and promote the exchange of
business people among the signatories, an element that helps Australia to
be recognised as an integral member of the region. Australia’s sound
economic growth over the decade has contributed to its being an attractive
FTA partner, as is evidenced by Malaysia’s interest in an FTA with Australia.
In addition, Howard’s participation in the summit meeting with ASEAN
leaders in November 2004 in Laos—in which the three parties agreed to
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begin talks towards the creation of an FTA among ASEAN, Australia, and
New Zealand (AFTA-CER)—was important as a positive sign of Southeast
Asian countries’ greater receptiveness to Australia’s engagement policy. It
is noteworthy that this meeting was held on the occasion of the ASEAN+3
Meetings, of which Australia is not an official member, even though the
AFTA-CER FTA proposal was once rejected in 2000, mainly because of
Malaysia’s opposition.
The issue of Australia’s commitment to East Asian cooperation also
surfaced during heated debate on Australia’s membership in the inaugural
East Asian Summit in Malaysia, December 2005. Australia initially gave
the cold shoulder to ASEAN’s request that it sign the ASEAN Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), on the grounds that it was perceived to be
a remnant of the Cold War and bore little relevance to the contemporary
regional order. But ASEAN, especially Malaysia, the host of the Summit,
insisted that signing the TAC should be a precondition of Australia’s
participation in the Summit. Australia hesitated to sign the TAC, which
included the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries,
a linchpin of ASEAN’s political values. This was because Australia feared
that its diplomatic reach would be restricted if it could not assist the
United States to promote human rights and democracy in Southeast Asia.
Moreover, Howard’s pre-emptive strike statement in the wake of the
terrorist attack in Bali in December 2002 appeared to contradict this
principle. So Australia’s eventual decision to sign the TAC indicated that
it placed higher value on participation in the Summit than on Howard’s
personal political faith. This decision was a key to East Asia’s full acceptance
of Australia as a fellow member.
Downer had at one stage ruled out Australia’s interest in the ASEAN+3
framework, as mentioned above, but other Australian leaders attempted
to overturn this position. Treasurer Peter Costello stated, ‘[w]e would love
to have ASEAN Plus Four. We have pursued it and we will continue to
pursue it’ (cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 June 2003). Downer
ultimately discarded his previous doubts about ASEAN+3 and worked
hard to persuade Howard to sign the TAC so that Australia could be
admitted to the inaugural East Asian Summit. ASEAN+3 and East Asian
Summit can serve to ‘provide a framework for demonstrating East Asian
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influence and leadership on regional and international affairs’ (Drysdale
2003:12), enabling East Asian leaders to identify common positions more
easily and to articulate them more effectively in multilateral institutions
such as WTO and the United Nations. Australia’s decision to sign the
TAC, overturning its previous position suggests that the significance of
this argument has been acknowledged by Australian political leaders.
The birth of East Asian regionalism involving Australia, initiated by
Koizumi, was to be realised through the organisation of the East Asian
Summit, held in Malaysia in December 2005. Japan, as well as Singapore
and Indonesia, supported Australia’s membership in the summit. This
encouraged Australia to sign the TAC, a precondition for it to be invited
to the Summit. Like Australia, Japan at one time hesitated to sign the
TAC, as Prime Minister Koizumi stated in the 2003 ASEAN+3 meeting
in Bali: ‘I believe it is possible for Japan to strengthen its ties with ASEAN
in the future without Japan signing the treaty. I think we have the
understanding of ASEAN members on this point’ (cited in Asahi Shimbun,
16 December 2003). However, China’s announcement that it had signed
the treaty influenced Japan’s subsequent decision to do so. Importantly,
before its decision to sign it, Japan had examined the impact and
implications of the Treaty for its foreign policy, especially the US-Japan
alliance system, and the result of the analysis was delivered to Australia
through its Embassy in Tokyo (personal interview with a senior official of
MOFA, 14 June 2005, Tokyo). It was Foreign Minister Nobutaka
Machimura who suggested to his counterpart, Alexander Downer, in their
meeting in March 2005, that Australia sign the TAC which, Machimura
argued, would not cause any serious problem for Australia’s foreign policy
(The Australian, 6 August 2005).
 The movement in Australia’s regional diplomacy in recent times was a
welcome development for Japan, which had been worried about Australia’s
inconsistent engagement with the region, especially after Howard came
into power in 1996, as outlined above.
Japan and Australia have been also engaged in strengthening their
bilateral relations, especially in security and defence areas. Japan’s generous
and crucial contribution to help fund the multinational force in East Timor
(INTERFET), which was led by Australia, was a good case of cooperation
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between the two nations in political and security areas. Welcoming Japan’s
contribution of some hundreds of engineers in East Timor, as part of
peacekeeping efforts in the former Indonesian province, Howard (2002)
said that ‘We see that kind of security involvement of Japan in the region
in an extremely positive light.’ This proposition is a foundation on which
Australia’s consistent and bipartisan support for Japan’s bid to be a
permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations has
been built.2 In February 2005, in response to requests from Japan as well
as the United States, Australia decided to despatch its troops to Iraq to
protect Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) there. In May 2005, the
trilateral strategic dialogue among the United States, Japan, and Australia
was upgraded to a ministerial-level forum involving the three Foreign
Ministers. The highlight of both nation’s interest in forging closer strategic
ties is the formal declaration of security cooperation, launched by Howard
and Abe in March 2007. This may be a symbolic attempt to formalise the
bilateral cooperation on security, as seen in Cambodia and East Timor
previously, but the declaration and the subsequent coverage of it in major
Japanese newspapers, which was very rare previously, reinforced a view
among the Japanese that Australia was now the second closest strategic
partner after the United States. Japan’s initial interest in inviting Australia
into its proposed East Asian Community is partly motivated by Japan’s
wish to check China’s growing political influence in the region, as well as
its long-term regional partnership with Australia. These developments
can be seen as a means of achieving the common strategic interests that
the three countries share.
Japan’s agreement to set up a feasibility study for a bilateral FTA (a
development that sounds perplexing at first glance, as Australia is one of
Japan’s largest agricultural exporters) can be seen as reflecting Koizumi’s
desire to take Australia’s trade interest more seriously as a sign of Japan’s
gratitude for Australia’s deployment of troops to Iraq to protect Japan’s
SDF units (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 April 2005). It also reflected Japan’s
intention to strengthen relations with Australia more comprehensively
despite the political difficulties the FTA would cause at home. Accordingly,
should the Japan-Australia FTA occur, it might be Japan’s first bilateral
FTA that is promoted primarily on the basis of political and strategic
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considerations rather than economic considerations. It can be argued that,
in the era of the East Asian Community, the Australia-Japan partnership
should be built on such a substantive and solid framework, as this will
reinforce the wider strategic and economic interests shared by Japan and
Australia in more stable and resilient ways.
Conclusion
Historically, the Australia-Japan partnership was strengthened through
the activities undertaken towards the realisation of economic institutions
in the Asia-Pacific region, and it was the partnership with Japan that helped
to promote Australia’s engagement with the region. Yet Howard’s early
disengagement with regional institutions, including APEC, and growing
indifference towards his Southeast Asian partners placed the function of
the Australia-Japan partnership under uncertainty, and this view was further
strengthened by Japan’s keener commitment to East Asian regionalism
like ASEAN+3, which excluded Australia.
However, the partnership was strengthened by incorporating more
strategic elements following the emergence of China. If China’s interests
in improving and strengthening its relations with ASEAN and its further
commitment to the formation of an East Asian community were seen as a
way of China creating its own sphere of influence in East Asia, this would
be counterproductive to America’s regional interests. So the role of the
bilateral partnership between Japan and Australia, both key regional US
allies, was to counter the emergence of China’s ambition to dominate the
region. However, a complicating factor is the fact that China’s substantially
growing economy means that both Japan and Australia have a strong
interest in forging better economic relations for the sake of their economic
growth. The fact that China was the world’s largest importer of iron ore
and wool in 2004 explains Australia’s keener interest in the FTA with
China. The fact that China has replaced the United States as Japan’s largest
trading partner illustrates its closer mutual economic interdependence
with China, prompting many Japanese business leaders to request Prime
Minister Koizumi not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine so that this major cause
of the bilateral tensions would not hamper the smoother economic ties.
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Therefore, the separation of strategic and political issues from economic
and business interests in attempts to deal with the rise of China might be
a key to the successful formation of an East Asian community. For instance,
in their meeting in Washington in July 2005, Howard was reported to
have turned down Bush’s request that the United States and Australia
work together to ‘reinforce the need for China to accept certain values as
“universal”’ on the grounds of Howard’s approach towards China which
was ‘to build on the things that we have in common, and not become
obsessed with the things that make us different’ (Straits Times, 19 August
2005). This indicates Australia’s reluctance to contain China strategically
in East Asia especially in the East Asian Summit, in line with US interests.
However, as long as Japan maintains extremely high tariffs on Australia’s
key agricultural exports, it is highly unlikely that Japan and Australia
would be able to conclude a bilateral FTA, suggesting that both nations
lack a basis for future joint initiatives in promoting regional economic
integration in East Asia. Moreover, the divergence of Japanese and
Australian approaches to agricultural liberalisation also makes it difficult
for them to forge a partnership in the WTO Doha Round negotiations,
which has been hampered by differing tariff reduction proposals among
key members including Japan and Australia. Given that Australia has been
committed to improving its strained relations with Indonesia and Malaysia
about which Japan had long worried, a key factor for restoring the bilateral
partnership—in both regional and global bodies—is whether Japan can
compromise over its highly protected agricultural products.
The ‘isolation’ factor has been a backdrop to Australia’s commitment to
regional institutions (Terada 2000), so the emergence of East Asian
regionalism and the declining significance of APEC highlighted the lack
of useful mechanism on which Australia could rely for avoiding its isolation
in the region. In this sense, if Australia were admitted to the gradually
expanding array of meetings, working groups, and cooperative linkages
within ASEAN+3, it would be able to create networks of the responsible
officials in relevant ministries such as trade, industry, or finance and the
ways in which they are associated with their counterparts in other member
economies. As these intra- and inter-governmental interactions and
networks between government agencies in East Asia will become more
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entrenched among members, they can be instrumental in nurturing a
sense of ‘togetherness’ among those officials, including Australia. They are
also useful in identifying common policy interests among members.
Given the fact that the existence of different levels of policy discussions
on the basis of their shared interest in regional economic cooperation played
a significant role assisting Japan and Australia in their initiatives in Asia
Pacific regionalism, this movement also should involve academic as well as
business exchanges. The intellectual assets represented by those policy
networks, which sustained the leadership role of both nations in institution
building in the Asia Pacific region, can provide a platform for both nations
to think through the evolution of the East Asian community idea and the
relationship of East Asian cooperation arrangements in the new regional
policy environment that faces both countries in the twenty-first century.
Notes
1 Aware of ‘the fact that East Asia was the only part of the world not to have a regular
Summit of leaders,’ Hawke was encouraged to propose such a meeting within APEC in
mid-1991 (Mills 1993:195); yet Hawke’s prime ministership was taken over by Keating
late that year, and Keating instead proposed the leaders’ meeting in April 1992. Keating
had canvassed the idea with major regional leaders including Japanese Prime Minister
Kiichi Miyazawa, who officially supported the idea during his visit to Canberra in April
1993. This idea was later adopted by US President Clinton when the United States
hosted the APEC meetings in Seattle in 1993.
2 Prime Minister Hawke officially supported Japan’s permanent membership of the UN
Security Council as early as 1990, in one of the earliest expressions of support Japan
received in this regard (Terada 2000:192).
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4 JAPAN’S QUEST FOR FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS
CONSTRAINTS FROM BUREAUCRATIC AND
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu
In the 1990s, regional economic arrangements including free trade
agreements (FTAs) became a popular way of promoting trade liberalisation
and market integration. Japan, as an economy possessing exceptionally
diverse export markets, had long taken a cautious stance on regional
economic arrangements with a discriminatory nature. The Japanese
government deemed economic arrangements with specific countries as
contradicting the spirit of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)/ World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as stunting the growth
of overall trade.
However, intensive moves worldwide towards FTAs and regionalism
have prompted Japan to reconsider its basic trade policy stance. Only in
the late 1990s, did the Japanese government begin to shift the emphasis
of its trade policy from multilateral to bilateral and regional arrangements.
In part of this shift, in January 2001 Tokyo embarked on formal negotiations
with Singapore about the formation of an FTA, signing the Japan-Singapore
Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) one year later. This move was
followed by bilateral FTA agreements with Mexico, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, and negotiations with South Korea, Indonesia,
and others.
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Indeed, international forces constituted the initial factor that induced
the Japanese government to reconsider its basic trade policy and promote
bilateral FTAs. At the same time, domestic politics influenced the manner
and speed with which the government’s initiatives in FTAs were realised.
Two factors are particularly important. The first is the preferences and
behaviour of central government bureaucrats. In Japan, trade negotiations
have been undertaken by four ministries: the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), and the Ministry
of Finance (MOF). These ministries tend to develop specific preferences
that are incorporated into their concrete actions. The second factor is the
influence of major domestic interest groups. A shift from the multilateral-
oriented to the bilateral-centred trade policy has significant distributive
effects on various segments of the domestic society. Accordingly, major
interest groups have developed particular preferences and sought to have
them accepted in the policymaking process.
This chapter argues that bureaucratic politics and interest group politics
have impinged on the initiation and evolution of FTA policy in Japan.
While inter-ministerial conflicts inhibited the Japanese government from
pursuing a clear-cut approach on FTA policy and negotiations, demands
from major interest groups exercised a critical influence over the start and
progress of an FTA with a particular country. Before examining the
development of Japan’s FTA policy in detail, the following section provides
a brief overview of bureaucratic politics and interest group politics in Japan.
Japan’s FTA policy and trade politics
In the late 1990s, the Japanese government began to shift its stance on
trade policy from an emphasis on multilateralism to stressing regionalism.
In 1998, METI began internal discussions about new trade policy, and
revealed its new policy orientation in its 1999 White Paper (Munakata
2001). In line with this change, in January 2001 Tokyo embarked on
formal negotiations with Singapore over the formation of an FTA, signing
the JSEPA one year after. Then, Japan signed the Japan-Mexico FTA in
September 2004, followed by the conclusion of a similar agreement with
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Malaysia in December 2005 and the Philippines in September 2006 (Table
4.1). Japan expanded the target of its FTA partners by beginning
governmental negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Indonesia, Brunei and Chile.
While the Japanese government shifted its basic stance on trade policy,
this shift did not produce apparent and smooth policy outcomes. The
Japanese government did not at the outset, as a whole, set up a clear-cut
vision for a new trade policy, and some of its new initiatives took a long
time to put in place. Why did Japan show such an indecisive and rather
awkward attitude towards trade policy? In order to address this question,
we need to highlight two factors that affect continuity in reactive trade
politics: bureaucratic politics and interest group politics.
In Japan, the parliamentary political system is practised and the cabinet
led by the Prime Minister constitutes the senior executive organ. Since
political appointees such as the ministers and senior vice-ministers turn
over in a short time-span, ministries are run in practice by career officials,
headed by the vice ministers and secretaries. Accordingly, bureaucrats have
Table 4.1 Japan’s negotiation of FTAs to April 2007
Partner Negotiations Signature Effective
Singapore 1/01–10/01 1/02 11/02
Mexico 11/02–3/04 9/04 4/05
South Korea 12/03–ongoing n.a. n.a.
Malaysia 1/04–5/05 12/05 7/06
Philippines 2/04–11/04 9/06 n.a.
Thailand 2/04–9/05 4/07 n.a.
ASEAN 4/05–
Indonesia 7/05– 11/06 n.a. n.a.
Chile 2/06– 9/06 3/07 n.a.
Brunei 6/06– 12/06 n.a. n.a.
Gulf Cooperation Council 9/06–ongoing
Vietnam 1/07–ongoing
India 1/07–ongoing
Source: Compiled by the author from data on the Japanese government website.
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considerable autonomy and discretionary power, particularly with regard
to internal organisation and personnel decisions. Moreover, central
government bureaucrats are highly talented and disciplined elite officials
with many years of service in the same ministry. They dominate the
policymaking process by drafting virtually all legislation, controlling the
national budget, and retaining significant amount of information necessary
for formulating public policy (Johnson 1982, 1995; Campbell 1989).
Thus, bureaucratic politics constitutes a major element in Japanese
policymaking.
Bureaucratic politics in Japan is characterised by sectionalism—turf
battles among ministries. This characteristic derives from various factors.
The historical origins of sectionalism lie in conflicts among the south-
western clans in the early Meiji era. Institutionally, the structure of each
ministry is determined by the establishment law of each agency, and the
code of conduct for each ministry is produced under this law. This legal
system has deepened the gap between the ministries (Muramatsu 1994).
Furthermore, limitations on resources given to each ministry have
intensified sectionalism. Ministry-centred competition enabled the
government to maximise the mobilisation of limited resources by way of
severe inter-ministerial competition in the political market for policy
innovation (Muramatsu 1996). From a broader perspective, bureaucratic
conflicts had much to do with the weak power of the Prime Minister and
the cabinet. Both the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Secretariat
traditionally had weak capabilities with small staff, most of whom were
bureaucrats, not personal appointees, often being entrenched in the
sectionalism of their home ministries (Mulgan 2000).
The second factor that prevented the Japanese government from
adopting a decisive stance on trade policy is interest group politics. Some
scholars of international political economy postulate that trade policy is a
function of interests and capabilities of interest groups that compete each
other for greater benefits or incomes and form political coalitions to attain
this objective. Theoretical and empirical interests have been directed
towards clarifying conditions under which particular groups develop
particular preferences for trade policy. Some observers have focused on
factors of production such as labour and capital, as central factors in creating
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different policy preferences (Rogowski 1989). Others have highlighted
sectoral or firm-based factors as keys to develop particular policy preferences
(Ray 1981; Milner 1988; Frieden 1990). The characteristics of sectors—
including the number of firms or workers in an industry, an industry’s
size or geographic concentration—have been regarded as critical factors in
affecting concrete policy preferences and outcomes of trade politics.
As far as the representation of interest groups in Japanese policymaking
is concerned, some scholars argue that the influence of traditional interest
groups such as big business, labour and farmers declined as Japan moved
to its catch-up goal and its matured economy produced more diverse
interests in the society (Curtis 1999). However, the political influence of
these traditional interest groups still matters, especially in the fields where
a bureaucratic agency, relevant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians,
and interest groups constitute the so-called ‘sub-governments’.1 This sub-
governmental triangle is an exclusive policymaking institution, which is
often insulated to a large extent from the influence of other political actors
(Otake 1979). In the sub-governments, interest groups have influenced
the evolution of public policy by forging tie-ups with relevant politicians
in the ruling parties.
Reactive FTA politics before 2003
Japanese trade negotiations are conducted by various representatives from
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry, Trade and Economy, Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, and Finance. Ministerial rivalries and bureaucratic
conflicts have often impeded the Japanese government from formulating
consistent and cohesive trade policy in a timely manner. This problem has
been repeated over the handling of agricultural products in FTA
negotiations between MAFF on the one hand and MOFA and METI, on
the other. MOFA and METI considered that close trade linkages through
FTAs were inevitable trends. It was METI that led a shift in trade policy
from multilateralism to bilateralism. When METI officials began to
investigate the importance of bilateral FTAs in the late 1990s, they regarded
FTAs as effective measures to motivate government officials and private
actors to promote structural reforms of domestic industries (Oyane
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2004:58). In October 2002, MOFA published guidelines for FTAs, Japan’s
FTA Strategy (MOFA 2002). In these guidelines, MOFA maintains that
‘unless we take a stance linking FTAs to economic reforms in Japan, we
will not succeed in making them a means of improving the international
competition of Japan as a whole’. Accordingly, both ministries
acknowledged that some pains resulting from the formation of FTAs would
be unavoidable for promoting structural reforms.
However, MAFF was cautious about including agricultural products in
the purview of FTAs. MAFF’s views on FTAs were revealed in several official
documents. In a paper regarding the JSEPA released in August 2001,
MAFF stated that given the current situation of Japanese agriculture, tariffs
relating to agriculture, forestry and fisheries should be discussed at the
WTO negotiations, and that further tariff reductions should not be made
at negotiations for individual FTAs (MAFF 2001). In July 2002, MAFF
issued a formal position paper entitled Japan’s Food Security and Agricultural
Trade Policy: Focusing on FTAs. MAFF stated that, in committing to an
FTA, it is necessary to pay due attention to food security in Japan and to
avoid negative impacts on efforts to implement structural adjustment.
The report also states that FTAs will give minimal direct benefits to the
agricultural sector (MAFF 2002). MAFF considered the potential benefits
of FTAs in light of the agricultural sector alone, not the entire Japanese
economy.
While MOFA and METI adopted a concerted stance over the necessity
of market opening even in internationally weak sectors, they had different
views over concrete approaches to FTAs. In the 2002 FTA guidelines,
MOFA argued that Japan should give priority to FTAs with South Korea,
ASEAN and Mexico. MOFA’s basic direction was the same as METI’s.
However, there were differences in concrete strategies between the two
ministries. For instance, MOFA’s strategy for ASEAN was to create bilateral
economic partnership individually, and begin a process of expanding these
agreements to one between Japan and ASEAN as a whole. As for China,
MOFA supported a strategy of continuing to closely monitor the country’s
fulfilment of its WTO obligations and the status of overall bilateral relations
before determining Japan’s policy. METI hoped to pursue the conclusion
of an FTA with ASEAN as a whole. METI’s policy orientation was
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understandable given that the ministry has striven to assist economic
integration and industrial cooperation in ASEAN, which would then serve
to the interests of Japanese firms operating in the region. As for China,
METI included the country into its concept of the ‘East Asian Business
Zone’.2
Trade frictions have often occurred in policy fields where the major
interest groups and their supporters in political circles could play a vital
role in policymaking. This interest group politics was prominent in the
initial stage of Japan’s FTA policy. A driving force to promote some of
FTAs was exercised by Nippon Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation,
hereafter referred in this article as Keidanren), the most influential peak
business association in Japan.3 Keidanren became the main player who
raised the position of Mexico in Japan’s FTA strategy. Mexico was one of
the most active countries in the promotion of FTA networks. Mexico signed
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 and expanded
its FTA networks to encompass Latin American countries in 1994. As of
December 2002, Mexico had concluded FTAs with 32 countries covering
regions from the American Continent through Europe to the Middle East.
US firms had already secured access to the Mexican market through
NAFTA, as did the Europeans after the FTA between Mexico and the
European Union (EU) came into force in July 2000. Japanese manufacturing
firms and trading houses suffered from serious negative effects from these
moves. The absence of an FTA with Mexico forced Japanese firms to pay
duties on key imports products from Japan and excluded them from bids
on government procurement in the country.
Given the above conditions, Keidanren demanded a prompt conclusion
of the Japan-Mexico FTA (JMFTA). In April 1999, the federation issued
a report entitled Report on the Possible Effects of a Japan-Mexico Free Trade
Agreement on Japanese Industry. This was the first comprehensive report
that examined the likely effects of the FTA on bilateral trade and Japanese
investment in Mexico, and identified problems needing to be resolved.
Furthermore, Keidanren directly lobbied senior government officials in
both countries to conclude the FTA at an early date. When the members
of the federation’s Japan-Mexico Economic Committee met with Herminio
Blanco Mendoza, Minister of Commerce and Industrial Development, in
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July 1999 and August 2000, they made a formal request that the Mexican
government begin FTA negotiations as swiftly as possible. Furthermore,
Nobuhiko Kawamoto, the head of the Japan-Mexico Economic
Committee, met with Takeo Hiranuma, then Minister of METI,
immediately prior to Hiranuma’s visit to Mexico in January 2001, and
requested the Japanese government to conclude the JMFTA as soon as
possible (Tsuchida 2001). The federation’s persistent lobbying persuaded
the Japanese government to consider the JMFTA issue seriously. In
particular, the federation forced the government to take necessary actions
by demonstrating the serious damage being caused to Japanese firms’
businesses with Mexico by the absence of the FTA with the country.
Interest group politics had regressive influences on Japan’s FTA policy.
The norin zoku (‘agricultural tribes’) in the LDP had vital influence in
initiatives and negotiations over a series of FTAs.4 A major reason why
Japan chose Singapore as the first partner for an FTA was that the country
exported a minimal amount of agricultural products. Singapore’s exports
of agricultural products, such as dairy products and cut flowers, made up
only 3 per cent of Japan’s imports from the country. Nonetheless, the
treatment of the agricultural sector became a controversial issue during
the negotiations because MAFF asserted that agricultural products should
be excluded from the target of an FTA. The Japanese government as a
whole was anxious about international criticisms of excluding the entire
range of agricultural products from the FTA with Singapore. Accordingly,
the government adopted a policy to list agricultural products whose tariffs
were virtually zero as ‘tariff zero products’. Some 460 items became the
target under this method.
The peculiar treatment of agricultural products in the JSEPA had much
to do with political pressure. In early August 2001, MAFF explained
detailed policies for agricultural products in an FTA with Singapore at the
LDP’s Research Commission on Trade in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Products, and confirmed that tariffs affecting agricultural and fishing
products would not change as a result of the FTA. However, commission
members argued that tariffs on agricultural products should only be
discussed at the WTO and that it was necessary to examine effects of an
FTA with Singapore on Japan’s proposed FTA negotiations with Mexico
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and South Korea.5 LDP commission members had a strong preference for
discussing tariffs on agricultural products at the WTO because they feared
that once Japan made concessions on market liberalisation in an FTA with
Singapore, it would be forced to make the same concession to other
countries. Eventually, on the same day as the third round of negotiations,
when the Japanese government hoped to reach a virtual agreement with
Singapore, the LDP formally approved the government policy.6 A
government official who was involved in the negotiations recalls that ‘there
was strong pressure from the LDP and the farm lobby on the government
not to agree to make any further liberalisation of the agricultural market
in negotiating an FTA with Singapore’.7
The FTA negotiations with countries that had larger agricultural exports
to Japan then became more controversial. A typical example is Japan’s
FTA with Thailand. In September 2002, the Japanese and Thai
governments set up a working group to discuss FTA issues. Since Thai
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra planned to make a visit to Tokyo in
June 2003, both governments hoped to use his visit as an occasion to
launch formal FTA negotiations that would conclude by the end of 2003.
However, the LDP’s norin zoku objected to full-scale negotiations because
Thailand was expected to demand the liberalisation of rice imports and
free trade in chicken. The MOFA officials in charge of FTA policy lobbied
the norin zoku to agree to the conclusion of the FTA within 2003, but
they met furious opposition.8
The FTA talks with Mexico were also problematic. At a meeting of the
LDP’s Research Commission on Trade in Agriculture in May 2003,
commission members reached a consensus that an accord that would bring
benefits to both Japan and Mexico should be pursued and that Japan
should not agree to an easy compromise. They also decided that exceptional
items should be established in an FTA. At a meeting in August 2003, the
commission reaffirmed that important exceptions should be allowed.
Strong lobbying by the agricultural groups occurred behind the scenes.
When the initiation of the full-scale FTA negotiations with Thailand
became a critical issue, agricultural groups intensified their lobbying of
the norin zoku and LDP executive members. In April 2003, the Central
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Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenchu) distributed to the LDP
members a brochure entitled Requests Regarding FTA Talks with Thailand,
Mexico and Other Countries. In the brochure, the association expressed
vehement opposition to FTAs, stating that it was premature to begin
negotiations with Thailand and that the Mexican request to liberalise tariffs
on agricultural imports was unacceptable. At a meeting of the LDP’s
Research Commission on Trade in Agriculture in May 2003, Isamu Miyata,
chairman of Zenchu, asserted that a transition to formal negotiations for
an FTA with Thailand would not be permitted because this would ignore
the preferences of those who would suffer serious damage if FTAs were
implemented, namely those in the agricultural, forestry and fishery sectors.9
Eventually, the Japanese government failed to agree on the start of
negotiations for the FTA with Thailand during Thaksin’s visit.
When negotiations on the FTA with Mexico entered their final stage,
agricultural groups again became increasingly active. At a meeting of the
LDP’s Research Commission on Trade in Agriculture in September 2003,
Zenchu’s executive director adamantly opposed concessions to Mexico
involving tariff cuts for all farm products.10 In early October, Zenchu
chairman Miyata held a meeting with senior LDP executives, and
demanded that pork be listed as an exclusion item in the FTA with Mexico.11
The LDP members, norin zoku in particular, were attentive to the demands
of agricultural groups because a general election was expected before June
2004. Clearly, when LDP members called for postponing formal FTA
negotiations with Thailand and the adoption of exceptional items in the
FTA with Mexico, these were responses to demands by the agricultural
groups that could influence the retention of their elected positions.
In brief, bureaucratic politics and interest group politics constituted
major obstacles to the smooth formation and implementation of trade
policy in Japan. The fragmented structure of the Government on trade
issues and the lack of coherent interests and policies among bureaucrats
virtually prevented the government from formulating cohesive and
persistent trade policy preferences. The protection of specific sectors due
to opposition from interest groups and their political supporters often
impeded the smooth development of FTA initiatives.
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Nuanced changes in FTA politics after 2004
In the previous section, we outlined how Japan’s reactive trade policy and
indecisive commitments to any new policy had much to do with
bureaucratic politics and interest group politics.
An objective source of bureaucratic politics lies in the fact that no single
entity had the authority and power to make decisions that span multiple
ministries. In order to overcome this problem, the coordinating role or
leadership of the Prime Minister had long been called for. In this respect,
the reorganisation of government ministries in January 2001 contributed
to enhancing the power of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The
Cabinet Secretariat increased its authority by assuming the role of planning
and drafting important national policies. This was one of the major points
that bureaucrats strongly resisted during the consultations over
administrative reform. The existing ministries did not want the Cabinet
Secretariat to plan and draft bills in their own jurisdiction (Shinoda 2004).
The secretariat also strengthened its functions by the expansion of senior
positions. Five new posts (three Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretaries, one
Cabinet Public Relations Secretary and one Director of Cabinet
Intelligence) were established as special positions directly appointed by
the Prime Minister.12
Moreover, the Prime Minister demonstrated his determination to
improve coordination among the ministries. In February 2002, Prime
Minister Koizumi ordered an expansion of personnel exchanges among
the ministries, aiming to increase the ratio of exchange in some 1,400
senior posts from 3 per cent in 2004 to 10 per cent in 2007. In summer
2004, 14 ministries and agencies exchanged officials for 40 new posts in
addition to the 47 existing posts. This initiative was expected to overcome
the shortcoming of vertically structured ministries and to promote more
coordination among the ministries.
The Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretariat also began to play
more coordinating roles in trade policy formation and negotiations in
various ways. For instance, the Prime Minister became more willing to
intervene directly in the trade negotiation process. A typical example was
negotiations over an FTA with Mexico. The Japanese government strongly
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hoped it could reach an agreement on the FTA when Mexican President
Vicente Fox visited Tokyo in October 2003. Accordingly, Tokyo proposed
a bold cut in tariffs on pork imported from Mexico at the final stage of
negotiations. However, both governments failed to agree, largely due to a
difference of view over the access quota for Mexican orange juice. In early
November, a mission comprised of senior officials from METI and MAFF
had a meeting with the Mexican government representatives, but no
progress was made. In late November, Prime Minister Koizumi dispatched
Shotaro Yachi, a Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, to Mexico City in a bid
to break the impasse in the FTA negotiations. Cabinet Secretariat officials
were part of the mission, but officials from relevant ministries such as
METI and MAFF were excluded on the basis of instructions from the
Prime Minister. That this action was exceptional is shown by the fact that
Hosei Norota, Chairman of the LDP’s Research Commission on
Comprehensive Agricultural Administration, criticised this move as leading
to ‘dual diplomacy’.13
Prime Minister Koizumi continued his efforts to strengthen the
participation of the Cabinet Secretariat in coordinating issues over trade
policy among ministries. Koizumi himself considered that the lack of
coordination among ministries was a main cause of failure in negotiations
with Mexico. Accordingly, several measures were adopted in order to
overcome this problem. In December 2003, Koizumi ordered the
institutionalisation of meetings of FTA-related ministries under the Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary. At the meeting, Directors-General from 14 relevant
ministries were in attendance. Furthermore, Prime Minister Koizumi
created the Council of Ministers on the Promotion of Economic
Partnerships. Council members from 15 government agencies held their
first meeting in March 2004, and discussed Japan’s overall FTA policy at
their second and third meetings in September and December. At the third
meeting in December 2004, the Basic Policy towards Further Promotion
of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) was announced. The policy
identified the value of EPAs in the development of Japan’s foreign relations,
the attainment of Japan’s economic interests and the promotion of
structural reforms, and positioned EPAs as a mechanism to complement
the multilateral free trade system centring on the WTO. The policy was
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accompanied by criteria for identifying countries and regions with which
EPAs were to be negotiated.
These two institutions aimed to strengthen systems that overcome
miscommunication and bickering within the different government
branches. In particular, the Basic Policy was important because it was
virtually the first coordinated government policy for FTAs and EPAs.
Although each ministry had issued its own FTA policy, there was no
integrated policy as the Japanese government.
The formation of cross-ministry institutions had positive effects on each
ministry’s posture towards FTAs. In November 2004, MAFF made public
its policy guidelines (Promotion of EPAs with Other Asian Countries in
the Field of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Green Asia—EPA Promotion
Strategy). The new guidelines were explicit in proclaiming that ‘EPA
efforts…will be promoted in a positive way.’ It then listed six points in
promoting EPAs: i) stabilising and diversifying the sources of food imports
into Japan; ii) ensuring the importation of safe food; iii) promoting the
export of Japanese brands of agricultural products; iv) developing a business
environment for the food industry; v) resolving problems like poverty in
rural areas; and vi) conserving the global environment and ensuring the
sustainable use of resources. MAFF defined the value of FTAs by referring
to the expansion of exports of Japanese agricultural products and the
maintenance of the people’s food safety.
The institutionalisation of the ministers’ meeting forced MAFF to
reconsider its previous approach. Before the basic policy towards EPAs
was announced at the Council’s meeting, each ministry needed to clarify
its own policy stance. MAFF maintained an extremely cautious approach
about including the agricultural sector in FTA talks, formulating a list of
strict criteria for FTA negotiations. Other ministries had formulated their
approach to FTA policy stressing the promotion of FTAs with East Asian
countries. MAFF was in a difficult policy position as most East Asian
countries aimed to conclude FTAs that expanded agricultural exports to
Japan. Eventually, MAFF formulated new policy guidelines with a focus
on Asian countries.
Despite moves to overcome inter-ministerial conflicts, bureaucratic
politics remained a major issue for Japan’s FTA policy. As the FTA
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negotiation emerged as a crucial policy issue for Japan, relevant ministries
began to strengthen their internal organisations that sought to implement
this policy. In November 2003, MAFF established its FTA Headquarters
for formulating strategies for FTA negotiations. Under the headquarters,
five country-specific teams were organised. In August 2004, MOFA
reorganised its FTA/EPA Office into the Regional Economic Partnership
Division, increasing the number of staff from 30 to 40. METI also
established its Economic Partnership Division with some 80 staff.14 These
moves intensified rivalries among ministries and led to less coordination
in FTA negotiations.
This influence was seen in the Japan-South Korea FTA (JKFTA). During
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in
October 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi and Korean President Roh Moo-
hyun agreed to launch formal negotiations for a JKFTA, and the first
round of negotiations took place two months later. However, talks were
stalled after late 2004, largely due to political tensions caused by Prime
Minister Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. At the same time, internal
differences over negotiation style within the Japanese government impinged
on the deadlock. METI and MAFF had different ideas about negotiating
the JKFTA. While METI asserted a negotiation style of exchanging
demands from each government first, MAFF supported a strategy of
presenting the concession lists each other first.
In April 2006, METI announced its New Global Economic Strategy.
One of two pillars of the strategy was the East Asian EPA concept.15 The
concept aimed at launching a comprehensive economic partnership
agreement among ASEAN members, China, South Korea, India, Australia
and New Zealand regarding investment, intellectual property rights, and
economic cooperation in addition to tariff reductions. The creation of a
region-wide FTA network would assist Japanese manufacturing firms under
METI’s jurisdiction that had formed production networks throughout
East Asia.
However, other ministries displayed chilly attitudes towards the East
Asian EPA concept. For instance, Shoichi Nakagawa, who had changed
his ministerial post from METI to MAFF in October 2005, criticised the
concept at the press conference just after it was announced by METI.
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Nakagawa claimed that METI’s concept was unexpected and many matters
should be settled before launching such a concept.16 From MAFF’s
standpoint, the East Asian EPA concept, which included Australia, a major
exporter of agricultural products to Japan, should have been formulated
with due consideration to the influence on the domestic agricultural
market. MOFA was also sceptical about the concept from the viewpoint
of Japan’s relations with the United States, which was excluded from the
concept, and coordination with the ongoing bilateral FTA negotiations.
It was an urgent matter for Japan to formulate a regional FTA strategy
once China launched its aggressive regional economic policy. In fact, the
concept behind Japan’s strategy derived from METI’s concern with the
rising regional role of China, which had proposed the establishment of a
study group for an FTA among ASEAN members, China, Japan and South
Korea at the ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers meeting in September 2004.
METI hoped to show Japan’s leadership in regional FTA policy by
expanding the possible membership to 16 countries to the regional FTA
and broadening the fields targeted in the agreement.17 However, contrary
to normal bureaucratic practice in Japan, METI did not undertake prior
consultations concerning the East Asian EPA concept with other ministries.
METI had little interest in conducting satisfactory discussions, and the
Council of Ministers on the Promotion of Economic Partnership did not
function effectively.
Significant changes in attitudes towards trade policy began to emerge
in the moves and influence of the interest groups and their supporting
politicians. Keidanren gradually intensified their activities in support of
FTAs. A particularly important move was its use of the resumption of
political donations as leverage to exert influence on politicians. In January
2003, Keidanren revealed its plan to commence discussions about the
resumption of political contributions, and this move strengthened the
federation’s bargaining position against politicians. Keidanren organised
meetings with the LDP’s senior executives where its officials explained the
damage that lack of FTAs by Japan caused to Japanese industry. When the
federation’s senior officials met with the LDP’s top executives in June 2003,
the LDP members welcomed the federation’s decision to resume political
contributions. Keidanren members referred to the FTA issue and obtained
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positive responses from the party.18 Coincidentally, one month after this
meeting, the LDP set up the Select Commission on FTAs. Keidanren also
linked the provision of political donations to the parties’ commitments to
its preferred policies. One of the ten priority policy items was ‘the promotion
of commercial, investment and economic cooperation policies responding
to intensive global competition’. Keidanren’s strong commitment to FTAs
was the main content of this item.
Keidanren’s activities made LDP politicians recognise FTAs as a vital
policy issue by detailing the negative effects resulting from the lack of
FTAs on Japanese business activities and the Japanese economy. For
instance, ‘Promotion of EPA/FTA Strategy’—the policy guidelines that
the LDP’s Select Commission on FTAs launched in February 2004—
included a phrase that ‘we need to take account of preventing and breaking
up situations where Japan suffers diplomatic and economic drawbacks
from the lack of an FTA’. This was precisely the point that Keidanren
forcefully argued in relation to the necessity of an FTA with Mexico.
Keidanren also took the lead in expanding the target countries for FTAs.
In April 2006, the Japanese government officially announced that it would
start FTA talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the first
negotiation meeting was held in Tokyo in September 2006.19 The close
linkages with the GCC through an FTA were important in terms of energy
security because Japan gets 75 per cent its crude oil from GCC members.
Japan’s moves were rather slow given that China started FTA talks with
the GCC in April 2005 and the EU did in March 2002.
Importantly, Keidanren was the primary actor urging the government
to enter into FTA negotiations with the GCC promptly. In September
2005, the federation issued a policy proposal—Call for Early Launch of
Negotiations for Japan—GCC Economic Partnership Agreement. The
paper stated that ‘Japan must actively pursue a comprehensive EPA with
the GCC. Such an agreement should include not only elements of an FTA
but also cover the energy sector and the improvement of the business
environment. The conclusion of such an agreement would be of crucial
strategic importance to the historically amicable diplomatic relationship
between Japan and the Middle Eastern countries’ (Nippon Keidanren
2005). Keidanren hoped to avoid a repetition of the experience where
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Japanese firms suffered substantial economic losses due to the lack of an
FTA with Mexico.
As already explained, the agricultural sector was the most serious
constraint upon Japan’s new trade policy, and Zenchu was the actor leading
moves against the inclusion of the agricultural sector in FTAs. However,
the association eventually began to be more realistic towards FTAs. Before
formal negotiations FTAs with Asian countries were launched, an informal
study group comprising representatives from the government, business
and academia engaged in a deliberation of possible effects and problems
of the FTAs. Zenchu sent its officials to these study groups as representatives
from Japanese business circles. In the meantime, Zenchu began intensive
internal discussions about the impact of FTAs on Japanese agriculture. In
February 2004, the association issued a report entitled JA Group’s Basic
Ideas Concerning FTAs with South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia,
and Indonesia. The 54-page report was still cautious about the conclusion
of FTAs, but it represented substantial progress in that Zenchu had actually
investigated the concrete impact of FTA arrangements on Japanese
agriculture from various viewpoints. Moreover, the report stressed the need
for a public dissemination program in order to make the agricultural groups’
basic stance on FTAs better understood by the members and the public.
In line with this new orientation, Zenchu intensified its own public
relations activities to disseminate its basic approach on FTAs to the Japanese
public. An important event in this respect was a summit meeting with
Keidanren, a long-honoured enemy over trade policy. At this meeting in
February 2004, Chairman of Zenchu Isamu Miyata explained to Chairman
of Keidanren, Hiroshi Okuda, the necessity of ‘offensive’ strategies such as
export expansion for Japanese agriculture. The association then determined
that April–June 2004 would be months during which it would conduct
intensive public relations activities such as convening study groups and
symposiums. Zenchu’s public relations activities even went beyond borders.
When a special seminar of the Asian Farmers’ Group for Cooperation was
held in Manila in mid-March, Association representatives attended and
stressed that FTAs should not pursue trade liberalisation alone, but must
involve agricultural cooperation in areas such as food safety and rural
development.20 In March and April, the Association sent a 30-member
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mission to the Philippines and Thailand to exchange views with senior
government officials in the two countries and explain Japan’s conditions
for FTA negotiations.
These changes in attitudes on the part of the agricultural groups were
partially caused by new shifts in their support for politicians from the
LDP. Some of the norin zoku gradually departed from advocating the simple
protection of the domestic farm market from international competition.
These zoku can be called the ‘internationally oriented zoku’ who consider
the protection of Japanese agriculture from a broader and international
perspective. They are different from the conventional zoku who tend to
act to defend narrow interests of agricultural groups. Former Agriculture
Ministers, Yoshio Yatsu and Shoichi Nakagawa, are two representatives of
the newly emerging zoku.
The internationally oriented zoku directly influenced the evolution of
FTA policy and negotiations. In April 2003, Nakagawa and Yatsu met
with Koizumi, and stressed the importance of FTAs. Koizumi was
reportedly influenced through this discussion about FTAs.21 They also
played a crucial role in leading the conclusion of an FTA with Mexico.
Nakagawa, who had become the Minister of METI in the cabinet reshuffle
in September 2003, sought to lead the negotiations over the Japan-Mexico
FTA to a smooth conclusion by coordinating agricultural and trade policies
and interests. As noted earlier, the Japanese government made concessions
by cutting tariffs on pork in October 2003. Some LDP members criticised
this bold measure at a meeting of the party’s Research Commission on
Trade in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products. Yoshio Yatsu, the
Secretary-General of the commission, asserted that the commission
members agreed to leave the matter to the executives of the commission,
and the Government undertook negotiations in close liaison with
commission executives and agricultural producers.22
In summary, the fundamental characteristics of sectionalism in Japanese
bureaucratic politics have remained almost unchanged. However, the Prime
Minister has deepened his recognition of shortcomings caused by
sectionalism and of the need to provide more coordination among
ministries. As a result, the Cabinet Secretariat intervened in trade
negotiations processes and set up institutions that cut across the ministries.
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New moves also emerged in interest group politics. While pro-FTA interest
groups gradually increased their influence, anti-FTA groups became more
realistic in handling the FTA issues and were more tolerant of FTAs. As
for the agricultural issues, internationally oriented zoku gained influence
in the policymaking process.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the evolution of Japan’s FTA policy by examining
trends in domestic politics. In particular, it considered the influence of
bureaucratic politics and interest group politics.
Japan was behind other countries in initiating bilateral FTAs due to its
commitments to multilateralism. After a policy shift from multilateralism
to bilateralism in the late 1990s, Tokyo intensified its own internal
deliberations on FTAs and expanded the number of countries who would
be party to the agreement. However, the new trade initiatives, in general,
did not lead to smooth policy outcomes. The Japanese government failed
to establish a clear-cut vision for FTAs, and the negotiation process often
took longer than expected. The bureaucratic politics and interest group
politics had much to do with this result.
The Japanese government failed to formulate and implement
comprehensive and consistent external economic policy largely because of
rivalry and factionalism among relevant government agencies. METI,
MAFF and MOFA adopted diverse policy stances on FTAs. MAFF was
extremely reluctant to promote FTAs that would lead to the liberalisation
of the long protected agricultural market. METI was an active promoter
of FTAs that would produce significant benefits to Japanese manufacturing
exporters. MOFA tended to consider FTA issues from the broader
perspective such as the stable relationship with the United States.
Interest group politics exercised a vital influence over the evolution of
Japan’s FTA policy. The Japanese Government was obliged to be passive
towards FTAs due to strong opposition to market liberalisation from
agricultural interest groups and their supporting politicians. Agricultural
groups successfully impeded the progress of negotiations of FTAs with
Mexico and Thailand. On the other hand, Keidanren spearheaded the
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evolution of the FTA with Mexico through various measures. In its position
papers, the federation explicitly demonstrated the negative effects that
the absence of an FTA with Mexico had on the performance of Japanese
firms operating in that country. It then lobbied government officials and
ruling politicians to begin negotiations for an FTA. These activities
encouraged government officials to consider the adoption of an FTA strategy
more seriously and to take necessary actions to this end.
Some evolution occurred also in both bureaucratic politics and interest
group politics. The Koizumi administration made efforts to promote inter-
ministerial coordination and intensified direct involvement of the Cabinet
Secretariat in FTA issues. Moreover, cross-ministry institutions were set
up to promote smooth coordination among relevant ministries. Such moves
surely contributed to the advancement of FTA policy by drawing flexible
responses from MAFF. However, the fundamental characteristics of fierce
inter-ministerial rivalry remained unchanged. As for interest group politics,
Keidanren increased its leverage in political circles by resuming political
donations. Agricultural groups became more realistic in handling the FTA
issues. They changed their strategy from stubborn opposition to stress on
public relations activities to gain public understanding about its stance
on FTAs.
Notes
1 Sub-governments are defined as ‘small groups of political actors, both governmental and
nongovernmental, that specialise in specific issue areas’ (Ripley and Franklin 1984:8).
2 The concept of the East Asian Business Zone was formally introduced in the White
Paper on International Trade and Industry 2003.
3 Nippon Keidanren was founded in May 2002 through the merger of the Japan Federation
of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) and the Japan Federation of Employers’
Association (Nikkeiren).
4 Zoku (tribe or clan) are ‘LDP Diet members who exert, formally or informally, a strong
influence on specific policy areas mainly at the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council’
Inoguchi and Iwai 1987:20).
5 Nihon Nogyo Shimbun, 10 August 2001.
6 Nihon Nogyo Shimbun, 4 September 2001.
7 Japan Times, 23 November 2001.
8 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 August 2003.
9 Nihon Nogyo Shimbun, 31 May 2003.
10 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 September 2003.
11 Nihon Nogyo Shimbun, 3 October 2003.
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12 At this reorganisation, the Cabinet Office was established by merging most part of the
Prime Minister’s Office with the Economic Planning Agency, with an eye to providing
greater assistance and support to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
13 Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 2003.
14 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 27 July 2004.
15 The other pillar was the establishment of a policy coordination entity in East Asia to be
modelled after the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
16 Press Conference by Shoichi Nakagawa, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,
7 April 2006. Available at http://www.kanbou.maff.go.jp/kouhou/060407daijin.htm.
17 Asahi Shimbun, 28 July 2006.
18 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 17 June 2003.
19 The GCC member countries are United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Qatar, and Kuwait.
20 Nihon Nogyo Shimbun, 13 March 2004; Japan Agrinfo Newsletter, 21, 9 May 2004.
21 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 December 2003.
22 Asahi Shimbun, 21 November 2003.
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5 OPEN, SECURE, INFLUENTIAL?
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN JAPAN’S
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
Christopher Pokarier
Open borders facilitate economic prosperity but entail risks. Whilst the
promotion of further economic openness remains a formal objective of
Japanese government policy, this imperative is tempered by politically
salient national security concerns that are both broad in scope and deeply
complex. Since 2000, a series of diverse and significant negative events—
such as terrorism, crime, disease, and economic nationalism abroad—have
impacted upon the perceived risks of open borders and reliance upon
international supply chains. These developments have given rise not only
to demands for specific public policy and private sector initiatives in
response to such perceived threats, but have also contributed to a general
attitudinal climate in which policy measures to guard ‘national interests’
find ready legitimacy. Economic openness is not inevitable, being strongly
contested domestically.
Japan’s deep international economic engagement presents a challenging
confluence of contemporary risk management issues, but these are easily
appropriated by domestic protectionist interests and old-fashioned
nationalists. Expansive, and heightened, national security concerns have
led to Japan’s scope for influencing its international environment becoming
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a more explicit object of policy. Japan exhibits strong concerns about being
what may be termed ‘open, secure, and influential’ in its international
economic engagement. This chapter explores the imperatives behind, the
deep tensions within, and the prospects for, these aspirations.
Japan’s recently more uncertain international political environment,
and its policy responses, have been well explored from conventional security
perspectives. The threat of cross-border terrorism, regional tensions
involving a rising China, an autarkic and paranoid North Korea, and a
more self-confident Russia impact on Japanese perceptions of national
security. Japan’s historical concern with resource security has renewed
currency with the rapid growth of China and India as rival customers for
energy and raw materials, in a context of a near global resurgence in economic
nationalism in relation to the resources sector. More generally, the ever-
growing dependence of the Japanese corporate sector on cross-border supply
chains, foreign production locations and markets make the attenuation of
threats to such cross-border business operations a growing concern for
Japanese firms and policymakers. Threats include political and regulatory
risk, infrastructural limitations, inadequate protection of property rights,
crime and corruption, and growing competition for essential business inputs
(energy, basic materials, human resources, rights to technology and brands
etc.). Other operating risks emanate from the physical environment, such
as natural disasters, from the scale, connectivity and mobility of modern
human environments—such as contagious disease and other phyto-sanitary
threats—and from growing political awareness of issues of environmental
sustainability.
From a business perspective, impacts of diverse negative events such as
the SARS epidemic, terrorism, mad cow (BSE) disease, and natural disasters
are experienced by firms directly through operational disruptions and,
indirectly, through the responses—measured or otherwise—of managers,
insurers, investors and regulators. From a public policy perspective, many
of these cross-border risks are compounded by national rivalries, principally
intra-regional. International cooperation is less than fully forthcoming for
joint efforts to address cross-border risks to national welfare. National
pursuit of supply chain certainty through forward integration abroad (such
as through controlling equity stakes) and controls at home, collectively
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may compound perceived overall uncertainty in the international business
environment. Many of the contemporary international risk issues are
characterised by a high level of technical complexity; with understandings
shared amongst international networks of experts—often state employees—
across regions. This has significant implications for the scope and nature
of public policy prescriptions, the forms of international cooperation, and
raises important questions about the efficacy of bilateral and regional
approaches.
The international mobility of many contemporary knowledge-intensive
Japanese enterprises makes salient a much broader set of policy preferences
than when Japan was primarily an exporter of manufactures. For instance,
foreign investment regulation (including those pertaining to cross-border
mergers and acquisitions), intellectual property and corporate law regimes,
product and business regulation, and tax treatment of royalties and license
fees can impact as heavily on firms abroad as tariff regimes. The imperative
for policy reciprocity, in turn, potentially makes these same issues
contentious within Japan. Whilst change in Japan’s preferred loci of
negotiations—from multilateral to bilateral initiatives—attracts much
attention, equally important is the shift in Japan’s priority issues.
Leading Japanese enterprises potentially are significant contributors to
the resolution of apparent conflicts between the imperatives for fewer
barriers to international trade and more secure societies. Japanese firms
are leading providers of information and communications technologies
(ICTs), especially hardware, that may permit the simultaneous facilitation
of desirable cross-border mobility whilst strengthening capacities for
legitimate border protection. In the aftermath of 9/11 the US government
has given unprecedented policy and financial support to technological
applications aimed at enhancing homeland security. Applications providers,
in turn, are scrambling to meet this opportunity, and to align products
and systems with established corporate demands for more efficient ICT-
enabled cross-border supply chains. The pursuit of ‘traceability’ through
radio frequency identity systems (RFIDS) (also known as IC tag) and
e-documentation symbolises this heady pursuit of simultaneous efficiency
and accountability. Japan is, potentially, at the forefront of this
technologically enabled pursuit of a secure but open society.
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Consequently, Japan potentially has much to contribute internationally:
commercially, through aid for capacity building; and through positive
demonstration effects. Yet the scope for creative policy responses might be
heavily constrained by residual structures of interests, and the heightened
risk averseness and uncertainty avoidance commonly associated with mature
economies, an aging demographic make-up, and perhaps with established
patterns of Japanese values.1 Efficiency with assurance (assurance of security
and/or effective attenuation of unavoidable but bearable risks) is the key,
still not well understood, objective.
Much of the large literature on the determinants of Japan’s trade and
other policies impacting on its international economic engagement looks
primarily to the nation’s domestic environment (for example, Mason 1992;
Warren 1997). Whilst developments in the international environment
are profoundly important, and have contributed significantly to policy
change, such influences are generally manifested through a domestic
political economy (for example, Yoshimatsu 2000, 2003). Good accounts
abound of the roles of private interest politics, bureaucratic interests and
turf wars and, somewhat less systematically, public interest ideas concerning
national economic development, in shaping policy outcomes. They accord
with a substantial international literature, both comparative and country-
specific, that examines the domestic politics of trade protectionism (Odell
1990; Milner and Yoffie 1989). The role of countervailing domestic private
interests in promoting foreign trade liberalisation in various countries is
also well understood; as is the interdependent nature of trade policies and
structures of domestic economic interests (Milner 1988; Rogowski 1989;
Odell, 1990; Simmons 1994). Although these studies emphasise the
concrete material interests of domestic constituencies, the important role
of ideas and imperfect information as an explanatory variable is also
recognised (Breton 1964; Anderson and Garnaut 1987; Machan 1992).
Consumers, and sometimes even producer interests, may have an imperfect
understanding of their interests (Bates and Krueger 1993).
The discussion that follows in this chapter assumes an important
explanatory role for both private interests, including those manifested by
and through public institutions, and public interest ideas. The potentiality
of political and policy entrepreneurship for reform can be readily
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conceptualised in these terms; as the Koizumi administrations attested to
the importance of (Mulgan 2000, 2002). Ideas have independent
explanatory power in relation to policy outcomes because information
and cognitive limitations are systematic, as the recent theoretical work of
eminent economic historian Douglass North (2005) prioritises. Of
particular relevance to this chapter is stability and change—sometimes
rapid change—in the perceived security of private and national economic
interests. North sees economic performance as principally a function of
the quality of a society’s institutions, broadly defined, and a principal
objective of such institutions is a perpetual, and often fruitless, desire
to deal with uncertainty (in the Knight-Ellsberg sense; see Moss
2002:40–43).
Open?
Early globalisation discourses about an inexorable move towards ‘a
borderless world’, as in the title of Ohmae’s (1990) influential book, were
rather naïve (Wolf 2002). Despite increasing international regulatory
cooperation and binding international agreements, sovereign national
borders still fundamentally delineate authority in distinct economic
governance systems. Certainly technological innovation has further enabled
various forms of cross-border mobility, and the competitive commercial
adoption of these transport and communications technologies has
dramatically lowered, over time, the costs of such mobility. The direct
consequence has been a dramatic quickening in the pace of growth of
cross-border mobility of all factors of production: ‘globalisation’ as
popularly discussed.
For convenience’s sake, the many forms of cross-border mobility may
be simply classified as involving the following types of flows: goods, services,
financial and corporate transactions, information, and people. A distinction
is drawn between cross-border financial flows and corporate mobility, the
latter referring to cross-border shifts in legal residence of a corporate entity
or to a move, or extension abroad, of the networks and hierarchies of control
that firms represent. Significantly, most international mobility involves
the crossing of public borders through the means of private channels, be
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it via privately provided transport, communications, payments or service
infrastructures. Yet, crucially, new technologies need not necessarily weaken
the capacity of states to enforce borders. They will impact significantly on
the means available and necessity to do so. The ready accessibility of modern
border-spanning private channels creates new national vulnerabilities, and
hence political imperatives for effective border enforcement. At the same
time, recognition of the profound economic and social benefits of open
borders creates imperatives for efficient and minimalist policing of borders.
Japan ranks quite highly in aggregate measures of globalisation, reflecting
the formidable performance of its leading enterprises in global markets
and its international political engagement. Dreher’s (2006) KOF index of
globalisation, ranked Japan 21st in 2000, although the 2007 ranking had
Japan at 40th overall (Swiss Institute of Business Cycle Research, KOF
2007). The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report
2006–2007 has Japan ranked 7th; reflecting its emphasis upon
endowments (such as a rigorous education system and advanced social
infrastructure) rather than openness per se (World Economic Forum 2007).
With certain sectoral exceptions, most notably in agriculture, Japan
has very low average tariff rates. Of course, formally open borders are only
part of the story. It may be that beyond open borders nonetheless lie
closed domestic worlds. Indeed, the formal opening to foreigners of certain
industries and organisations may not be particularly threatening to
established domestic interests because established practices discourage or
frustrate new entrants—domestic or foreign. Japan ranked well behind
the United States and Germany (as EU surrogate) in Wolf, Levaux and
Tong’s (1999) mid 1990s assessment of the practical openness of particular
economies to foreign enterprises; metrics derived through extensive surveys
of executives and qualitative assessments in relation to the three countries
plus South Korea and China. Indeed, on technical barriers such as testing
and certification, restrictions to entry and the like, Japan ranked least
open amongst the five economies. Japan was consistently ranked third
across ten attributes of foreign investment openness (Wolf et al., 1999).
In the decade to 2007 there has been incremental micro-economic reform
in many sectors, but it remains to be demonstrated that Japan’s relative
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openness in relation to NTBs has improved while, as will be seen below,
there are signs of regression in relation to some forms of foreign investments.
Barriers may be attitudinal as much as regulatory or organisational.
Richard Florida (2005:68) may be over-simplifying things somewhat when
he argues, in his influential work on the mobility of ‘creative class’, that
‘openness is the real motor force of economic growth’. He nonetheless
raises challenging questions with his insistence that openness means much
more than the absence of formal barriers to new participants, ideas and
approaches. Openness also entails a substantial cultural dimension.2 There
are no ready comprehensive metrics when the socio-cultural dimensions
of economic openness are considered. The Dreher/KOF indices are notable
for the incorporation of a composite measure of social globalisation; such
proxy measures of social openness being still remarkably rare given the
enormous debate over the nature and social impacts of globalisation (Koster
2007). The KOF 2007 social globalisation had Japan at 54th; although
methodological issues may result in a significant under-estimation of the
extent of inbound information flows to Japan and convergence of tastes.
Yet strikingly, Florida’s ‘Global Creativity Index’ ranks Japan second
only to Sweden, followed in turn by Finland and the United States (Florida
2005:156). Florida’s index is a composite measure based on the ‘3 Ts of
economic growth’—technology, talent and tolerance—with Japan being
particularly strong in the first two. Much of Florida’s work though is
predicated on concerns that the United States, in particular, is dissipating
its own established strengths in those two dimensions through declining
tolerance, especially in relation to the inward mobility of people, as freshly
perceived threats to national security become politically salient. It is to
the Japanese experience of the contemporary security-openness quandary
that we now turn.
Secure?
This section first considers perceived security, security and threats as both
perceived and empirical phenomena, and the scope for profound disconnects
between them. Contemporary Japanese concerns about the national security
dimensions of open borders fall into two broad categories, which the
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following discussion deals with in turn. The first may be described generally
as the risks entailed in a prosperous dependence upon cross-border
transactions. These primarily relate to supply chain security, and resource
security in particular, and vulnerabilities associated with reliance upon
foreign production locations and markets. The second category entails
threats from abroad associated with particular forms of inward cross-border
mobility. To reiterate, the inflows with which such threats may be associated
entail the general areas of goods, services, corporate, financial and
informational flows, as well as human flows.
Perceived security
Central to perceived security is the presence or otherwise of sensed threats,
judged abilities to avoid them, or at least attenuate their (by definition,
negative) impacts, and capacities and preparedness to bear any such residual
impacts. Posner (2004:120–2) explores the ‘economics of attention’ to
explain the inevitably limited capacities of individuals to give attention to
diverse risks and their varying probabilities; with the consequence that
risks ‘available to the mind’ owing to recent occurrence gain greater
attention. They have lower ‘imagination costs’ than less frequent negative
events, reflecting ‘the tendency of people to attach disproportionate weight
to salient, arresting events’; an insight that accords directly with
psychologists’ concept of the availability heuristic (Posner 2004:122, 169).
The mass media, in turn, can identify and amplify the cognitive impacts
of events amongst large audiences that are typically national in orientation.
Benedict Anderson’s (1983) profound insight into how nations are
essentially ‘imagined communities’, given that no citizen knows more than
a tiny proportion of her fellow citizens, and the role of the media in that
imagining, is of direct relevance to the expansive nation of national security
under consideration here. Many of the recently perceived cross-border
risks that are by-product of economic openness would manifest in negative
impacts on a relatively small proportion of individuals, whom it is unlikely
most citizens would ever know personally. Yet through the entrepreneurship
of certain actors—media, political, rent-seekers or others—the perceived
threat may become politically salient.
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Japan, and indeed many other nations, has experienced, since 2000, a
substantial number of ‘arresting events’. Moreover, it is hypothesised here
that these come on top of a gradual rise in risk averseness associated with
economic maturation (Moss 2002) and an aging demographic. Moss
(2002:290), in a masterful study of the expansion of the role of the
American state as ‘the ultimate risk manager’, noted that ‘beginning around
1960, policymakers not only demonstrated unprecedented interest in
addressing a wide range of risks facing the average citizen but also revealed
a new affinity for risk management policies of all kinds’. This ‘security for
all’ exposed the state to significant potential financial liabilities, potentially
compounding moral hazard problems (Moss 2002). This is consistent
with North’s insight, noted earlier, that economic institutions have evolved
as peoples endeavoured to deal, often ultimately fruitlessly, with
uncertainty. Heightened popular risk perception could bring political
pressures upon governments to attenuate perceived threats; without
commensurate understandings or acceptance of the opportunity costs of
trying to do so with the often blunt policy instruments available to the
state.
Prosperous dependence and security
Japan’s growing concerns about resource security are certainly not just
perceptual; they are clearly evidenced in the sharp rises in energy and
minerals prices since 2003. This has not been an entirely unmitigated
bad for corporate Japan. Some firms, such as Mitsubishi Corporation,
who took equity stakes in foreign resources projects in the past, have achieved
dramatic capital gains and dividend returns on those stakes. Often initially
taken to underpin long-term procurement contracts (effectively bond
posting) or for partial control, these stakes had some of the ‘forward defense’
attributes noted above. Yet Japan’s longer-term resource security is an
overriding concern for the Japanese Government as China proactively seeks
such equity stakes in the development of new resource projects. Combined
with a resurgence of economic nationalism in Russia and Latin America,
ongoing governance problems in Africa, renewed instability in the Middle
East, and rising demand from India and other emerging economies, Japan
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faces significant challenges. Disagreement with China over test drilling in
disputed waters has provided a potent ‘arresting event’, if high gasoline
prices and Middle East instability were not already enough to make resource
security a broadly salient threat.
Detailed discussion of Japan’s recent resource security initiatives is
beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to note that there is considerable
public-private sector coordination for renewed ‘resources diplomacy’ and
alternative energy projects, amongst other initiatives. For instance, key
coal industry stakeholders have been involved in an extensive study with
the Queensland state government and Australian industry participants to
address both infrastructure bottlenecks and promote the development of
clean coal technologies. Yet this also highlights a particular policy dilemma
facing the Japanese Government: its championing of greenhouse gas
emission reductions since its decisive hosting of the 1997 UN Climate
Change negotiations brought the Kyoto Protocol into being. Japan has
joined, along with China, India and South Korea in the joint Australia-
US initiative, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate, which had its inaugural ministerial meeting on 12 January 2006
(www.asiapacificpartnership.org; The Australian, 13 January 2006; Yomiuri
Shimbun, 13 January 2006). This is despite other lead members seeing it
as an alternative to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
Broader supply chain security and efficiency issues have become more
important to Japan as its firms increasingly source and produce abroad for
global markets, including Japan’s own. It is increasingly recognised that
costs associated with inefficiencies or monopoly in port and associated
multi-modal transport infrastructures can dwarf the trade-reducing effects
of tariff protection. This is recognised in an issues paper on the liberalisation
of logistics services submitted to multilateral trade negotiators earlier in
2004 by Australia amongst others (Australia 2004b). Transaction costs
for cross-border trade remain relatively high for the Asia Pacific as a whole,
compared to OECD averages (Wilson 2006). Issues include port efficiency,
documentation requirements, extent of IT infrastructure and inter-
operability throughout cross-border supply chains and the like (World
Bank 2005). Japan has been an active proponent of reform and capacity-
building in these areas through APEC and other regional forums although,
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as shall be seen below, it remains in need of further regulatory reform and
enhanced corporate practice at home.
Although observers of Japan’s shift in priorities to bilateral agreements
frequently refer to these as free trade agreements, Japan’s preferred
terminology of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) is significant,
not just because it was less antagonistic towards domestic agricultural
issues (Terada 2006). Nippon Keidanren, the key domestic constituency
for trade liberalisation at all levels, takes seriously the wide range of non-
tariff issues that Japanese negotiators have pursued concessions on. For
instance, Japan’s agreement with Malaysia, formally concluded in
December 2005, covers investment, services trade, intellectual property
issues and competition policy (Daily Yomiuri, 12 December 2005). Mutual
recognition of regulatory standards is another significant policy preference;
once that mirrors European Union developments a decade before. Some
of these issues ‘beyond tariffs’ have a long pedigree; with matters such as
tax treaties and visa rules having figured prominently in negotiations
between Australia and Japan in the mid 1950s in the lead-up to their
landmark Commerce Agreement of 1957 (Australia, DFAT 1997). For
Japan’s global firms, these basic issues matter a great deal. For instance, in
February 2006 Japan and the United Kingdom agreed to a revised tax
treaty that reformed source country taxation on dividend payments from
a subsidiary to the parent firm abroad; including exemptions for royalty
income from trademarks and patents. At the same time, reducing tax
evasion was a joint objective; highlighting the desire of states to strengthen
their enforcement capacities while acting to facilitate international business
(Daily Yomiuri, 4 February 2006).
At the failed Cancun ministerial meeting Japan placed great importance
on the ‘Singapore issues’ of multilateral investment rules, trade facilitation
measures (such as customs and trade procedures), transparency in
government procurement and common competition policy rules (WTO
1998, 1999; Tanaka 2004). Investment provisions, along with competition
issues, were strongly opposed by developing countries and yet were Japan’s
highest priority. Such a policy preference was consistent with the interests
of Japanese enterprises operating abroad. Yet the ‘Singapore issues’ could
also serve as a shield against criticism for the failure of multilateral
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negotiations over the refusal of Japan and the EU to make substantial
concessions on agriculture. One senior Japanese official has since effectively
acknowledged this while asserting that all countries sought to use the
intractable Singapore issues in such a fashion (Tanaka 2004). The politics
of the ‘old trade issues’ remain intractable in sensitive sectors in Japan,
Europe and the United States, and are the main reason for stalled
multilateral negotiations.
Salient inbound risks
Most types of cross-border inflows into Japan are currently perceived by
at least some policymakers and commentators as presenting distinct risks
to national welfare. Tough new anti-money laundering provisions have
seen tighter controls imposed on both the international operations of
banking service providers in Japan, and new identification verification
requirements for domestic cash deposits. Only cross-border information
flows are generally seen in a thoroughly benign light. Interestingly, Japan
is distinguished from many other nations by its lack of protectionist
measures in media contents—especially broadcast and cinema markets
(although foreign control of a broadcaster is prohibited and the Japanese
language affords a degree of natural protection in the case of contents).
Risks associated with imports of goods, foreign investment bringing
corporate control, and the presence of foreigners entail particularly salient
issues.
Goods mobility
Contraband is always of concern, not least given the proximity of Japan’s
neighbours and the astonishing track record of North Korea’s involvement
in the cross-border smuggling of drugs. Enhancement of Japan’s shipping
interdiction capacities has been pursued through joint military and policy
training with the United States and Australia in particular. Smaller scale
anti-smuggling measures are also important. Enforcement of a total import
ban on North Korean products, imposed in response to nuclear and missile
tests, resulted, for instance, in arrest of a Chinese merchant-ship crew in
late March 2007 for falsely declaring North Korean clams as of Chinese
origin (Kyodo/Daily Yomiuri, 1 April 2007).
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International concern about cross-border shipping as a terrorist vector
has arisen given the huge volume of cargo and ship movements, with
much of the seaborne shipping being under flags of convenience, and the
complex interface of port operations and various domestic transport and
other infrastructures (Barnes 2004; Australia, DFAT 2004). As of 1 July
2004 maritime shipping has been subject to new security measures—the
International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) code—mandated by the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in cooperation with the World
Customs Organisation (WCO). It addresses basic shipping security and
is entailing significant compliance challenges and costs for the global
industry (Barnes 2004). Far more onerous however are the United States’
voluntary measures, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The latter
envisages a security and prescreening regime for entire supply chains and
would place US customs officials in foreign ports (OECD 2003). It requires
close working relationships between firms, host governments and US
agencies and has potentially significant implications for cross-border trade.
The concerns for Japan are currently more pertaining to the imposts on
Japanese exporters and shippers to the United States, and less upon Japan’s
own import clearance regime. US developments nonetheless provide a
significant reference point for Japan’s own border security initiatives, as is
clearly seen in the case of passenger movements discussed below. The US
approach to security essentially has two dimensions: ‘pushing the border
out’ and ‘profiling out’, the latter being aimed at concentrating limited
resources for inspection and monitoring upon cross-border movements
that may entail the highest risk (Riley 2005:589).
Japan is in a relatively strong position as a potential lead developer,
implementer, and international supplier of advanced technology-based e-
border and cross-border supply chain management systems that may help
to resolve the seeming contending imperatives for more efficient cross-
border flows and for enhanced border security. Japan is richly endowed
with private sector providers of information and communications
technology-based (ICTs) hardware and applications, such as Hitachi Ltd,
with its advanced hardware infrastructure capacity and leading place in
the rapidly growing RFID IC-tag business. The latter is central to advanced
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inventory management and supply chain traceability systems. Japanese
firms are also leading providers in scanning and sensor technologies, data
storage architecture and so many other relevant high technology
applications. There is an ostensibly supportive policy environment, under
such banners as e-Japan and a ‘ubiquitous computing society’, since at
least the time of the Mori government in 2001, yet in practice public
sector agencies involved in border enforcement could do much more. Given
the cross-border nature of perceived threats, the international government-
to-government coordination challenges are immense if even just some of
the potential of ICT applications (for trade efficiency with border security)
is to be realised.
Given the pattern of Japan’s trade, and the primacy of the Asia Pacific
in its firms’ production networks, regional coordination will be crucial
and the most efficient locus of negotiation and cooperation in relation to
international trade security. Trans-shipment is a striking feature of regional
goods flows, and multi-location production in industries such as consumer
electronics is so common, that a mainly bilateral approach within the
Asian region to the issues will be insufficient. Japan has been a strong
supporter of recent initiatives in APEC in relation to counter terrorism
(APEC 2003a), including strengthening the APEC Counter Terrorism
Task Force. Simultaneously, APEC adopted a regional trade and financial
security initiative within the Asian Development Bank to support projects
related to port security and other measures to guard against the economic
and social costs of terrorism (APEC 2003a). The APEC leaders’ statement
of November 2005 addressed counter-terrorism measures, including
voluntary tests of airport vulnerabilities. Yet APEC still remained mindful
of its founding mission to facilitate trade and regional economic integration;
adopting a statement of resolve to realise simplified customs procedures
whilst strengthening border security (Daily Yomiuri, 17 November 2005).
As noted above, Japan has been a strong supporter of regional initiatives
to enhance port and other supply chain infrastructure and efficiency in
the Asia Pacific region. Yet Japan itself has been in need of port reform,
streamlining of documentation requirements, and more electronic enabling
of the export-import function amongst both businesses and agencies. Japan
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has lagged well behind both leading European economies, as well as efficient
open Asia Pacific economies such as Singapore. Japan’s direct port charges
are among the highest in the world and diminish both Japan’s
competitiveness as an export production location and its market accessibility
for foreign-made goods (Tanaka 2004). Compliance with the full US
agenda on port and logistics security could significantly compound these
costs, as would any future Japan-specific security initiatives. Prime Minister
Abe sought to address some of the port inefficiencies late in 2006,
announcing a series of reforms, including more efficient documentation
and 24-hour operations for certain facilities.
Cross-border goods trade may substantially increase the risk of cross-
border flows of biohazards—to people, to economically and socially
important agriculture, and to species diversity. Consequently, sensitive
trade issues, at multilateral, regional or bilateral levels, are increasingly
concerned with the contested science of threats. Quarantine matters, and
related consumer protection issues, have had a strongly bilateral dimension,
reflecting the usual pattern of direct shipment of perishables. This is also
partly because restrictions often arise under existing administrative
arrangements and can be reformed without new legislation. However, such
issues would be resolved more easily if countries were to follow scientifically
rigorous risk assessment and management practices that enjoy multilateral
standing.
Japan’s response to identification of a single case of Bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) (or ‘mad cow disease’) in the United States in
December 2003 is illuminative of the complex domestic political economy
of phyto-sanitary measures. An immediate ban on US beef was imposed,
which remained in effect until December 2005, when Japan concluded a
bilateral deal with the United States that applied much tougher restrictions
than applied in the United States.3 Japan had demanded a comprehensive
BSE-testing program for all herds in the United States (Japan Times, 9
July 2004). A ban on US beef was re-imposed in early 2006 after a shipment
from the United States was found to contain backbone material, but was
then lifted in July after official Japanese inspections of certified US export
processing plants (Daily Yomiuri, 31 March 2007). Japan’s initial ban had
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a dramatically negative impact on Japanese beef importers and end users
such as the large gyudon (beef bowl) chain Yoshinoya, having ended a
trade worth US$1.4 billion in 2003 (Daily Yomiuri, 31 March 2007).
Although Japanese beef producers gained some modest short-term
benefits from the ban, ironically more significant was the boost to the
reputation of Australia as beef provider as Japanese users featured it in
their advertising. Japan’s own BSE cases presented a challenge to the existing
bureaucratic politics of agricultural policy as it clearly pitted domestic
producers’ interests against the cause of consumer protection, placing
bureaucrats and legislative supporters of producer interests in a difficult
position. Anticipating official granting of safety status to US beef by the
UN World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in May 2007, the US
Agriculture Secretary called on Japan to ease its restrictive provisions for
US beef imports swiftly (31 March 2007). The issue brings to the fore the
issue of Japan imposing more stringent standards than international
organisations, taking up the counsel of international communities of experts,
have adopted.
Services
Japan’s general progress on services liberalisation has been well explored
elsewhere, as has such reform’s capacity to stimulate economic growth
more generally (see, for example, Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian
2006). Motoshige Itoh has recently identified public services, health care,
food services and education as areas where reform remains difficult, but is
needed. The call by private sector members of a government panel for
‘open skies’ aviation deals and 24-hour operations at Haneda (Kyodo/
Daily Yomiuri, 29 March 2007) touched on a sensitive area of infrastructure
in which national security concerns can readily be deployed in defense of
established interests. In late March 2007, a Construction and Transport
Ministry advisory panel issued a report to the Government recommending
strict measures—regulatory and firm-based—to prevent foreign investors
having significant shareholdings in Japan’s three major international airport
operators. Narita International Airport Corp., Chubu Centrair
International Airport Corp. and Kansai International Airport Co. are to
be privatised through public floats. The report declared that: ‘[i]t is
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necessary to prevent foreign entities from obtaining control and investment
funds from conducting hostile takeovers’ as the airports constitute ‘social
infrastructure indispensable to the nation’s economic activity and citizens’
life’ (Kyodo/Daily Yomiuri, 29 March 2007).
Corporate mobility
As this case suggests, inbound corporate mobility—principally captured
statistically through figures on inward FDI and mergers and acquisitions
involving foreign firms—continues to provoke insecurities in Japan. This
is despite powerful positive examples provided by the likes of the Renault-
Nissan corporate alliance that revitalised the once-ailing Japanese
automaker (Ghosn and Ries 2005). Merger and acquisition activity
involving Japanese firms abroad actually outstripped that involving foreign
firms in Japan in 2004 and 2005 and, overall, inward FDI into Japan is
strikingly low by comparison with other OECD economies.
Hostile corporate control events, once exceedingly rare in Japan, have
become more common (Milhaupt 2005; Nottage 2006). The Japan
Ministries of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Justice released
guidelines for defensive measures against hostile takeover bids in 2005,
around the rather nebulous notion of ‘corporate value’, which they saw as
something analytically distinct from shareholder value (Whittaker and
Hayakawa 2007:20). Subsequent legislative changes to company law in
May 2006 gave incumbent managers more latitude to enact takeover
defences. This was principally because of more liberal provisions relating
to the issue of special class shares, new rights plans that would exclude a
bidder, and the use of ‘golden shares’ (Whittaker and Hayakawa 2007:21).
A 2006 Nikkei survey revealed that some 70 per cent of responding
executives were considering adoption of takeover defences (Nikkei Weekly,
29 March 2007). NTT and airlines have defences in place, primarily
directed at foreign investors seeking control (Kyodo/Daily Yomiuri, 29
March 2007). Striking too is the support that the managements of targeted
firms can draw from sections of the mass media; itself a recent loci of
controversies over unsolicited bids for corporate control by domestic
industry outsiders, principally from new media/internet entrepreneurs.
In 2005–6 Japan was transfixed by the hostile move on Fuji Television by
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internet firm Livedoor and its controversial then-president Takefumi Horie.
The role of the US investment banking institution, Lehman Brothers, in
providing finance to Livedoor attracted critical scrutiny from both populist
politicians and some media commentators.
The American investment fund, Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund
(Offshore), has been a lightning rod for criticism of the role of foreign
investors. Steel Partners launched unsolicited bids for several firms,
including Yushiro Chemical, Soto Co. and Myojo (Forbes, 29 March
2007). The bids all failed, but were nonetheless profitable as Steel Partners
were able to sell down partial stakes in the firms at substantial premium,
following alternative ‘white knight’ bids solicited by the boards of the
targeted firms. In the case of Myojo, it was absorbed by larger domestic
rival Nissin. Yet Steel Partners’ move on leading brewer, Sapporo Holdings
Ltd, ran into interesting difficulties, where its board won approval from a
majority of shareholders for defensive measures (Nikkei, 29 March 2007;
Forbes, 29 March 2007). These shareholders included a considerable
number of individual investors, who may have foregone short-term capital
gain as a consequence.4 Appeals to attitudes concerning the distinctive
attributes of Japanese firms, and an element of economic nationalism,
seem to have been effective for management.
The Fuji–Livedoor dispute and Steel Partners cases have prompted
intense discussion in Japan about markets for corporate control, shareholder
value norms, and their appropriateness or otherwise in Japan. The Yomiuri
Shimbun, a leading conservative daily, editorialised vociferously against
such non-Japanese practices, vulture-like hedge funds, and a culture of
so-called ‘mammonism’. The antipathy to foreign ownership and control
evidenced in the Construction and Transport Ministry advisory report on
privatisation of major airports, cited earlier, was strikingly at odds with
Japan’s professed objectives in international negotiations. To date, such
multilateral negotiations have shown no prospects for success while those
at the bilateral level have involved partners that were unlikely to be
significant sources of direct investment to Japan.
People mobility
The dual themes of openness and security, and potential tensions between
them, are readily observed in policy developments and public discourse
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over the presence of foreigners in Japan, on both temporary and longer
term bases. Whilst the entry of foreigners in Japan has long been
associated—probably quite excessively—with the risk of crime, several
violent crimes and instances of pickpocket and burglar gangs in the early
2000s compounded such fears. The events of 9/11, and the United States’
subsequent adoption of a strict advance passenger movement alert systems,
fingerprinting on arrival, profiling, and its push for wide adoption ‘smart’
biometric passports, have significant changed Japanese policy dynamics
on migration controls. Taking a lead from the new US measures, Japan
passed legislation implementing many similar measures. Whether the new
ICT applications are utilised to simply enhance the efficiency of border
policing—at the expense of the comfort of foreigners travelling to and
from Japan—or whether they also offer benefits to the affected will be a
significant test of the resolve of policymakers to realise secure but relatively
open borders. ICT applications have the potential to simplify significantly
the currently arcane alien registration system, as well as applying for visa
extensions that currently entails considerable inefficiency and frustration
for applicants.
In Japan, as elsewhere, SARS was a potent ‘arresting event’ in relation
to the perceived risks of international mobility. Concerns about cross-
border transmission of disease are not limited to inbound foreigners, given
the high international mobility of Japanese. Health issues are inevitably
regional and multilateral given the multidirectional mobility of people
across borders. The threat of a pandemic, with devastating direct social as
well as economic costs, entails profound technical and policy complexity.
Clumsy anticipatory responses themselves may have profoundly negative
economic impacts. The APEC Leaders’ and Ministers’ meetings in Bangkok
(APEC 2003a, 2003b) endorsed the Health Security Initiative in the wake
of SARS and of a US-Singapore initiative to create a regional emerging
disease intervention centre in the latter. In November 2005, APEC
members in Busan agreed to the establishment of a list of ‘available and
funded’ experts on bird flu and like influenza pandemics, to a joint desk-
top simulation exercise testing readiness, and to building capabilities for
rapid responses to pandemics in their early stages. The statement pledged
members ‘to effective surveillance, transparency, and openness and close
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domestic, regional and international coordination and collaboration’ (Daily
Yomiuri, 20 November 2005). Around the same time, the G7 also agreed
to closer cooperation on the bird flu threat (Daily Yomiuri, 20 November
2005). Significantly, APEC members also committed to information
exchange on border screening procedures and controls, with a view to
minimising adverse impacts on trade and travellers (Daily Yomiuri, 20
November 2005).
It is a formal object of policy to promote substantial growth in inbound
international student, researcher and specialised labour mobility.
Motivations for this include their potential role as an impetus to the
invigoration of the organisations that host them, synergistic effects leading
to the creation of new knowledge resources, and longer-term linkages that
might enhance Japan’s international influence. Somewhat controversially,
Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement with the Philippines created a
precedent for concessions on access for professional service providers. The
agreement allowed for a quota of nurses from the Philippines, subject to
professional qualifications and Japanese language requirements being met.
New concerns about guarding knowledge resources from theft by foreign
employees and visiting researchers have become publicly salient. In 2004,
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
(MEXT) issued a formal advisory to universities about access to certain
sensitive technologies by foreign researchers and students. Media attention
focused in early 2007 on the particular case of a Chinese employee at
Toyota-related firm, Denso, which was found to have copied a large number
of component blueprints. Popular concerns about Chinese espionage—
official and industrial—were much heightened by the suicide of a Japanese
diplomat in China after he reportedly was entrapped through a romantic
liaison. In March 2007 significant media attention was being given to the
case of a Maritime Self-Defense Force petty officer who was found to be in
possession of a hard disk containing advanced Aegis destroyer radar data
after police searched his home following an allegation that his wife, a
Chinese national, was in violation of immigration law (Yomiuri Shimbun,
31 March 2007). Subsequent reports suggested that long-standing data
mishandling at a training centre had, in fact, led to a number of unapproved
SDF staff being in possession of the data.
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In recent years there have been explicit official policy statements in
relation to the contribution that long-term foreign residents and permanent
migrants may make to Japan, both in terms of addressing specific skills
shortages and contributing to the general problem of Japan’s rapidly aging
demographic profile. In fact, as Dr Robert Feldman notes, the economics
of an aging society in Japan are so severe that they cannot be resolved
primarily through inward migration (Feldman 2004). Domestic human
resource productivity must play the primary role, although he notes that
foreign human resources—through either management know-how or
simply an infectious desire to work and achieve—may help stimulate that.
Yet many Japanese firms are still a long way from changing human resource
recruitment and promotion systems that would allow Japan to attract and
retain the international human resources mooted in official policy
statements. In a positive vein, there was strong media interest in 2006
data showing that more than one in a dozen marriages in Japan were to
foreign citizens, with a ratio of nearly one to eight in the Tokyo region.
This may prove to be an impetus to discussion about Japan’s growing
diversity and what it means for national interests.
Influential?
In a system of sovereign nation states, threats to national interests
originating beyond national borders can be addressed only through appeals
to the mutual interests of foreign public and private actors where present,
or through exercising influence over them. Japan’s scope for international
influence in relation to the issues discussed above has two dimensions.
Firstly, reflecting the technical complexity and the consequent importance
of communities of expertise, is the open question of Japanese influence in
these specialist international circles. That also gives rise to consideration
of the international standing of Japanese universities and other research
institutions, and to the issue discussed above of what are the appropriate
loci of international negotiation on particular issues impacting on, or arising
from, economic integration. Secondly, broader issues of Japan’s ‘soft power’
arise. That, in turn, raises the continuing domestic and international
political difficulties surrounding Japan’s modern history in the region, as
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well as how the politics of domestic interest groups may impact adversely
on Japanese influence abroad.
Specialist influence
The previous section noted the complexity of many of the contemporary
perceived threats to national welfare associated with Japan’s international
economic engagement. This complexity has two dimensions: inherent
technical difficulty and then the complexity entailed in designing,
implementing and assessing policy responses to it. Relevant policy
communities have a distinct demography, reflecting networks and clusters
of expertise that span organisational types and, in specialist academic circles
at least, national borders. Frequently, members of these policy communities
will have strong shared norms that may shape the set of conceivable policy
options (Atkinson and Coleman 1992).
An illuminating instance of the dynamics potentially involved here is
provided by Japan’s July 2003 defeat in a WTO Dispute Settlement Body
ruling on a case brought by the United States against Japan for its ban on
American apples.5 Japan utilised quarantine provisions to prevent the
imports on the grounds of a risk of the apple blight disease being
transmitted to domestic apple production. The panel report did not accept
that Japan had established such a risk as it was obligated to do under the
agreement on phyto-sanitary measures adopted at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round. A review of the transcripts of the final hearings is
illuminating in showing how risk issues were dealt with by the expert
witnesses and how the Japanese case appeared not to be informed by those
established risk assessment and management concepts (WTO 2003).6 Yet
the considerable size and status of the Japanese delegation in attendance
testifies to the importance that was placed on the WTO panel report by
Japanese policymakers (WTO 2003) One of the expert witnesses in the
case concluded that the original SPS agreement had specified the Principle
of Managed Risk which should have led signatories to establish a formal
risk management policy and, by implication, appropriate capacities to
realise it (WTO 2003).7
Recent supply crises involving the beef, poultry and pork industries
might be transformed into a positive force over the longer term if there is
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effective state-private sector collaboration within Japan and with suppliers
abroad to implement mutually accepted risk management methodologies
and tracing technologies. Greater consumer confidence can be invoked, to
the benefit of foreign and Japanese stakeholders in such international supply
chains. Moreover, states have a significant capacity to attenuate or
compound the disruption to international supply chains entailed in critical
incidents, not only through border controls but also through their control
of major medical, scientific and analytical capacity as well as state authority
itself. Many firms and other private institutions, for instance, relied solely
on the official advices issued by home governments and international
agencies on basic matters such as staff travel after the outbreak of SARS
and heightened concerns about terrorism. While international regulatory
cooperation, under the aegis of multilateral, regional and bilateral initiatives,
has certainly been enhanced in recent years, there is still a long way to go
before a true ‘international policy community’ can be said to exist. The
Japanese civil service needs enhanced risk assessment and management
capacities as well as more personnel with the skills set necessary to function
as effective long-term interlocutors with their counterparts in relevant
foreign agencies.
Japan’s ‘soft power’ and regional challenges?
Complex external threats, especially arising through and because of
transnational private organisations, require the cooperation of many foreign
individuals, diversely situated organisationally, to address them. Nye
(2004) argues for the importance of ‘soft power’ in a nation being able to
secure that cooperation. METI (2003a, 2003b) has recently made much
of the role of exports from Japan’s cultural industries in enhancing the
nation’s ‘soft power’—‘Brand Japan’ in Foreign Minister Aso’s words—
and the positive economic ‘ripple effects’ to other Japanese industries and
organisations abroad.8 Japan’s official FTA strategy statement asserted,
rather blithely, that resulting economic linkages would give ‘rise to a sense
of political trust among countries that are parties to these agreements,
expanding Japan’s global diplomatic influence and interests’9 (MOFA
2002).
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Japan’s standing as a net exporter and major beneficiary of the multilateral
trading system means it risks dissipating international influence in
protecting uncompetitive domestic producers in remaining protected
sectors. World Bank research revealed significant gaps between the perceived
openness and efficiency of particular national business environments—as
measured in influential surveys such as that by AT Kearney—and realities
as judged by World Bank analysts (World Bank 2004). This suggests an
important role—of an essentially public goods nature—for the effective
national projection to international business communities, and the media
and public agencies relating to them. The Japan Export Trade Organisation
(JETRO) has long been well-resourced and committed to such a function,
yet the broader lesson remains that perception management is imperative.
Japan’s greatest economic and political challenges lie in engagement
with emerging China. As the discussion above attests, an emergent China
is a significant consideration in a number of Japan’s established and
emerging security concerns, broadly defined. Japanese exports and
investment to China have surged (Asian Wall Street Journal, 23–25 July
2004:A3). China presents significant competition to Japan in raw materials
and energy markets, as well as in related shipping and other business
services. China is very relevant to contemporary Japanese cross-border crime
and public health concerns. While Japan’s official FTA strategy flagged a
vision of future mutual economic partnership between Japan, China, Korea
and ASEAN, a ‘wait and see’ policy on an FTA with China was enunciated
(MOFA 2002). Achieving a comprehensive FTA with China would be
immensely difficult, with a pre-requisite being an effective official dialogue
that goes well beyond the recent thaw in official relations with the ascension
of Shinzo Abe to the prime ministership.
The contemporary cross-border risk agenda can only be addressed
through international cooperation and negotiation, the loci of which must
be driven by the nature of each of the issues at stake. It must also be
recognised that the scope for trade-offs will vary greatly depending on the
nature and number of parties at the table; the level of the international
game impacts on the domestic political calculus for governments. In their
review of the state of the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship, de Brouwer
and Warren (2001) concluded that while the locus of negotiations over
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the removal of tariffs and other major formal trade barriers should be at
the multilateral level, important trade facilitation initiatives could
nonetheless be pursued at the bilateral and regional level. Some of the
issues at the interface of trade and security will inevitably be first dealt
with at a bilateral level—albeit with the United States rather than the
countries with which Japan pursues free trade agreements.
Conclusions
Established structures of producer, legislative and bureaucratic interests
have interacted historically to present apparently formidable barriers to a
major change in Japan’s foreign economic policy preferences. Nonetheless,
the Japanese economy, through both long established dynamics of policy
liberalisation and private sector initiative, has become deeply integrated
into the Asia Pacific regional and global economies. Key Japanese
constituencies for further economic openness abroad—such as the
Keidanren and its leading members—could do much more though to
articulate the benefits of openness at home. In particular, the positive
contribution that foreign investors, in free markets for corporate control,
might make to corporate value in Japan needs to be prioritised.
Japan is sufficiently endowed with technical expertise to make a
significant contribution to resolving the apparent dilemmas of national
economic openness and security. The suite of contemporary risk issues,
ranging from terrorism to disease and including immigration and crime,
has made ‘border protection’ highly political salient in many countries.
Some political entrepreneurialism tapping community concerns in Japan
is inevitable. As in past political controversies over the costs and benefits
of trade and FDI, there is a crucial role for independent rigorous assessments
of the real risks presented by cross-border movements of goods and people
and the opportunity costs of heavy-handed restrictions. Japan’s past spurious
defences of non-tariff barriers on risk grounds are the stuff of legends.
Japanese trade policymaking needs to be informed by a sense of the fragility
of state credibility and yet the potency of state reputation in restoring
confidence in the wake of a critical incident.
As Yoshimatsu in this volume and other authors have shown, bureaucratic
turf wars on ‘traditional’ trade issues in Japan remain rife, underpinned as
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they are by private interest politics and institutional inadequacies that
make strategic policy initiatives difficult both to formulate and to
implement. With effective political leadership, the new security, risk and
border protection agendas could provide an impetus to inter-agency
coordination and strategic planning. This would not only see the issues
dealt with more effectively, but might also provide some scope for
transcending particularistic interests in favour of national interest-
maximising trade policy preferences. Ideally, leading civil servants would
use the technical complexity and new analytics of the risk issues involved
to take on a ‘bureau shaping’ role. Dunleavy (1992) recognised that this
was fundamental to executive actors in Anglo-American societies becoming
drivers of bureaucratic reform itself and broader economic reform. Without
that leadership, entrenched protectionist interests might appropriate the
new currency of cross-border risk to frustrate some of the market
liberalisation initiatives arising from bilateral and, one hopes, multilateral
negotiations.
Notes
1 It is not the intention of the author to extrapolate from the influential work of Hofstede
(2001) on comparative values, in which Japanese were found to exhibit relatively very
high levels of ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (as he used the term) on average, to the political
economy of cross border mobilities. Much more conceptual and comparative empirical
work would be required before any such conclusions could be drawn.
2 In Florida’s (2005:72) words: ‘Since every human being has creative potential, the key
role for culture is to create a society where that talent can be attracted, mobilised and
unleashed. All of this turns on an expansive, open, and proactively inclusive culture…Open
culture is a spur to innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic development’.
3 US standards require the removal of brains, spinal cords, backbones and other risk
material from cattle aged 30 months or older, while the more restrictive Japanese provisions
imposed a 20-month age threshold. That agreement was nonetheless controversial in
Japan (Daily Yomiuri, 31 March 2007).
4 The Sapporo poison pill and related defence measures nonetheless required annual
reaffirmation by shareholders, suggesting that management needs have at least some
regard for shareholder value.
5 Japanese agriculture bureaucrats and legislative backers seem determined to strengthen
their hand vis-à-vis major food suppliers such as the United States and Australia on
phyto-sanitary issues wherever possible. In 2005 the ministry announced a new project,
and associated pubic consultation process, to examine the environmental and economic
impact of introduced species.
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6 The US submission wryly observed of Japan’s much-emphasised distinction between
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ evidence of a risk, with the latter being sufficient to justify restrictive
measures, that what mattered of evidence was ‘whether it was scientific’ (WTO 2003:24).
7 The advising expert was Dr Ian Smith, Director-General of the European and
Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation in Paris. He noted that submissions in
the apple case, as in some others, had focused solely on the Principle of Minimal Impact.
Yet the Principle of Managed Risk created as part of the International Standards on
Phyto-sanitary Measures states that ‘because some risk of introduction of a quarantine
pest always exists, countries shall agree to a policy of risk management when formulating
phyto-sanitary measures’. Coupled with Standard No. 11 that stated ‘since zero risk is
not a reasonable option, the guiding principle for risk management should be to manage
risk to achieve the required degree of safety that can be justified and is feasible within the
limits of available options and resources’. Smith concluded that ‘on the basis of this
principal it should be possible to manage risks which are open to some uncertainty’
(WTO 2003:220).
8 The ‘soft power’ concept was first developed by Joseph Nye and has recently been
applied to discussions of the United States in particular in the wake of September 11 and
the Iraq conflict. Popular and official interest in Japan’s soft power was provoked by an
article in Foreign Policy by MacGray (2002) on Japan’s ‘gross national cool’. The general
‘brand state’ notion was proposed by van Ham (2001) in an equally influential article in
Foreign Affairs.
9 Moreover, it was declared that FTAs would ‘increase Japan’s bargaining power in WTO
negotiations’ without clarifying how or to what ends such leverage, if it was in fact
attained, might be deployed (MOFA 2002).
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6 OUT OF THE JAPANESE INCUBATOR
I-MODE AND THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IMPERATIVE
Adam Johns
Due to a critical mass of high-tech manufacturers and the resultant
intensity of domestic competition, Japan has long been a hotbed of
innovation in various manufacturing and services sectors. Yet despite this
potential for domestic competition to fuel international competitiveness
of locally developed innovations, many Japanese firms have faced difficulties
in expanding operations overseas. While exports of technology-centric
manufactures have achieved considerable success, process or knowledge-
intensive exports of services that are reliant on tacit communication have
been more problematic for Japanese firms, despite some innovative and
efficient services sector operating in the domestic market. It is not surprising
thus that this deficit in trade of services has contributed to the perception
that Japan’s only competitive sectors are in manufacturing. This lack of
competitiveness has particularly been the case when it comes to reaping a
return on the intellectual property component inherent in innovations in
technology, processes, and business models or systems.
This comes despite Japan having been an exemplar throughout East
Asia and the Pacific as an innovator across a number of industries. Many
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economies in the region have long looked to Japan as the forerunner in
innovations ranging from consumer electronics to automobiles, and from
television programs to lifestyle goods. Yet despite this demonstration effect,1
more intangible products such us television programs and business models
have, in the past, either been imitated and adapted by local firms, or have
not been exported for a number of reasons. In both situations, rents have
not flowed back to Japan in an era when the economy needs to rely
increasingly on its human capital and intellectual property.
In the field where telecommunications, consumer electronics, and media
content converge, Japan has witnessed the unique success of mobile internet
through the innovation of front-running mobile operator NTT DoCoMo
and its ‘i-mode’ service, alongside rival services offered by KDDI and
Softbank.2 DoCoMo’s i-mode is worthy of further investigation not only
because of its unique success in Japan, when operators in other countries
failed to launch a sustainable mobile internet service, but also because it
provides a pertinent example of how a successful business model was
licensed to mobile operators in countries around the world.
In the face of attempts at foreign direct investment in the US content
business by Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers (Matsushita and
Sony), this case highlights how Japanese firms are beginning to seek
alternative revenue streams for exporting innovations not only in
technological hardware and production processes, but in marketing and
business model design.
The role of licensing such intellectual property has been cemented not
only by the rise in recent years of licensing fees and royalties as a proportion
of Japanese foreign earnings, but also by cogent Japanese government
policies that recognise the value of building capacity for intellectual property
creation and protecting the rights of intellectual property owners.
This chapter explores the unique success factors of i-mode, and,
questioning its applicability outside of Japan, shows how DoCoMo went
about licensing the business model after failed attempts at foreign direct
investment. I-mode’s international licensing may well be a harbinger for
an increase in the licensing and export of a variety of Japanese innovations
abroad that have the ability to transcend cultural specificities.
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The i-mode model
Mobile internet technologies have had the potential to provide consumers
with significant utility, given their ability to deliver information in a timely
fashion, reduce transaction costs, and provide access to a wide variety of
content. Yet until the now well-documented success of i-mode and mobile
internet in Japan, mobile internet platforms in most developed countries
had failed to capture consumer and industry interest. In Japan, however,
mobile internet subscribers to the three major carriers’ services had passed
70 million in May 2004, providing users, operators, and industry with a
value-added communications channel. As of February 2007, subscribers
had passed 83 million (Telecommunication Carriers Association 2007).3
Launched by NTT DoCoMo in 1999 to abate the slowed growth of
the maturing mobile telephony market, i-mode began to garner attention
from analysts, industry players, and academics outside of Japan when it
attracted 10 million subscribers by mid–2000, and had 30 million
subscribers by the end of 2001.4 This resulted in a plethora of news articles
and research reports as well as a significant volume of academic articles
(such as Devine and Holmsqvist 2001; Jonason and Eliasson 2000), which
have continued into recent years as DoCoMo began to take i-mode overseas
(for example, Peltokorpi et al. 2007; Lindmark et al. 2004).
Following this success, operators across Europe and Asia have signed
licensing agreements with NTT DoCoMo to offer the i-mode service in
their respective markets. Yet with subscriber growth from some of
DoCoMo’s European partners indicating mixed results, and some operators
such as Telstra in Australia and O2 in the UK announcing in July 2007
their discontinuation of i-mode, can the fundamental business model
evidenced in i-mode’s success in Japan be replicated in other countries, or
is it simply due to socio-cultural or industry characteristics in the Japanese
market?
If i-mode can in fact be transplanted to other countries, it may well
become an exemplar for Japanese firms licensing their innovations abroad,
given that it represents a convergence of tangible goods such as electronics
manufacturing and telecommunications hardware, with more intangible
products including creative content, software and technological standards,
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as well as marketing know-how and innovative business model design.
Not only would the successful licensing of i-mode have positive spill-over
effects on other Japanese firms, such as handset manufacturers and content
providers, but it would also present an example of how intellectual property
residing in a wide gamut of knowledge-based products can be exported.
Key features of the business model
DoCoMo’s i-mode offers users (as do its rival services in Japan) an ‘always
on’ dedicated email client and web browser by which they can access a
variety of aggregated content, allowing them to browse news, check weather
and train timetables, download music, buy plane tickets, update their
blog, and interact with others on social networking sites. It provides a
service for ‘analogue’ people rather than a gadget for technology enthusiasts
(Matsunaga 2000).
The core of the i-mode business model can be described as creating a
‘semi-open platform’, that is with elements of closed, proprietary systems
that offer structure and security, and open platforms that provide freedom
of choice and interconnectivity (Johns 2003). The key elements to this
platform are a collaborative business network between the operator and
the handset manufacturer, the aggregation of content, a centralised payment
mechanism, the separation between operators and content providers,
freedom of access for users, and the increased connectivity these elements
deliver.
Collaborative business network. The inter-firm relationships between
DoCoMo (the network operator) and various handset manufacturers
resulted in a highly reliable and functional technical platform. Handsets
were tailored to the network operator’s specifications, meaning there was
no chance of incompatibility between handset capability and network-
supported services. This stable operating environment was not achieved
through vertical integration but through close cooperation between
manufacturers, vendors, and network operators.
This ‘single and indivisible relationship’ (Natsuno 2000) between service
provider (DoCoMo) and handset manufacturer has resulted in a win-win
situation for both parties, as demand for new functions and services means
an increased demand for new handsets that make these applications
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possible. This increases the turnover rate of handsets and improves the
profitability of both actors. Thus highly customised network-specific
handsets produced by popular manufacturers became necessary in order
for network operators to attract and retain subscribers.5
Behind the reliable user interface, building an interdependent
relationship with handset manufacturers allowed for the easier deployment
of standard technologies. I-mode’s cHTML (compact Hypertext Markup
Language) was a ‘simple’ solution in that being a subset of HTML made
it more open and widely understood. By developing cHTML and associated
transfer protocols, DoCoMo implemented a language that end-users and
programmers were more likely to be familiar with, as it is the de facto
internet standard (Lunn 2001).
Furthermore, this cHTML platform was implemented over a packet-
based network rather than circuit-switching technology, giving users
immediate access without the need to ‘dial-up’, and allowing for seamless
movement between web and voice usage. It also made it easier for operators
to charge users for the volume of information they downloaded, not the
time they were connected.
Pointing to the success also enjoyed by rival services that use different
technologies, some observers have questioned the role cHTML and packet
switching played in i-mode’s popularity (Lindmark et al. 2004). Yet other
platforms (KDDI and J-Phone/Softbank) use different technology because
cHTML was developed by DoCoMo. Without the large research and
development budgets, these competitors used tweaked de facto standards
or licensed technical solutions and packaged them in a way that ultimately
replicated i-mode’s functionality.6 As discussed later, the presence of a
unique technology also has ramifications for the licensing of i-mode overseas.
Aggregating content. Acting as a content aggregator, DoCoMo provided
access to a variety of ‘official’ content services through their ‘iMenu’ portal,
affording users easy and timely access to a wide variety of content, while
content providers were given easy access to markets. By restricting content
that was placed on the ‘iMenu’, however, DoCoMo also played a
monitoring role providing users with the assurance of quality. As the service
provider, DoCoMo were ideally situated to play the role of aggregator
between content providers and users.
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Critically, the value of the i-mode services lies in the inherent market-
making function of aggregation. DoCoMo do not create any content
themselves, but rather organise third-party content into a user-friendly
portal for users to access.7 Aggregating content services in a portal added
structure to the platform by organising content and information, thereby
reducing search and decision costs while improving quality of service.
Starting with 67 content providers, i-mode’s iMenu had 4,245 ‘official
sites’ as at June 2004. As of February 2007, there were over 8,430 official
sites for 3G i-mode users (NTT DoCoMo 2007a).
Micro-payment mechanism. According to Natsuno (2000), it was difficult
for content providers to receive benefits or revenue from internet-delivered
information before the entry of i-mode. Adding a centralised micro-payment
mechanism allowed small subscription fees for official content to be placed
on users’ phone bill rather than requiring them to use another form of
payment such as credit cards or prepaid cards. Instead of paying tiny fees
to various content providers, subscribers have their charges aggregated on
their monthly bill by NTT DoCoMo, who collects fees on behalf of
providers, taking a nine per cent commission from this revenue. DoCoMo
also placed restrictions on pricing strategies of content providers, limiting
them to between 100–300 yen per month (Matsunaga 2000).
Encouraging third parties to develop and provide content, and users to
access this content saw i-mode act as a market-place intermediary. At a
time when a lack of established payment mechanisms were causing
problems for ‘e-commerce’ and ‘m-commerce’ (mobile commerce) alike,
i-mode’s payment system added a stable and secure structure to the mobile
internet platform and allowed it to be used as a viable distribution channel
without the need to create a direct billing relationship between users and
content providers.
Despite its success, this concept is not completely revolutionary or
unique. As Matsunaga (2000) points out, telecommunications carriers
have long been a proxy for the collection of fees for premium telephone
information services. Similarly, subscription television operators provide
users with access to a bundle of channels, and then charge on behalf of the
respective content providers.
141OUT OF THE JAPANESE INCUBATOR
Separation from content provider. Significantly, i-mode’s evolution to an
e-marketplace was encouraged by ensuring independence from content
providers, which facilitated a more ‘level-playing field’ for potential
suppliers, and signalled diversity of content for users (Johns 2003). In
contrast to strategies exhibited in recent years by media and
telecommunications firms such as AOL TimeWarner in the United States
and Telstra in Australia, the success of i-mode was assisted by DoCoMo’s
decision to pursue ‘arms-length’ transactions with upstream content
providers rather than securing exclusive rights for content. Independent
content providers are therefore more likely to use the platform to distribute
their content as they do not perceive DoCoMo to have a vested interest in
promoting the content of affiliates above their own. DoCoMo profits from
commission fees, an increase in traffic, and the launch of new services
rather than from holding rights to exclusive or in-house content.
Freedom of access. The fifth element i-mode exhibits is the provision of a
platform without restrictions. When first introduced, i-mode users were
only able to access content on the official iMenu. It appears however,
DoCoMo realised that its subscribers desired the freedom to access
information and content from alternative sources, and the ability to create
their own web sites. Therefore, even content providers who were not on
the i-mode portal could use the platform to provide information to users
or to distribute their content by writing their pages in cHTML. Users
were not only able to access these non-official or ‘independent’ sites freely,
but could also create their own web pages, which DoCoMo actively
encouraged. This resulted in a greater critical mass of content, which
improved the platform’s attractiveness and also generated revenue for
DoCoMo through data charges. As of June 2004, there were 77,550
independent sites created by individuals and ‘non-official’ providers (NTT
DoCoMo 2004). In March 2007 this figure was estimated at over 107,000
(OH!NEW? 2007).
Connectivity. Finally, a cumulative result of these factors is the increased
connectivity between users. The ability to send messages via email to both
fixed and mobile internet devices gave users an inter-personal
communication medium not just between users on the same network or
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technology, but across platforms. Allowing users the freedom to access
sites outside the i-mode portal provided an opportunity for self-expression
and improved connectivity between users. The ability for users to create
their own web pages and access those of other users resulted in a greater
number of sites on the i-mode platform and facilitated community building
and connectivity among users.
Hence, through this semi-open platform, i-mode reduced transaction
costs, improved timeliness, and increased the value of aggregation for all
participants in the value chain. Vishik and Whinston (1999) identified
that aggregation of content results in a more structured, but not restricted,
informational space. This appears to be the most crucial value-adding
principle of the semi-open platform: to add structure but without
restrictions.
Japan-specificity
Despite the key fundamentals of this business model, its transferability
outside of Japan has often been questioned. Apart from the core business
model, various Japan-specific factors seem to have contributed to the
success of i-mode, which may limit its potential replication overseas. Many
of these are well recognised. While fixed internet in Japan has now become
one of the most competitive among OECD nations, evidence suggests
that slow internet take-up during the introduction of mobile internet
may have resulted in the absence of a comparable substitute. In particular,
the legacy of telecommunications regulations had a lasting impact on the
pricing and diffusion of internet services. Furthermore, the extent to which
socio-cultural aspects such as commuting, and industry characteristics
such as competitive media industries, contributed to the success of i-mode
needs to be considered.
Low diffusion of personal computers. Despite Japan’s high level of
technological innovation, critics have referred to low penetration of personal
computers in Japanese homes, schools, and offices during the early days of
the internet (Gottlieb 2000).
The high price of portable laptop computers in Japan during the early
days of internet growth discouraged their widespread use. This combined
with the restricted living space in Japanese homes, which has arguably
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driven much innovation in device convergence, consequently resulted in a
lack of space for a dedicated PC fixture.8 Other demand-related arguments
for low PC penetration in early years include difficulties in word processing
in the Japanese language (Fransman 1999).9
On the supply side, the large sunk investments that many electronics
companies had in antiquated word processor technologies may have
resulted in their reluctance to abandon marketing these even after PCs
had become commonplace in other countries.10 Alternatively, as Fransman
(1999) argues, a de facto monopoly in the PC market held by NEC (who
used their own standard rather than IBM-compatible hardware) caused
the Japanese PC market to grow considerably more slowly than the United
States.
High cost of telecommunications. Until regulatory reform in the 1990s,
Japanese telecommunications fees had been among the highest in the world
(Devine and Holmqvist 2001; Anchordoguy 2001). Regulations allowed
the incumbent telecommunications carrier, NTT, to effectively own the
‘last mile’, or the final connection to every Japanese household (McNeill
2001; Mollman 2001). Having all calls terminating and originating on
NTT wires, resulted in higher costs for users.11 The persisting NTT
subscriber bond system also meant that the actual purchase of the phone
line may have been the biggest expense. This constituted a significant
barrier to young people and lower income earners acquiring their
own private communications channel, particularly during the dial-up
internet era.12
The Japanese Government’s style of deregulatory policy also provided
DoCoMo with the economic incentive to innovate. The deregulation of
telecommunications resulted in the state monopoly NTT being broken
up into regional and product-type companies such as NTT East and NTT
West (fixed line), NTT Communications (long distance), and NTT
DoCoMo (mobile). This separation of the mobile carrier DoCoMo was a
key difference from most countries where incumbent networks faced the
challenge of expanding mobile services without cannibalising fixed line
revenues. Thus DoCoMo had a clear impetus for developing a highly
competitive mobile phone service, particularly after the deregulation of
the mobile telephony market in 1994.
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Since the government implementation of stringent competition policy
and the surge in broadband services—first via cable then in particular
through ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line), Japan has seen
dramatic increases in internet connectivity, with new market entrants being
granted access to NTT’s lines, and access rates fell dramatically. Data
from 2002 suggests that Japan’s ADSL packages consistently rank among
the fastest and cheapest in the world.13 Some argue in addition that as
Japan’s internet connectivity was comparable to European countries such
as France, it cannot be considered as a key factor in i-mode’s success (Funk
2001; Lindmark et al. 2004). Yet France also experienced below average
connectivity, often attributed to sunken investments in home-grown
Minitel technology (see Brousseau 2003).
While mobile telephony in Japan appears to have offered an alternative
to fixed line, Funk (2001) rightly questions the degree to which mobile is
a substitute for fixed internet. Despite the above discussion on the
comparative attractiveness of mobile internet, it would not be accurate to
say that Japanese consumers ‘prefer mobile to fixed internet’, or that their
‘first online experience was on mobile not fixed internet’. Mobile internet
(and telephony in general) also has a complementary relationship to fixed
line, and neither can be said to be direct substitutes for the other, even if
substitution does occur at some point. Despite current high levels of fixed
connectivity, mobile internet remains popular, as it has evolved as a discrete
value-added service. There are, however, socio-cultural factors that also
need to be considered.
Commuting. The long commuting hours of Japanese have often been raised
as a reason for the success of mobile internet (Jonason and Eliasson 2000).
This travel time gives subscribers pockets of time during which they could
access information and entertainment in a timely fashion (Lunn 2001).
Moreover, it is possible that this reliance on and dependability of public
transport initially increased the demand for mobile telephones. The
necessity of commuting meant that people were both uncontactable at
home or office for long periods, and were also left with time to fill.
Funk (2001) and Lindmark et al. (2004) suggest commuting time is
irrelevant to the success of mobile internet in Japan, suggesting other
developed nations may have equally utilised public transport systems. Yet
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many nations do not rely on public transport to the extent that Japan
does. In Australia, for example, the comparative lack of people relying on
public transportation is obvious, with just 12 per cent of the population
commuting by train or bus to work in 2000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2000).14 Importantly, it is not just the high usage of public transport,
but also the exceptionally crowded commuting environment on public
transportation in Japan that spurs the need for a compact channel for
communication and entertainment.15
Timeliness and connectivity premium. As a result, a need for a mobile
communication channel emerges, which will allow users to remain
connected to their associates. Mobile telephony, and mobile internet, satisfy
this need to be connected, which may in fact be more pertinent in Japan
than in other countries. The improved interconnectivity of adding email
to mobile phones added value that users in other countries would be
unlikely to experience, given that text messages in Japan could only be
used between users on the same network.
Likewise, a premium also appears to be placed on timeliness. As Ariga
(1996:120) argues, the ‘condensed society’ aspect of Japan has spurred
several ‘time-saving’ business opportunities that have resulted in innovative
and efficient uses of time and space.
Vibrant content market. These pockets of time have resulted in an increased
demand for media products such as newspapers, magazines, comics, and
books. An important aspect of Japanese society is the sheer volume of
information and the amount of time people devote to consuming it (Ariga
1996). Supply-side, the scale of Japan’s media content industries is
considerable. According to METI estimates, the broader content industry
is worth 11 trillion yen, making it twice as large as the iron and steel
industry and approximately half the size of the automobile industry
(JETRO 2005).
Domestically, Japan has the second-largest national broadcaster and
one of the largest publishing industries in the world (Tanaka 1998).
Furthermore, Japan’s circulation of daily newspapers is by far the largest
in the world (Ariga 1996:128). Notably, half of all books published in
Japan are pocket-sized paperbacks, indicating a tendency for consumers
to carry books and read them when they have available pockets of time.
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Magazines likewise, share the pocketbook’s portability; the printing of
magazines vastly outnumber the printing of books (Tanaka 1998). Given
their popularity, i-mode services were designed to replicate magazines rather
than fixed internet offerings (Matsunaga 2000). Again, commuting on
public transport and the resulting pockets of time has undoubtedly fuelled
demand for portable, informative, printed media products, and in doing
so increasing this very readership.
Known in many western countries for anime, manga, and computer
games, Japanese content is also well known throughout East Asia, which
has long been a recipient of Japanese programming (Kawatake et al. 1996).
Over 60 per cent of the animated cartoons broadcast around the world are
made in Japan, with Japan’s US-bound exports of animation alone being
estimated at US$4.35 billion, while in East Asia 4 billion yen was generated
in license sales and over 80 billion yen in sales of original manga comics
(JETRO 2005).
Exportability of the model
Essentially, the i-mode model provides an end-to-end solution for device,
content, delivery, and billing. The business model’s semi-open nature
brought structure in the form of a reliable technical platform, aggregated
content and billing from subscription broadcast business models, and
reduced restrictions by delivering the service across an open internet network
that allowed users freedom of access and self-expression while maintaining
significant separation from content providers.
While the semi-open platform evidenced in the i-mode business model
is not characterised by any overt cultural specificities, its successful
implementation will be affected by the unique features of individual
markets. The exportability of the model, and hence DoCoMo’s ability to
earn money from licensing and royalty payments, also depends on its
ability to have the value-added components of the business model
recognised as proprietary intellectual property.
DoCoMo’s forays in foreign markets. DoCoMo’s initial strategy to spread
their i-mode service and third generation W-CDMA standard was through
direct equity investments during the mobile telecommunications ‘bubble’,
which came at a serious cost. In 2001, DoCoMo wrote off US$7.7 billion
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of its overseas investments, and by late 2002, had decided to write down
a further US$4.6 billion on investments in AT&T Wireless, Hutchinson
3G UK (“3”), and KPN Mobile.
DoCoMo sold its shares in AT&T Wireless to Cingular, and also sold
its 20 per cent stake in “3” back to Hong Kong’s Hutchinson in 2004
when Hutchinson failed to adopt i-mode as its content service for its “3”
mobile network in the UK. Hutchinson’s rival operator O2 launched their
UK and Ireland i-mode service in 2005 after signing an agreement with
DoCoMo in 2004.
Licensing to operators. Despite this series of strategic errors, DoCoMo
continues to add to its list of overseas operators who are adopting i-mode.
While it has invested in operators such as KPN in the past, DoCoMo
appears to believe that the way to achieve less capital-intensive growth is
through licensing its technology and business model rather than through
direct equity investments.
The current list of i-mode licencees now includes KPN Mobile
(Netherlands) and its subsidiary E-Plus (Germany), Telefonica (Spain),
BASE (Belgium), Bouygues (France), Wind (Italy), Cosmote (Greece and
Romania), O2 (UK and Ireland), Telstra (Australia), Far EasTone (Taiwan),
Star Hub (Singapore)16, Mobile TeleSystems (Russia and CIS), Cellcom
(Israel), with Hutchinson Mobile (Hong Kong and Macau), Hutch (India),
GloBul (Bulgaria), and SMART (Philippines) planned to launch services
in 2007 (NTT DoCoMo 2007b).
Lacklustre subscriber figures outside of Japan have fuelled scepticism
about i-mode’s transferability and the ability of DoCoMo to license the
technology overseas (The Times 2007).17 The willingness of mobile operators
to license i-mode may be questioned if i-mode were to be perceived as
‘out-dated and easy to copy’. Despite the decisions of Telstra and O2 to
drop the service in favour of their own 3G substitute, operators continue
to sign up to carry i-mode with StarHub joining in 2005, GloBul in
2006, and Cosmote Romania, Hutchinson Mobile, Hutch, and SMART
in 2007. Further, the willingness of these non-equity partners provides
greater evidence of market support for i-mode rather than it being
implemented by operators with which DoCoMo has direct equity
investments.
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As indicated above, the business model of aggregating content and
payments is not as revolutionary as is its application in mobile internet
markets. While licensing a technology has a more ‘tangible’ value
proposition and historically has had clearer recourse for litigation of
infringement, providing a ‘technological’ solution several years after its
development may in fact have been detrimental to DoCoMo’s attempts to
license i-mode in developed nations. Yet the existence of a proprietary
technology is particularly important for earning revenue from an innovation
if the brand holds little value in the new market or the business model is
easy to replicate.18 This, combined with a business model that includes
operator-driven handset specifications as an integral part of its success,
offers significant value to offer potential licensees, even if they choose not
to use the ‘i-mode’ brand, as did Telefonica in Spain. If O2 decides to go
ahead with the launch of i-mode in Germany it is certain to be
implemented under a different brand name, given that their competitor
E-Plus is currently providing an internet service in the German market
with the i-mode brand.
Barriers to exportability. One of the major differences likely to be
encountered, technological differences aside, is the lack of the close
relationship with handset makers. While there may be resistance from
operators in assuming risk and from users in purchasing a network-specific
handset, the absence of this collaborative relationship and operator-specified
standards, this may inversely represent an opportunity for Japanese handset
manufacturers to expand overseas. Many Japanese handset makers have
had difficulties breaking into overseas markets, not just due to technological
differences but also because of the intensity of the competition in the
Japanese market. Mobile handsets have been somewhat of an anomaly in
the expected pattern of industries that experience strong competition
domestically being competitive in international markets. Intense
competition combined with operator-controlled specifications in Japan
arguably constrained manufacturers from expanding into overseas markets.
Japanese makers therefore stand to do well with i-mode’s expansion, as
evidenced by the number of handsets NEC and other makers are adapting
for overseas markets.
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The second potential difference in host countries is the relationships
that exist between network operators and content providers. In some
European countries, the United States, and Australia, the tendency for
operators to enter into exclusive agreements with content providers in
order to secure content for the platform threatens to undermine a key
factor of the semi-open i-mode model. Where there is a perceived lack of
supply, operators may be tempted to provide content themselves or to
enter into exclusive relationships with preferred providers. The need to
keep the platform open to innovative providers of content may represent
one of the biggest challenges to i-mode’s transferability.19
Thirdly, given the high diffusion of prepaid mobiles (rather than the
predominant post-paid contracts in Japan) i-mode billing systems would
need to be adjusted to incorporate prepaid users. Overseas operators are
also likely to see i-mode as a way to get prepaid users to move onto contracts,
although KPN’s i-mode offerings in the Netherlands and Germany appear
to be available to their prepaid users.20
Regardless of socio-cultural differences such as commuting and high
consumption of information, the business model seen in i-mode appears
to be replicable outside of Japan, provided it can meet specific market needs.
Intellectual property and policy implications
This instance of DoCoMo exporting i-mode is a pertinent example of
both the potential for, and the visible trend towards, Japanese firms
exploiting the value of their intellectual property overseas. Just as NTT
DoCoMo developed i-mode out of the need to catalyse further growth in
a maturing mobile telephony market, Japanese policymakers are similarly
looking to intellectual property as a key to revitalising the economy and
maintaining Japan’s competitiveness. This realisation of the importance of
intellectual property in the economy has been underpinned by a sense
that prevailing industry and policy settings in Japan have not allowed
firms to fully exploit the internationalisation of their intellectual property.
While i-mode provides an instance of exporting Japanese technology
and business models, the trade in television program formats offers another
example of the dynamics of licensing intellectual property innovations
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outside of Japan. While TV program exports account for only a small
amount of content exports according to METI data, it provides another
example of the ability to use the intellectual property inherent in products
and allow them to be adapted to local markets rather than exporting ready-
made products.
The expansion of exports in other IP-based sectors
As mentioned above, Japanese programming has been exported to Asia for
several decades, as has Japanese animation been sold around the world.
While programming exports doubled over the 1970s to reach 4,500 hours
in 1980 (Hagiwara 1995a), this figured had increased four-fold to over
19,500 hours by 1992 (Kawatake et al. 1996), indicating the exponential
growth in exports, of which 58 per cent was animation. Yet METI figures
estimate the value of television program exports at 5.3 billion yen in 2001,
compared with 253 billion yen for game software (Hasegawa and
Midorikawa 2005). Historically, Western Europe, Asia, and North America
have been the largest regional markets for Japanese programming, with
the largest single markets being the United States, Spain, and Hong Kong
(Kawatake et al. 1996).
While there is a growing market for Japanese content, particularly with
the rise of the ‘Cool Japan’ discourse (see McGray 2002), audiences tend
to prefer local content (Hagiwara 1995b). Despite the ‘cool Japan’
phenomenon, an inability to adapt programs, particularly the language,
is likely to reduce exportability. Furthermore, given that many nations
still impose local content requirements on broadcasters, the demand for
licensing innovative program formats is bound to be particularly strong.
Similarly, linkages or vertical integration with local production companies
may mean broadcasters prefer to produce local content rather than paying
a premium for successful foreign content. Licensing formats rather than
exporting programs allow local production companies to use local talent
to produce content tailored for the local market and pay the Japanese
originator a licensing fee.
The Iron Chef television program, for example, which is broadcast in
11 countries around the world (JETRO 2005), has begun licensing the
program’s format to overseas broadcasters and production companies. The
151OUT OF THE JAPANESE INCUBATOR
US remake of the show is now exported to other English-speaking countries.
Similarly, ADV Films in the US announced plans for a live-action version
of Japanese anime Neon Genesis Evangelion, while the Resident Evil series
of movies has been taken from the Japanese computer game of the same
name (know as Biohazard in Japan).
Japanese television industries have been recognised as having an
influential role in circulating and adapting content in East Asia (Keane
2006). Yet there has been a trend in the past, prevalent particularly in
Asia, for copyright holders to see their revenues ‘eroded’ both by piracy of
their original content, and imitating of (or borrowing from) Japanese-
originated formats. In the music industry, for example, pirated copies of
Japanese content accounted for 17 per cent of the music software market
in Hong Kong and 32 per cent of the market in Taiwan, according to a
2002 survey by the Copyright Research and Information Center (JETRO
2005). While this infringement of copyright may have ancillary benefits
in other areas of the Japanese economy,21 rents accruing to the content
sector itself may be difficult to extract, either from the export market or
from domestic industries that benefit from the unauthorised use of content.
There is a growing imperative to be able to repatriate rents from these
innovations. This need is not only limited to content-based goods, but
extends to all sectors of the Japanese economy that have an inherent
intellectual property component to their products. For Japanese firms,
however, it has been easier to identify, protect, and sell a tangible product
such as an automobile part in international markets than it has an intangible
good such as content or a business process. While there has been no shortage
of innovations being cultivated in Japan, firms have often fallen short in
their ability to exploit this intellectual capital overseas.
Character licensing has also seen considerable growth, and for some
examples of media content, has earned copyright owners more revenue
than has sales of the original content itself. Pokemon provides an example
where a computer game also spawned a movie with 22 billion yen box
office takings, and 700 billion yen from merchandising (METI figures in
Hasegawa and Midorikawa 2005). The ability for intellectual property
rights to be assigned to other formats, and bought and sold, indicates not
only the significant potential in scope economies, but also the need for
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human resources that can exploit the international expansion of content,
whether it is for information, education, or entertainment.
Policies to strengthen Japan’s intellectual property standing
The intellectual property imperative. Rather than simply evidencing a
‘hollowing out’, the established trend of manufacturing shifting offshore
suggests that Japan’s competitive advantage lies in innovation and the
development of intellectual property rather than in retaining lower-end
manufacturing. Yet Japan has often had difficulty reaping the returns on
its investment in intellectual property. Comparative studies, for example,
indicate that while intra-industry research and development knowledge
flows and spill-overs are greater in Japan than in the United States, the
ability to appropriate rents from innovation has been less (Cohen et al.
2002).
It is likely therefore that a lack of capacity to protect and exploit these
innovations has resulted in Japanese firms being unable to extract sufficient
rents from intellectual property. This may be due to a misuse of IP by
third parties, an insufficient legal framework, or the absence of professionals
who are able to market intellectual property services, manage intellectual
property rights, and deal with the litigation of intellectual property
infringement.22
Japan’s intellectual property strategic program. The plan for the Japanese
Government to play an active role in boosting Japan’s ability to exploit its
intellectual property status in the world was evidenced in February 2002
with Prime Minister Koizumi’s ‘intellectual property super-power’ speech.
Since this public expression of policy intent, the government has moved
with unprecedented speed in establishing a series of intellectual property-
related policies (Hatakeyama 2005). The government’s 2004 intellectual
property Strategic Program pointed to the need to expedite Japan’s
transformation into an intellectual property-based nation ‘by making the
best use of intellectual property as a source of national wealth including
patents, know-how, and content such as movies and game software’ (IPSH
2004). Two years on, the program was intending to make Japan ‘the most
advanced intellectual property-based nation in the world’ (IPSH 2006).
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The Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters (herein IPSH) was
created in 2003 under the Cabinet Office.23 Its annual whole-of-
government strategic programs specify agencies and ministries to carry
out action items, which aimed to develop local capacity for creating and
commercialising intellectual property, and to strengthen intellectual
property protection regimes. These documents demonstrate that
policymakers have recognised the necessity of capacity building and plan
to achieve this through a multitude of policies that promote the ‘creation’
of intellectual property, the ‘protection’ of intellectual property rights,
and the ability for firms to ‘exploit’ the intellectual property developed in
Japan both domestically and abroad.
On the ‘creation’ front, the government’s 2006 Strategic Program aims
to revitalise universities and improve their international competitiveness,
to improve the mobility and diversity of researchers, and to promote
research and development at universities that focuses on intellectual
property creation (IPSH 2006). A significant volume of literature has
focused on the poor standing of Japanese universities on the world scale,
particularly at the graduate level, that need not be revisited here. But it is
also recognised that a significant proportion of the patentable scientific
research is conducted at universities, and the ability to allow the private
sector to tap these innovations appears to be one area of the government’s
strategy.24 Universities also provide an ideal environment to act as incubators
as students who have acquired relevant skills prepare to make the move
into the industry. Relaxing the rules for universities to increase the industry-
specific skills at a post-graduate level for professionals has seen the rise of
new universities such as Digital Hollywood, an industry-driven school
that teaches students the skills to become digital content experts,
particularly in games and animation.
The Program includes strategies to bolster ‘protection’ through an
improved intellectual property legal framework. Some of the key policies
to advance this protection are the strengthening of domestic and
international legislation, and the monitoring of counterfeit goods and
patent, trademark and copyright infringement. In April 2005, the
Intellectual Property High Court was established to give Japanese firms
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streamlined access to litigation and faster resolution of IP disputes.25 Given
the well recognised lack of practising lawyers in Japan, the 2004 Program
also calls for an increase in IP lawyers, to be actualised by doubling the
bar exam pass rate by 2010 (IPSH 2004).
On the international front, where patent and copyright infringements
are believed to considerably reduce the earning potential of Japanese firms,
the government is making efforts in both multilateral forums such at the
WTO, APEC, and WIPO and bilaterally with individual governments.
An IPSH plan for the prevention of counterfeit and pirated goods called
for a system to be established by 2005 whereby rights holders in Japan
can file intellectual property rights complaints directly to the attributable
countries (IPSH 2004b). Making particular reference to counterfeit and
pirated goods providing funding for criminal and terrorist groups, the
2006 Program designated action agencies to cooperate with international
organisations to prohibit the import of counterfeit goods.
With regard to the lack of ‘exploitability’, it appears there is a tendency
for companies to file for patents in order to defend rather than utilise their
intellectual property. The 2006 Strategic Program indicates that more
than half of registered patents are not being exploited. While little data is
provided in the policy statements, it has prompted the government to
move to revise patent laws with the aim of allowing these innovations to
be utilised rather than being no more than a listing in the Patent Office
directory. Alongside this, the government plans to support international
standardisation activities. Also of importance is the mention it makes of
allocating resources to supporting SMEs and ventures, given their important
role in innovation but their lack of resources to develop and exploit their
intellectual property. While this may sound ominously like government
helping larger firms to ‘exploit’ the intellectual property from SMEs and
start-ups, the Program points out the latter’s need for well trained and
informed IP professionals including lawyers and consultants.
This exploitation is inextricably linked to the policy documents’ concept
of creation. Yet it is important for policy to focus on capacity building
through the removal of cumbersome regulations combined with the
development of human capital that has skill-sets to take intellectual property
into the international market. While policy settings appear well-placed,
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there is always a danger that a policy focus on the ‘creation’ of intellectual
property may result in either subsidies for industry on the one hand, or
the government taking an over-active role in determining the allocation of
private capital investments on the other.
Increases in royalties and licence fee receipts. As described earlier, this
fervent policy activity has been contextualised by recent balance of
payments data showing a surplus in royalties and licence fees. While still
indicating a trade in services deficit on the current account, Japan’s net
balance for royalties and licence fees has been increasing since 1993, posting
its first surplus in 2003. Since then, the item has been increasing by
approximately US$1 billion per year, and at 2006 stood at a US$4.69
billion surplus according to balance of payments data from the Bank of
Japan. While this is a clear indication of Japan’s move towards exporting
IP rather than just manufactures, it does not necessarily suggest that
intellectual property-based services and content sectors are internationally
competitive.
Rather, data from the Bank of Japan suggest that strengths in the
manufacturing sector accounted for a large share in trade in services exports.
In fact, the majority of the royalties and license fee surplus until 2005 has
been attributed to strong overseas sales in these sectors, particularly
automobiles and electric machinery (Bank of Japan 2006). In an analysis
of 2003 trade in services data, Yamaguchi (2004) suggests these large
increases in receipts have mostly been comprised of payments for trademarks
and technical instruction from overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies,
rather than from licensing intellectual property to third parties.
Receipts from industrial property rights (particularly automobiles,
electronics, and other industrial firms) have been in surplus since 1997,
and stand in stark contrast to trade in copyrights (film, television,
publishing, music), which have been in constant deficit (Bank of Japan
2006). Despite the large scale of domestic content industries, copyright
payments have been around US$5 billion, compared to U$900 million
in receipts, a deficit which, according to Yamaguchi, has mostly been
comprised of computer-related software licensing from the United States.
Literature, music, and arts comprise only 10 per cent of the deficit,
according to Yamaguchi (2004). METI data from 2001 corroborates this
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deficit in the trade of most items: music, broadcast programs, publishing,
and movies. Yet receipts from exports of game software, at a 250 billion
yen surplus, would appear to negate the deficits in all other content areas.
Content industry-specific policies
While promoting the potential of the content industry, the Japanese
Government appears to be well aware of the terms of trade in this sector.
The 2004 intellectual property Strategy document, stated that ‘intellectual
property contents (works such as movies, music, animation, and game
software) created in Japan are highly acclaimed throughout the world,
but we cannot say that the parties concerned have made concerted efforts
to develop the content business under a common philosophy’ (IPSH
2004:112).
Evidently, this effort to encourage the industry to be more ‘proactive’ is
based on both the large deficit in the trade of copyright goods, and the
content industries in Japan accounting for a smaller share of GDP (2.3
per cent) than the global average (3.3 per cent). Further, with Japan’s
share in the worldwide content market at just three per cent in 2000
compared to the United States’ 17 per cent, digital content and pop culture
are increasingly being viewed as sources of potential high growth and
competitive advantage within Japan (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2005). Hence,
the desire of the government to encourage actors in the content industry
to actively increase exports is understandable.
Strategic policy objectives for content promotion. The Japanese
Government has realised, albeit belatedly, the nascent value in Japan’s
content-related business, and may well have taken its cue from external
forces signalling an interest in Japanese content (JETRO 2005; McGray
2002). The government’s interest in the industry appears to stem from
three sources.
First is the economic value of the industry itself. Given the domestic
industry’s scale being situated between steel and automobiles, the sector’s
contribution to the economy is clearly evident. Yet, its size also highlights
the lack of success in exploiting these goods in international markets, which
current Japanese IP policy is attempting to resolve.
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Second is the potential for spill-overs to other sectors of the economy.
As indicated in both the discussions of the i-mode model and the export
of television formats, content not only lends itself to be exploited in other
formats, but also fuels the consumption of complementary goods such as
mobile handsets and other hardware. Further, digital content often finds
applications in other industries as diverse as mining and aerospace for
purposes such as exploration and training.
Third is the ‘soft power’ benefits derived from exported content giving
overseas consumers a positive impression of Japan. The 2004 IP Strategic
Program makes an explicit reference to soft power benefits, and the
government may well hope that exporting content will improve the image
that residents of other countries have of Japan. This would have both
political public diplomacy benefits as well as the potential to make these
people more likely to purchase other goods from Japan, whether electronics,
automobiles, or inbound tourism.26 Among other factors however, this is
contingent on the type of content being exported from Japan, and its
ability to make a ‘positive’ impression.
Content promotion act. In June 2004, the ‘Content Promotion Act’ was
passed in the Japanese Diet, which applied to the content industry the
same goals of promoting the creation, protection, and exploitation that
guided Japan’s general intellectual property strategy. This includes efforts
by national and local governments to develop talent, as well as promoting
the fair trade and ownership of copyrights.
According to the 2006 Strategic Program, this Act required the
reinforcing of the anti-monopoly law and the revision of copyright laws to
allow copyright holders to use the internet to exploit the potential of their
content. On the investment front, the Act seeks to increase the available
capital to the industry by changing investment laws to limit the liability
of investors, and also by providing investment incentives to catalyse private
sector funding. On the users side, the government pledged to explore
flexible pricing systems for the sale and resale of content such as music
(CDs), a marked change from the traditional standardisation of prices for
content such as books and CDs.
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Policy implications. The strategic program appropriately addresses the
need to develop creative capacity both on the production side and within
the education system to turn out graduates that can function in the global
economy and sell intangible products overseas. Content providers, whether
for television programs or mobile internet sites, face the challenge of not
only language barriers from users (having to translate content) but also
linguistic limitations of explaining the benefits of these intangible goods
to potential buyers overseas. The government policy’s emphasis on the
need to bolster protection of intellectual property and create more spaces
for intellectual property professionals, including lawyers, is also well placed.
When it comes to protecting the intellectual property inherent in
content and exploiting its secondary use, copyrights are already an
established system. Yet the ability to prosecute those who infringe
copyrights overseas has been difficult. There does, however, appear to be a
turnaround in the status quo that has prevailed until recently.
Firstly, governments around the East Asian region realise that they need
to police intellectual property-related crimes such as piracy conscientiously
if they are to successfully induce foreign direct investment in these sectors.
Singapore’s stringent efforts to provide protection to copyrighted works
through prohibiting their illegal production and sale, for example, has
undoubtedly been fuelled by its free trade agreement with the United
States.
Secondly, Japanese copyright holders have become more proactive in
representing their rights overseas. This has been most recently seen in the
JASRAC and YouTube incident, where the Japanese copyright management
organisation threatened legal action if the YouTube owner (Google) did
not take measures to prevent users from posting animation and other video
clips managed by JASRAC on the site. Despite the potentially positive
effect that YouTube videos of Japanese copyrighted content may have for
the industry, international IP agreements concluded by the Japanese
Government at both bilateral and multilateral levels will undoubtedly
support claimants such as JASRAC in protecting unauthorised use of
Japanese IP. It is unfortunate for all parties involved that JASRAC could
not see the free promotional role that YouTube could have had for its
clients’ content. It is likely however, that JASRAC may pursue some
advertisement revenue-sharing deal with YouTube in the future.
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Conclusion
DoCoMo’s exporting of i-mode and the licensing of television formats are
exemplars of the potential for Japanese firms to exploit the value of their
intellectual property overseas. Whether i-mode will be successful in
particular foreign markets will depend significantly on the receptiveness
of host country industry players to the semi-open platform model. This i-
mode model also has the potential to be an impetus to innovation in the
creation and delivery of local content in respective markets. These benefits,
and the promise of spill-over effects to other technology and content sectors
in the economy, illustrate why the Japanese government is keen to have
Japan migrate to the status of an ‘intellectual property super-power’. This
would see Japan exporting models of innovation systems that are consistent
with the production of local cultural innovation.
While the government has neatly defined its strategic policy into
promoting the creation, protection, and exploitation of intellectual property,
the imperative to develop creative and internationalised talent suggest
that policies directed toward ‘creation’ must be aimed at capacity building
through human capital formation and modernising the intellectual
property legal regime. A key lesson from ‘cool Japan’ may well be that
open networks of well-trained creative individuals and private content
enterprises are the real drivers of intellectual property development.
The optimum role of the Japanese Government and of those hoping to
learn from Japan is to provide an institutional framework that allows
the nurturing of creativity, the freedom of private capital, and the
internationalisation of training institutions.
Notes
1 While these demonstration effects are implicit across various industries throughout East
Asia, official government policies in South East Asia such as Learn from Japan in Singapore
and Look East in Malaysia clearly reveal the Japan’s role of knowledge disseminator in the
region (Atarashi 1984).
2 NTT DoCoMo is a publicly listed subsidiary of NTT Holding Company and was the
incumbent mobile carrier before deregulation introduced competition. KDDI was formed
from a merger between former public monopoly international telecom company KDD
and mobile carriers DDI and IDO. Softbank’s mobile service was formerly known as
Vodafone and J-Phone reflecting the majority shareholder at the time.
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3 Subscribers to mobile internet as separate to mobile phones are possibly becoming less
relevant as a statistic in Japan as service subscription becomes standard.
4 As of February 2007, i-mode subscribers in Japan were at 47.3 million (NTT DoCoMo
website).
5 However, this absence of handset portability gives rise to certain switching costs for the
user. While mobile number portability has been introduced in Japan as recently as 2006,
handsets are still network-specific in contrast to services in many other countries where
handsets come equipped with interchangeable SIM cards. Users can now port their
number to another network but not their handset.
6 KDDI’s use of HDML, for example, was built off an early version of WAP developed by
the company Phone.com (Devine and Holmqvist 2001).
7 DoCoMo have more recently announced some capital tie-ups with some content firms
such as Kadokawa Group (NTT DoCoMo Press Release 2006)
8 Ariga (1996) indicates that average Japanese homes have 60 per cent of the living space
of US homes.
9 Natsuno (2000) also suggests low diffusion of PCs was due to a traditional belief in Japan
that as language is expressed by people, characters should be handwritten, even in
business circles.
10 Gottlieb (2000) offers figures indicating 1994 was the first year PCs outsold the now
antiquated word processors.
11 Prior to the introduction of ADSL and FTTH (fibre to the home) timed local calls
constituted a further cost to users in Japan.
12 This system which has been in place since post-war era, originally required subscribers to
pay 100,000 yen to NTT as a bond, which would be returned after 10 years. The
subscriber bond system was officially abolished in 1982 according to Anchordoguy, yet
various special bond systems and installation fees raised the cost of purchasing a phone
line (Anchordoguy 2001). In reality, the bond (kanyuken) still exists, requiring a fee of
less than 70,000 yen. This kanyuken, or ‘right to use a phone line’, can be bought cheaper
on secondary markets. NTT now offers access through a ‘lite plan’ without the bond,
although ongoing charges are slightly higher (as of 2004–5).
13 The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (then Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) released figures indicating
that as of May 2004 32 per cent of Japanese household had broadband internet
connections. Furthermore, according to InfoCom Research Inc. in the two years between
2000 and 2002, the available connection speed increased eight fold and the price halved,
offering speeds unavailable even in the United States and South Korea.
14 This low figure of public transport commuters (which can be assumed to be concentrated
in major cities) contrasts with more than 76 per cent of people using personal automobiles
to commute (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000). Japan census data from 2000
meanwhile indicates at least 26.4 per cent of people commute via public transport,
increasing to over 57.8 per cent in Tokyo.
15 Funk argues that i-mode take-up in rural areas (with less public transportation) has been
on par with that in urban areas. While this assumes that residents in rural areas are not
commuting longer distances by public transport, it also ignores the tendency for fixed
internet penetration, a possible substitute to mobile internet, to be lower in less urbanised
areas. On a cross-national level, data supports the correlation between urbanisation and
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fixed internet take-up. Controlling for per capita income, a regression of 2004 raw data
from World Development Indicators yielded an R-squared of 0.915 (significant at 95
per cent confidence interval) when using urban population as an analytical weight.
16 While DoCoMo has no major equity investments, NTT Communications is a substantial
shareholder of StarHub.
17 I-mode subscribers outside Japan were at 6 million as of March 2007 according to
DoCoMo (NTT DoCoMo 2007b)
18 While the ‘i-mode’ brand has received considerable attention from industry, analysts,
academics, and policymakers, the average consumer in most countries outside of Japan
would not be expected to know much about i-mode. The i-mode brand, therefore, may
bring little weight to the licensing agreement. Similarly, while the model of aggregating
third party content and providing centralised billing services was a DoCoMo-led
innovation for mobile internet, the business model itself is not revolutionary, having
been used in various forms by subscription television broadcasters.
19 This may be addressed to some extent by using foreign content (assuming no language
barrier exists) or encouraging user-made interactive content.
20 This existence of prepaid offerings is based on information available on web sites of
European operators licensing i-mode.
21 Pirated VCDs of the TV drama Hero starring Takuya Kimura in China are said to have
fuelled rapid sales of Japanese-made mobile phones (JETRO 2005).
22 Alternatively, it may suggest that intra-firm knowledge transfers are more commonplace
amongst Japanese firms
23 At the time of its establishment, its English name was the Intellectual Property Policy
Headquarters (IPPH).
24 A key government strategy to achieve this is the establishment of Technology Licensing
Organisations.
25 From the Intellectual Property High Court website, it appears to deal mostly with
domestic copyright infringement litigation and firms appealing patent rulings.
26 Given that tourism is a major contributor to Japan’s deficit in trade in services, the
government may find this argument particularly appealing.
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7 THE DYNAMIC IN EAST ASIAN
TRADE
Ligang Song, Tina Chen and Shiji Zhao
Trade has been a key component in the successful story of East Asian
development since the region embarked on its modernisation drive in the
1960s. Through trade and the associated export-oriented strategy and
regional economic cooperation, the East Asian economies have been
connected closely with each other in climbing up the ladder of
development, led first by Japan, the newly industrialising economies
(NIEs), and then ASEAN, China, Vietnam, India and other South Asian
countries. As a result, within a half century, the East Asia as a whole has
changed from a peripheral region to one of the most dynamic and highly
integrated economies in the world. The East Asian share of world trade
increased from 14 per cent in 1980 to about 20 per cent in 2003, equivalent
to the share of North America in world trade (Table 7.1). This has been
achieved despite some negative external shocks such as oil crisis in the
1970s and exchange rate volatility, difficulties in restructuring their
domestic economies, including financial opening of their economies since
the 1980s, and the painful experience of the financial crisis in the
mid 1990s.
The East Asian experiences demonstrated the feasibility and viability of
alternative trade policies: it was no longer possible to associate comparative
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advantage with reliance on primary commodity exports. And these
experiences certainly put to rest the mistaken belief that developing
countries relying on the international market would forever be specialised
in the production of primary commodities. These experiences also put an
end to the belief that developing countries could not develop rapidly when
relying on integration with the international economy as ‘a developing
country could achieve industrialisation without relying on domestic
markets to absorb almost all additional output. … That demonstrated
the fallacy of the earlier view that industrialisation could take place only
through import substitution’ (Krueger 1997:17).
The East Asian experience has thus stimulated some to attempt to
identity the ‘dynamic’ factors in exporting. Das (1998) stated that looking
back three decades, one finds that in several Asian economies, the structural
transformation has been more or less fundamental, in that these economies
have experienced a dynamic process of changing comparative advantage.
Table 7.1 Share of world trade by region, 1980–2003 (per cent)
1980 1990 2000 2003
East Asia 14.1 18.7 22.7 19.9
Japan 7.0 7.4 6.4 5.7
NIEs 4.3 7.8 10.2 6.6
ASEAN-4 2.3 2.7 3.7 3.8
China 1.0 1.7 3.5 4.9
Australia, New Zealand 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
North America 16.8 17.7 22.3 20.5
United States 12.3 13.1 15.4 14.4
Canada 3.6 3.7 4.2 3.9
Mexico 0.9 0.9 2.8 2.2
South America 2.8 1.7 2.0 1.9
European Union 41.0 44.0 35.4 37.7
Rest of world 23.9 16.5 16.2 18.6
Notes: NIEs: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong; North America: the United States,
Canada, Mexico; East Asia: Malaysia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, China,
Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines; Singapore is included in NIEs, not ASEAN; South
America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, and Venezuela.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, Washington, DC; International
Economic Databank, The Australian National University, Canberra.
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This entailed a rapid growth in their exports of manufactures as well as a
changing structure of manufactured exports. This echoes the view by
Krueger (1997) that there appears to be widespread agreement in the
1990s that the benefits of an open trade regime are largely ‘dynamic’ in
nature, and go well beyond the gains from trade under ‘static’ models of
an open economy.
While a variety of factors, such as technology and foreign direct
investment (FDI), have contributed to the achievement of the dynamic
gains from trade by the regional economies, an important element of the
whole process is the so-called ‘institutional integration’ which, as defined
in Drysdale (1988), refers to the legal agreements and institutional
arrangements which facilitate economic exchange among a community of
nations. Institutional integration matters as ‘institutional and market
integration involves an important two-way interaction, in which close
economic ties and common economic problems set the requirements for
institutional arrangements, and institutional arrangements influence the
degree of economic and political cohesion’ (Drysdale 1988:35).
According to Drysdale (1988), low institutional, political and other
resistances to trade interact with low transport and communications
resistances to generate high intensities in trade and other economic relations.
The argument is relevant to the East Asian model for dynamic resource
allocation and international specialisation in that if ‘there are institutional
and legal barriers to trade and capital movements but market ties survive,
market integration is frustrated by the lack of institutional integration’
(Drysdale 1988:35).
For example, a characteristic of the trade expansion of the newly
industrialising economies (NIEs), ASEAN and China resulting from the
changing pattern of their respective comparative advantage is the process
of their taking over market shares from Japan first in textiles and other
labour-intensive manufactured goods, and then from one another:
‘[a]rrangements that discriminate against their trade growth in favour of
established traders would adversely affect their trade and development
ambitions and regional trade interests’ (Drysdale 1988:21).
This chapter looks into the changing pattern of production and trade
and the extent of integration in East Asia in comparison with other major
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regional groups, and discusses the impacts and implications of China’s
rising trade on the regional economy and economic cooperation. It points
out possible future directions in terms of different forms of ‘institutional
integration’ that the regional economies are likely to take and how these
alternatives may affect the prospects of East Asian trade and economic
growth in the long run.
Changing structure of East Asian production and trade
Basic trade theory suggests that countries with higher ratios of labour to
natural resources and capital to labour will have a strong comparative
advantage in manufactures vis-à-vis primary production and exports. Such
theory also predicts that comparative advantage in manufactures will grow
more rapidly the faster the rate of growth of capital to labour ratio relatively
to growth in the rest of the world. As a result, the product composition of
exports would shift from a predominance of natural resource intensive
exports to unskilled labour intensive exports, further to physical and
human capital intensive exports, and then on to technology and knowledge
intensive exports (Garnaut and Anderson 1980; Song 1996a; Das 1998).
Table 7.2 presents the changing structures of production of the regional
economies from 1970 to 2002 that have a direct bearing on the trade
structure of these economies. First, the agricultural sector in all the reported
groups of Asian economies including South Asia has dramatically declined.
As expected, this change is most visible in NIEs where its share fell steadily
from 17 per cent to only three per cent of GDP over the 1970–2002
period. Their share of industry in GDP rose from the 1970s to 1980s,
and then declined over the 1990s as the services sector expanded which
accounted for 63 per cent of GDP in 2002.
Similarly, ASEAN economies experienced a substantial fall in the share
of agriculture, however, unlike in NIEs, the share of their industries
continued to rise reflecting the fact that ASEAN’s level of economic
maturity is less than that in NIEs (Das 1998). Compared to NIEs, ASEAN’s
services sector had a much lower share of GDP. The agricultural sector in
China has fallen quite dramatically especially in the 1990s, but is still
higher than that in ASEAN. The industrial sector continued to dominate
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the Chinese economy, accounting 51 per cent of GDP in 2002, a level
that was not matched by NIEs during the period of rapid growth in the
1980s. The expansion of the services sector in China has been less than
that in NIEs and ASEAN. South Asian economies have a relatively higher
share of agriculture and lower share of industries in GDP. This fact indicates
that South Asian economies have been on the lower rung of the development
ladder with a slower pace of industrialisation, although these economies
have been undergoing structural changes over the period under study.
The structural changes taking place in the East Asian economies is also
reflected in the rising shares of exports of manufactures in total exports
Table 7.2 Changing structure of production, 1970–2002
(per cent of GDP)
Agriculture Industry Service
Newly industrialising economies
1970 17 33 51
1980 9 40 51
1990 6 41 53
2002 3 34 63
ASEAN-4
1970 34 25 41
1980 25 36 39
1990 19 39 42
2002 13 43 44
China
1970 34 38 28
1980 31 47 22
1990 27 42 31
2002 15 51 34
South Asia
1970 45 21 35
1980 37 25 38
1990 32 27 42
2002 23 26 51
Note: NIEs in 2002 did not include Taiwan.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC.
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(Table 7.3). The significance of rising shares of exports of manufactures
lies in the fact that the relationship between exports of manufactures and
high TFP growth may well be the result of exporters’ role in helping
economies adopt and master international best-practice technologies, thus
being classified as a dynamic factor (Das 1998).
Exports of manufactures have risen as a proportion of total exports for
all the listed economies (Table 7.3). In newly industrialising economies,
they rose from 71 per cent in 1970 to 91 per cent in 2000, and for
ASEAN, the average proportion of manufactured products in total exports
increased from six to 76 per cent over the same period, representing a
faster export growth rate than that in newly industrialising economies.
During the same period, China nearly doubled its share of manufactured
products in total exports, which accounted for 88 per cent of its total
exports in 2000. A similar trend was observed for India whose share reached
79 per cent in 2000.
Table 7.3 Exports of manufactures as per cent of total exports,
1970–2000 (per cent)
1970 1980 1990 2000
NIEs 71.0 80.7 88.5 91.2
Hong Kong 95.9 96.5 95.8 95.7
Korea 76.6 89.9 93.6 90.8
Singapore 30.5 53.9 72.8 86.4
Taiwan 76.1 87.9 92.6 95.3
ASEAN-4 6.1 14.7 52.7 76.3
Indonesia 1.4 2.4 35.5 57.1
Malaysia 7.4 19.0 54.2 81.2
Philippines 7.6 36.8 68.8 88.6
Thailand 8.0 28.1 64.3 78.0
China 45.1 46.9 73.5 88.4
India 52.0 58.9 72.3 79.4
Source: UN COMTRADE, International Economic Databank, The Australian National
University, Canberra.
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Pattern and direction of East Asian trade
Table 7.4 outlines the trade (both export and import) relationships between
Japan, NIEs, ASEAN, EU and elsewhere for a selection of the East Asian
countries separately, 1980 compared to 2003. While the export share of
Japan’s exports to the United States continued to rise, the shares of NIEs
exports to the United States (and to Japan except Hong Kong) fell over
this period. The surge in China’s export share to the United States reflected
the fact that NIEs have been shifting their production bases to China to
take advantage of the relatively low labour costs there. There was a
substantial fall in export shares of most of NIE, ASEAN economies and
China to Japan while both intra-NIEs and intra-ASEAN trade shares are
on the rise. East Asian economies’ export shares to European Union show
a trend of declining with exception of Singapore and Indonesia.
With a few exceptions, most East Asian economies are recording falling
shares of imports from the United States, Japan and European Union while
their shares of import from NIEs and ASEAN economies are increasing.
NIEs, especially, have become major suppliers for ASEAN countries at
the expense of Japan. China’s import shares from the United States, Japan
and European Union are falling, while its shares from both NIEs and
ASEAN countries are increasing. As for China–Japan bilateral trade, China’s
exports to Japan accounted for 14.7 per cent of its total exports while
China’s imports from Japan accounted for 20 per cent of its total imports.
Changing pattern of comparative advantage
Table 7.5 illustrates the process of changing comparative advantage by
reference to individual commodities. Japan’s export specialisation in labour-
intensive products (travel goods, clothing and footwear) was still above
the global mean in 1970, but fell well below unity later, and virtually to
zero by the end of the century. A corresponding rise occurred over the
period in Japan’s export specialisation in such capital-intensive products
as machinery and electrical machinery. The NIEs’ export specialisation in
individual labour-intensive products reached a peak between 1970 and
173THE DYNAMIC IN EAST ASIAN TRADE
Table 7.4 Overall patterns of East Asian external trade, 1980 and
2003
Orientation of exports by selected East Asian countries (% of total exports of each country)
Exporting       To the US       To Japan        To NIEs        To ASEAN     To EU-15      Elsewhere
countries 1980 2003   1980  2003  1980  2003   1980  2003  1980 2003 1980 2003
Japan 24.2 28.2 0.0 0.0 10.7 17.5 7.0 10.0 15.1 17.1 42.9 27.2
Hong Kong 26.0 10.7 4.6 5.7 5.5 5.7 6.8 5.4 24.6 18.7 32.5 53.9
Korea 25.7 19.8 16.9 9.9 6.0 8.7 4.8 7.4 16.3 13.6 30.4 40.6
Singapore 12.4 13.9 8.0 6.8 9.1 15.6 22.1 25.1 13.1 14.4 35.2 24.3
Taiwan 34.3 22.3 11.0 10.3 12.0 28.8 5.2 7.2 15.3 14.7 22.3 16.8
Indonesia 19.6 14.4 49.2 21.9 13.4 18.8 1.3 7.3 6.6 13.3 9.9 24.4
Malaysia 16.3 21.0 22.8 11.4 23.0 25.9 3.4 7.8 18.0 13.3 16.3 20.7
Philippines 27.5 25.2 26.6 16.1 8.8 16.9 4.6 9.4 18.0 16.2 14.4 16.2
Thailand 12.7 18.3 15.1 15.6 13.6 14.9 8.6 8.9 26.5 16.1 23.5 26.1
China 5.4 26.7 22.2 14.7 26.3 23.1 4.3 3.9 14.7 14.5 27.1 17.1
Origin of imports of selected East Asian countries (% of total imports of each country)
Importing    From the US    From Japan   From NIEs   From ASEAN From EU-15    Elsewhere
countries 1980 2003 1980 2003 1980 2003 1980 2003 1980 2003 1980 2003
Japan 16.9 16.5 - - 5.0 7.2 15.9 13.7 6.3 13.2 55.8 49.3
Hong Kong 10.9 7.1 21.1 13.6 15.7 13.3 3.5 7.0 11.8 9.6 37.0 49.4
Korea 21.3 16.8 25.5 20.7 2.3 5.1 5.7 8.5 7.4 10.4 37.9 38.5
Singapore 12.5 14.5 15.9 12.1 4.9 6.2 24.2 28.9 11.0 11.2 31.5 27.1
Taiwan 23.7 17.0 27.2 24.0 3.4 11.3 6.3 11.3 8.6 12.0 30.8 24.4
Indonesia 12.4 7.8 30.0 17.1 15.7 18.5 3.6 8.0 13.9 13.6 24.4 34.9
Malaysia 14.8 13.3 22.4 16.6 16.2 29.5 4.6 10.9 16.9 11.0 25.0 18.6
Philippines 22.7 20.6 19.2 21.5 7.9 20.7 5.0 9.6 11.4 7.3 33.8 20.3
Thailand 14.1 10.1 20.7 23.2 11.2 11.9 5.4 10.8 15.0 10.5 33.7 33.6
China 19.3 10.3 26.1 20.2 3.8 18.6 2.3 9.1 16.8 14.8 31.5 27.0
Note: ASEAN excludes Singapore; NIEs includes Singapore; For Taiwan, the data of 2003 is
actually data of 2001.
Sources: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington DC;
International Economic Databank, The Australian National University, Canberra.
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Table 7.5 International comparison of shifting patterns of export
specialisation in selected industrial sectors, 1970–2000
(index of revealed comparative advantage)
Machinery (SITC 71) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
China 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7
Japan 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5
NIEs 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.4
ASEAN 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.4
United States 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.4
Electrical machinery (SITC 72)
China 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.1
Japan 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6
NIEs 1.8 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.8
ASEAN 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.1
United States 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
Travel goods (SITC 83)
China 2.8 3.2 3.4 8.2 3.1 8.6 7.9
Japan 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
NIEs 8.9 14.9 16.2 9.7 6.5 2.1 0.8
ASEAN 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.2
United States 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Clothing (SITC 84)
China 2.0 2.4 4.7 5.2 4.9 5.1 4.6
Japan 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
NIEs 13.3 14.2 10.1 6.8 4.2 2.1 1.7
ASEAN 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2
United States 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4
Footwear (SITC 85)
China 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 3.8 6.1 6.4
Japan 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NIEs 3.6 6.2 7.8 6.5 5.1 1.1 0.3
ASEAN 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.3 2.1 1.1
United States 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Note: ASEAN includes Singapore; NIEs excludes Singapore.
Source: Calculated using UN COMTRADE data, International Economic Databank, The
Australian National University, Canberra.
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the early 1980s. It then fell away rapidly to well below unity for most
products by the end of the century. The NIEs’ export specialisation in
machinery rose rapidly from low levels in 1970 to above unity at the end
of the century. The NIEs export specialisation in electrical machinery was
more stable, reflecting a wider range of relative factor requirements in
production of these goods.
Individual labour-intensive products tended to rise in proportion to
ASEAN countries’ total exports until the mid 1980s. That their peaks
were much lower than those in Northeast Asian economies is a reflection
of the ASEAN economies’ larger per capita endowments of natural
resources. ASEAN export specialisation in electrical machinery exceeded
unity by the 1980s and stabilised around 2 late in the 1990s. Export
specialisation in machinery exceeded unity in the mid 1990s and continues
to rise.
China’s export specialisation in most labour-intensive products peaked
at very high levels between the mid 1980s (travel goods and clothing) and
the mid 1990s (footwear). It has tended to stabilise at the high levels.
China’s internal economic differentiation means that the country as a whole
can retain comparative advantage in labour-intensive products for longer,
as lower-cost labour from the inland replaces the labour from coastal China
as the coastal provinces absorb more valuable skills and their labour costs
rise. China’s export specialisation in machinery rose rapidly from the mid-
1980s and was around unity, and rising, at the end of the century.
By contrast, US export specialisation in the products for which data are
recorded in Table 7.5 remained relatively stable throughout the last several
decades. It was consistently low for labour-intensive goods and high for
machinery.
Table 7.6 sets out the net exports of manufactures of some selected Asia
Pacific economies to Asia and the world for 1980–2000 (referred to as
‘the ladder of development’ by Leamer 1984). What matters here is not
only the sign patterns, but also the magnitude of these net export figures.
The data show that there is a clear pattern of trade specialisation in East
Asian region with regard to manufactured products during the past two
decades.
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Table 7.6 Net exports of manufactures to Asia and the world,
1980, 1990 and 2000 (US$ billion)
                          Labour-intensive      Capital-intensive        Machinery            Chemicals
1980                    Asia        World        Asia      World          Asia    World       Asia     World
Australia –0.70 –1.40 0.70 –0.11 –0.05 –6.02 –0.10 0.16
China 1.23 3.40 –1.23 –1.85 –1.63 –4.02 –3.25 –0.34
Hong Kong –2.19 1.89 2.19 –0.71 –0.42 –2.48 –0.85 –1.03
Indonesia –0.07 –0.08 0.07 –1.26 –0.06 –3.52 –0.11 –0.90
Japan –0.11 2.20 0.11 18.08 –2.18 62.38 –4.37 1.64
Korea 0.61 5.59 –0.61 1.20 –0.66 –1.54 –1.32 –1.12
Malaysia –0.15 0.01 0.15 –0.83 –0.07 –2.68 –0.15 –0.43
Singapore –0.44 –0.21 0.44 –0.94 –0.24 –1.95 –0.47 –0.48
Thailand 0.02 0.44 –0.02 –0.58 –0.12 –1.97 –0.24 –0.60
Taiwan 0.87 5.32 –0.87 –0.14 –0.95 –0.76 –1.89 –1.09
United States –7.62 –7.50 7.62 –5.29 –0.34 24.83 –0.67 5.82
1990
Australia –1.36 –2.17 0.09 –0.56 –0.99 –14.58 0.03 –1.33
China 5.47 13.42 0.87 –0.66 0.61 –11.10 0.14 –0.95
Hong Kong –14.19 –7.18 –0.96 –2.08 –7.38 –14.61 –1.27 –3.82
Indonesia 0.09 2.69 –0.28 –1.43 –1.49 –8.92 –0.47 –2.59
Japan –6.22 –7.71 5.95 10.81 42.27 152.43 5.44 2.96
Korea 2.14 16.10 0.95 1.28 2.64 0.05 0.60 –3.70
Malaysia –0.50 0.71 –0.28 –1.68 0.21 –4.55 –0.32 –1.35
Singapore –1.42 –0.32 0.02 –1.76 0.03 –0.68 1.08 –0.04
Thailand –0.27 3.56 –0.70 –2.91 –0.61 –8.90 –0.26 –2.01
Taiwan 3.79 11.21 0.43 0.93 3.78 5.41 0.94 –2.96
United States –28.76 –35.66 –3.32 –11.13 –7.77 –33.45 3.85 7.29
2000
Australia –2.60 –3.43 –0.57 –1.51 –6.26 –24.98 –0.26 –0.33
China 9.16 47.51 –0.76 1.03 –2.40 –14.00 –9.51 –16.61
Hong Kong –28.64 –23.83 –3.91 –6.11 –51.12 –80.06 –4.74 –9.53
Indonesia 0.69 8.63 –0.44 –1.14 2.34 0.08 –0.79 –2.25
Japan –18.04 –19.92 9.13 14.05 60.34 209.65 11.84 9.72
Korea 3.31 13.32 2.41 3.01 11.53 37.93 6.41 2.92
Malaysia –0.12 2.29 –0.53 –2.04 4.53 8.36 –0.08 –1.42
Singapore –1.92 –0.53 –0.07 –2.02 7.21 10.95 3.19 1.80
Thailand –0.41 4.74 –0.44 –2.82 1.16 1.83 0.66 –1.19
Taiwan 6.73 11.92 2.95 5.44 9.58 16.15 3.12 –3.04
United States –54.80 –79.23 –11.01 –21.30 –70.92 –180.70 4.53 –3.81
Source: UN COMTRADE, International Economic Databank, The Australian National
University, Canberra.
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First, Japan together with the United States ranks at the top by exporting
(net) the most advanced manufactured products, namely chemicals. Japan
exports more to Asia than to the world in 1990 and 2000. Both countries
are net importers of labour-intensive products, but a sharp difference
between them is that Japan exports both capital-intensive and machinery
products with high values, while the United States imports those products.
This suggests that both countries retain comparative advantage in producing
and exporting the most advanced manufactured products (chemicals) and
that Japan has very strong comparative advantage in machinery and capital-
intensive products.
Second, from 1980 to 1990 both Korea and Taiwan produced clear
shifts in their net exports of capital-intensive and machinery from net
importing to exporting these products. Such shifts provide some evidence
of structural changes resulting from their changing pattern of comparative
advantage. Korea and Taiwan have very similar sign patterns with regard
to these four aggregates, exporting all these manufactured products except
exports of chemicals to the world in the case of Taiwan. Another similarity
between them is that both Korea and Taiwan export much smaller volumes
of labour-intensive products to Asia than to the world (a clear sign of
competition from other industrialising economies in the region).
Third, like Korea and Taiwan, Singapore exports both machinery and
chemicals to both Asia and the world and capital-intensive products to
Asia only in 1990 and 2000. However, the difference is that while both
Korea and Taiwan are still exporting labour-intensive products to both
Asia and the world (much less to Asia than to the world in terms of the
values), Singapore has lost its comparative advantage in exporting this
category of manufactured products to both Asia and the world. Since
1990, Hong Kong has become a net importer of all four manufactured
aggregates.
Fourth, there are signs that Malaysia and Thailand are losing comparative
advantage in labour-intensive product market in Asia, but gaining some
comparative advantage in machinery by 2000. China and Indonesia are at
the next rung on the ladder, namely exporting labour-intensive products
to both Asia and the world. China is predominant in terms of its net
export values of this product category, particularly to the world market,
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but it depends heavily on imports of machinery and chemicals from both
Asia and the world by 2000.
Fifth, Australia appears to have some comparative advantage in exporting
capital-intensive and chemical products to Asia and the United States in
both 1980 and 1990, but has been losing comparative advantage on both
products by 2000. Australia is heavily dependent on imports of machinery
and labour-intensive products from the world.
Finally, China has settled on the export structure ladder as a major
exporter of labour-intensive manufactured products as determined by its
pattern of factor endowment. This situation did not change much during
the past two decades. What has changed noticeably is the magnitude of
the exports of labour-intensive products from China to Asia and particularly
to the world by 2000.
Intra-industry trade and trade in components
An outstanding feature of the changing pattern of East Asian comparative
advantage and trade specialisation is the huge expansion of trade in
components. There is no longer a ‘Japanese’ car or ‘Chinese’ television set.
Components are sourced from many countries to minimise total supply
costs. This is a feature of the contemporary global economy, but it has
been taken further in East Asia than in other major economic region
(Garnaut and Song 2006).
Greater openness leads to the internationalisation of a manufacturing
process in which many countries participate in different stages of the
manufacture of a specified product. Trade in intermediate goods such as
machinery parts and components is increasing. The process allows stages
of production to be located where they can be undertaken most efficiently
and at the lowest cost. As a result, countries are becoming more
interdependent on each other (Yeats 1998) and global value chains (GVCs)
offer significant opportunities to many Asian firms to take advantage of
the potential benefits of globalisation (ADB 2003).
Closer regional economic integration emerges through market processes.
A central feature of deeper East Asian economic integration has been the
remarkable growth of trade in intermediate goods and components. China
is now a major element in this process (Li et al. 2007). Athukorala (2003)
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shows that in 2000, over 60 per cent of ‘final exports’ from developing
Asia went to countries outside the East Asian region, especially North
America and Europe, up from 55 per cent in 1992.
Table 7.7 shows that East Asia has been more deeply involved in
fragmentation trade than other regions. Fragmentation trade is damaged
more than conventional trade by transactions costs. For this and other
reasons, it is damaged more than traditional trade by FTAs with their
rules of origin. While trade in components is mainly within East Asia, a
majority of the markets for the final products is still extra-regional. The
fragmentation of the supply chain accelerates the growth of trade in
components and makes the region more heavily dependent on extra-
regional trade for ‘growth dynamism’ than is suggested by data that does
separate out the trade in components (Findlay 2003).
The large increases in fragmentation trade have been associated with
rising intra-industry trade. By 2000, a few East Asian economies (Singapore,
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand) had similar indexes of intra-industry trade with
the world as a whole as the North American economies (Table 7.8). Most
Table 7.7 Contribution of parts and components to export
growth, 1992–2000 (per cent)
      ASEAN East Asia     EU-12  NAFTA World
China 32.9 31.1 12.6 10.3 17.9
Korea 58.9 51.2 35.4 40.6 41.0
Japan 66.9 52.7 86.2 34.1 50.1
Korea 58.9 51.2 35.4 40.6 41.0
Taiwan 67.6 50.8 37.5 54.9 47.4
Hong Kong 29.2 21.6 34.9 8.8 16.3
ASEAN 67.6 60.0 53.1 52.1 54.7
East Asia 64.2 52.6 40.9 35.0 42.8
EU-12 48.8 31.1 20.0 18.1 22.0
NAFTA 74.4 55.8 34.2 23.3 29.9
United States 73.9 55.9 34.8 30.7 38.1
World 63.0 49.6 21.1 25.1 27.0
Source: Compiled from the data from Athukorala 2003. Product fragmentation and trade
patterns in East Asia, Working Paper No. 21/2003. The Australian National University,
Canberra: Table A-3 (B).
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global indexes for the East Asian economies were moderately lower. Hong
Kong was very low, reflecting characteristics of trade and industry structure
rather than any failure of openness. Japan’s global index had more than
doubled between 1985 and 2000, but remained fairly low.
Extent of East Asian integration
Table 7.9 decomposes trade (exports plus imports) undertaken by countries
in the various regions into percentages of total intra-regional and total
inter-regional trade, which measures the extent of both intra- and inter-
regional integration.
Table 7.8 Intra-industry trade indexes by destination, 1985 and
2000
                   East Asia                  EU-12           North America            World
   1985   2000   1985   2000    1985   2000 1985 2000
Australia 11.9 25.7 10.5 23.4 12.2 27.9 22.4 36.6
New Zealand 8.8 12.0 6.5 16.7 12.9 23.3 20.7 30.3
Japan 17.7 42.5 32.9 43.1 21.2 42.1 19.8 41.6
Korea 48.5 68.7 44.2 40.5 25.1 48.9 40.7 55.9
China 23.2 49.9 10.0 42.7 7.6 32.6 21.3 47.6
Hong Kong 24.8 11.5 30.7 20.1 20.8 18.2 45.7 19.6
Taiwan 48.9 76.5 28.9 43.4 17.9 37.9 35.0 60.8
Singapore 44.9 82.3 41.9 45.9 51.1 56.2 58.5 78.9
Indonesia 10.1 32.8 3.9 20.1 1.9 14.8 15.1 34.0
Malaysia 25.6 65.8 20.1 48.7 50.9 43.2 37.2 60.4
Thailand 21.3 61.7 13.6 43.3 24.0 35.1 23.1 57.3
Philippines 32.3 56.4 25.5 29.2 45.1 45.1 36.1 49.9
Vietnam 2.2 19.0 3.2 8.1 0.3 7.7 7.1 17.6
EEC-12 43.5 50.9 97.6 92.9 53.3 67.2 78.9 86.6
United Kingdom 39.4 41.7 62.7 74.1 50.8 65.2 72.2 79.9
Germany 36.3 47.9 49.6 70.5 21.3 59.7 51.9 72.9
United States 27.5 44.1 47.5 62.2 61.6 64.2 52.3 62.9
Canada 13.3 17.2 25.7 39.5 61.3 63.4 63.3 66.0
Mexico 6.1 12.2 8.7 30.7 33.8 59.1 31.9 60.5
Source: UN Trade Data, International Economic Databank, The Australian National
University, Canberra.
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Table 7.9 Intra-regional and inter-regional trade among actual
and potential formal blocs, 1980–2003 (percentage of
total trade)
Pole 1980 1990 2000 2003
North America
Intra-regional 32.3 37.6 47.4 46.4
With European Union 18.8 20.0 15.6 16.7
With East Asia 24.9 35.4 31.6 31.4
With ASEAN 3.5 4.2 5.1 4.7
With Australia and New Zealand 1.4 1.5 0.9 0.9
European Union
Intra-regional 56.6 64.6 60.2 60.9
With North America 8.2 8.4 10.1 9.1
With East Asia 32.5 38.9 37.4 37.3
With ASEAN 1.1 1.5 2.1 1.9
With Australia and New Zealand 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
East Asia
Intra-regional 35.2 44.2 51.4 51.2
With North America 21.9 25.6 22.1 20.1
With European Union 12.0 16.3 13.7 13.9
With ASEAN 12.6 11.4 14.0 14.7
With Australia and New Zealand 3.7 3.2 2.5 2.7
ASEAN
Intra-regional 16.9 17.4 22.6 23.2
With North America 16.1 18.5 18.5 16.7
With European Union 13.0 15.8 12.9 12.7
With East Asia 53.0 55.5 55.5 55.9
With Australia and New Zealand 3.1 2.7 2.6 3.0
ANZ
Intra-regional 6.2 7.5 7.6 8.1
With North America 18.4 19.9 17.7 15.1
With European Union 20.1 20.1 17.0 19.8
With East Asia 45.1 51.0 52.7 53.1
With ASEAN 7.4 7.9 12.1 12.3
Notes: ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations; EU=European Union; North America
Pole: US, Canada, Mexico; East Asia Pole: Malaysia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South
Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines; ASEAN includes Singapore.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington DC;
International Economic Databank, The Australian National University, Canberra.
182 JAPAN’S FUTURE IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Table 7.10 shows that there are generally increasing trends of intra-
regional trade for all the blocs (except the European Union) across time.
By 2003, the level of intra-regional trade is highest in the EU (60 per
cent) followed by East Asia (51 per cent) and then North America (46 per
cent). The region of ASEAN, a sub-set of East Asia, is not highly integrated
in terms of intra-regional trade, although the trend is increasing. Australia
and New Zealand have a relatively low level of intra-regional integration
compared with other regions. In comparison with the rising trend of intra-
regional trade, inter-regional trade tends to fall for many regional blocs,
for example for North America trade with both the EU and East Asia.
However, East Asia has had the highest level of inter-regional trade with
North America followed by its trade with EU, suggesting a high level of
interdependence between the two regions. Australia and New Zealand
have a highest level of inter-regional trade with East Asia (53 per cent
compared with their trade share with the EU of 19 per cent and North
America of 15 per cent).
Table 7.10 allows us to assess the extent to which the expansion of East
Asian inter-regional and intra-regional trade has simply reflected the
increase in scale of East Asia’s trade with the rest of the world, and the
extent to which it has involved changes in trade intensity with one or
other set of partners (Garnaut and Song 2006). It does this through the
presentation of intensity indexes as originally developed by Kojima (1964).
It also breaks down the intensity index into complementarity and bias
indexes, following Drysdale (1969) (see also Drysdale and Garnaut 1982).
The latter step allows assessment of the extent to which changes in intensity
of trade reflect respectively a closer match of the commodity composition
of the two partners’ trade, relative to their trade with the rest of the world,
and the extent to which it resulted from changes in intensity of trade
commodity-by-commodity.
Between 1985 and 2000, the intensity of intra-regional trade fell in
East Asia, but rose in North America and Western Europe. Relative to the
respective regions’ shares in world trade, East Asia has come to trade
relatively less within its own region, and the other two regions relatively
more. Complementarity in intra-regional trade rose in East Asia, remained
steady in Europe, and fell in North America.
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China in East Asian economic integration
In his discussion of the ladder hypothesis and multiple export catch-up of
the East Asian economies, Pearson (1994) raised several questions about
China’s position and potential in the process of industrial and trade
transformation taking place in the region. The delayed entrance of the
Table 7.10 Bias, complementarity and intensity indexes for major
country groups, 1985 and 2000
           Australia and    East Asia       ASEAN       EU-12          North         Rest
            New Zealand         America      of world
Reporter  1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000
Type
Australia and New Zealand
Bias 8.3 9.0 1.8 1.7 2.6 2.3 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1
Complementarity 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2
Intensity 3.9 6.3 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.1 1.3
East Asia
Bias 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.2 2.0 1.4 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.5
Complementarity 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9
Intensity 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.0 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.4
ASEAN (6)
Bias 2.0 2.2 2.5 1.6 4.1 2.5 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.6
Complementarity 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9
Intensity 1.6 2.0 3.1 2.2 5.2 3.8 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5
EU-12
Bias 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.0
Complementarity 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
Intensity 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.1
North America
Bias 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 1.1 1.4 0.6 0.4
Complementarity 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0
Intensity 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.4
Rest of world
Bias 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.4
Complementarity 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1
Intensity 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.5
Source: Garnaut, R. and Song, L., 2005. Truncated globalisation: the fate of the Asia Pacific
economies?, in Hadi Soesastro and Christopher Findlay (eds), Reshaping the Asia Pacific
Economic Order, Routledge, London: Table 7.
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People’s Republic of China into this dynamic process in the late 1970s
poses interesting questions. Where has China settled on the export structure
ladder, and how rapidly will it climb? Are Korean and Taiwanese export
structures sufficiently sophisticated to escape pressure from China from
below? Will the entrance of China slow the progress of ASEAN economies
as exporters? Does the sheer size of the Chinese economy and its export
potential add a new dimension? (Pearson 1994:37)
The emergence of China as a major exporter of manufactures in the
1980s and especially the 1990s has intensified the competitive impacts
on other East Asian economies, thereby, accelerating the pace and depth
of the structural adjustment in the regional economy. For example,
competition between China and other Asian countries is likely to increase
as China’s relatively cheap and productive workforce provides it with
comparative advantages on world markets across a range of labour-intensive
products.
China has an important place in the sale of many labour-intensive
products in world markets, which are similar to those produced in the
ASEAN economies (Xu and Song 2000). China has also increased its shares
of world total labour-intensive manufactured exports from 1970 to 2000
(Figure 7.1). In contrast, the shares of NIEs in world total labour-intensive
exports have been declining rapidly, while the gap between China and
ASEAN in terms of their shares in world total has been widening especially
since the early 1990s (Figure 7.1).
Progress in structural adjustment in these economies can be seen from
the declining shares of labour-intensive products in their total exports
from 1970 to 2000 (Figure 7.2). However, the task of structural adjustment
seems more pressing for the latecomers.
Competitive relationships and structural adjustments
The competitive relationships between the three competing economies of
China, ASEAN and NIEs can be seen by examining the more detailed
two-digit SITC data. Table 7.11 presents the figures of two digit-SITC
categories falling into the advantage or disadvantage groups for each
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Figure 7.2 Share of labour-intensive products in total exports,
1970–2000 (per cent)
Source: Calculated using UN COMTRADE data, International Economic Databank, The
Australian National University, Canberra.
Figure 7.1 Changing share of some East Asian economies in world
total labour-intensive manufactured exports, 1970–
2000 (per cent)
Source: Authors’ calculation using UN COMTRADE, International Economic Databank,
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Table 7.11 Competitive advantage and disadvantage with the
United States, 1987–2000
Number of two-digit SITC
categories which had ASEAN China NIEs
Advantage 23 35 16
Disadvantage 35 24 40
Neutral 3 1 5
All 61 60 61
Source: Song, L., 2004. The export competitiveness of ASEAN, China and the East Asian
NIEs, 1987–2000, paper presented at the international conference on Rising China and the
East Asian Economy, The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), Seoul,
Korea:19–20: Table 13.
competing economy. The strong competitive advantage of China is also
evident at the two-digit level of SITC categories, followed by ASEAN and
then NIEs.
Increased competition has forced both China and other Asian countries
to make the necessary structural adjustments by upgrading their industries,
especially towards producing more capital- and technology-intensive
products. This competitive pressure is particularly important in the
relationship between China and the NIEs, as China’s rising trade has forced
the NIEs to move more quickly in upgrading their industrial structures in
order to sustain a rapid growth of exports (Song 2004).
Table 7.12 shows that 68 per cent of NIE exports and 60 per cent of
ASEAN exports, but only 44 per cent of Chinese exports in 1987 were in
sectors that grew above average from 1987 to 2000. The fact that 68 per
cent of NIE exports were concentrated in fast-growing categories suggests
that NIEs had considerable structural advantage compared with China
and ASEAN. The strong structural advantage of NIEs can also be found at
the two-digit level of SITC codes. Table 7.13 shows the number of SITC
categories that fell into either the structural advantage or structural
disadvantage groups. At this level, the structural advantage for the NIEs is
obvious with 45 categories that fell into the structural advantage group
compared with 22 for ASEAN and only 11 for China.
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Table 7.13 Structural advantage and disadvantage, 1987–2000
Number of two-digit SITC categories which had ASEAN China NIE
Structural advantage 22 11 45
Structural disadvantage 39 49 16
Total 61 60 61
Source: Song, L., 2004. The export competitiveness of ASEAN, China and the East Asian
NIEs, 1987–2000, paper presented at the international conference on Rising China and
the East Asian Economy, The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP),
Seoul, Korea:19–20: Table 11.
The China dimension of the process of East Asian economic integration
can be elucidated through the following analysis. First, the economic reform
and policy of opening up the economy has made China increasingly part
Table 7.12 Proportion of exports to the United States by SITC
category
1987–2000             Proportion of 1987 exports
Commodity Reference growth  Relative               (per cent)
(per cent)    growth ASEAN China NIE
0 - Food 7.16 Fast 7.66 2.37 1.01
1 - Beverages 7.45 Fast 0.14 0.08 0.04
2 - Crude materials 3.53 Slow 3.24 1.24 0.36
3 - Fuels 0.99 Slow 3.41 2.34 0.48
4 - Vegetable oil 3.07 Slow 1.35 0.02 0.01
5 - Chemicals 12.61 Fast 0.92 3.71 1.67
6 - Manufactures 6.75 Fast 6.94 12.87 9.59
7 - Machinery and transport equipment 12.42 Fast 44.42 25.14 56.07
8 - Miscellaneous manufactures 5.43 Slow 28.02 52.18 30.37
9 - Not classified –3.00 Slow 3.90 0.06 0.38
Average 5.64 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Song, L., 2004. The export competitiveness of ASEAN, China and the East Asian
NIEs, 1987-2000, paper presented at the international conference on Rising China and the
East Asian Economy, The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), Seoul,
Korea:19–20: Table 10.
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of East Asian economic integration, which is reflected in the significant
shifts in production and the trade structures of these economies. The
fundamental causes for such shifts lie in differences in the patterns of
factor endowments and levels of development in these economies. In case
of China, the result has been largely due to a convergence of its patterns of
factor endowments and trade, which accounts for the rapid expansion of
China’s trade share in labour-intensive manufactured exports and are
apparent in its increasing trade share in some capital-intensive
manufactured exports in the regional and world markets (Song 1996b).
Second, the process of industrial and trade transformation in the East
Asian region that started decades ago has been very dynamic. Participation
in this process by China since the beginning of its reform in the late
1970s has injected new forces into this transformation, increasing the
specialisation in manufactured production and exports. As a result, East
Asia economies, with an increase in intra-regional trade and investment
and a larger share in world trade, are emerging as a new economic centre
in the world economy.
Third, China’s economic integration with the East Asian economies
has benefited both China and other East Asian economies in terms of
creating a bigger market for export products and taking advantage of scale
economies and increased trade and investment opportunities. But it also
poses challenges to the economies in the region. These could take the
form of increased competition for labour-intensive manufactures exporters,
for some capital-intensive manufactures exporters in the next stage of
development of East Asian economy as well as competition for attracting
foreign investment.
Fourth, the trade outlook for the East Asian industrialising economies
will depend on future changes in their patterns of factor endowments. It
also depends on both the trade policies they apply domestically and those
pursued by their trading partners abroad. In this context, the industrialising
economies of East Asia have a large stake in continuing their strategy of
trade and investment liberalisation in their domestic economies and in
the maintenance of open, rules-oriented international trade and investment
regimes as well as the further developments of regional and multilateral
forums for trade negotiations (Balassa and Noland 1994).
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Prospects for the future East Asian trade and development
How has East Asia’s rapid growth in output and trade, and tendency to
trade globally rather than within its own region (to a greater extent than
North America and Europe), affected the rest of the world economy?
The main effect is to expand the potential gains from trade in the rest
of the world. This follows simply from the expanded scope for other
economies to specialise in supply of goods and services in which their
comparative advantage is strong.
The utilisation of these opportunities has required acceptance of
structural change. The relatively steady East Asian share of global markets
for the products in which the region’s export specialisation has been
strongest, labour-intensive manufactures, suggests that the costs of
structural change for the world outside East Asia have not been high since
the early 1980s, that is, since the early entry of East Asia into the
international economy (see also Garnaut and Huang 2000). The pressures
for continuing structural change of a radical kind have been greatest within
East Asia itself, as identified in this chapter.
The skewed nature of East Asia’s resource endowment relative to the
rest of the world, with extreme relative scarcity of land and other natural
resources, has made East Asia disproportionately and increasingly an
importer of resource-based products. This has reduced the pressures on
these old industries to decline in the industrial economies of the North
Atlantic.
The East Asian economies will certainly continue to benefit from those
contributing factors to East Asian trade and development, such as high
savings, accumulation of both physical and human capital, a relatively
stable market environment, liberalisation of domestic economies, inflows
of FDI, geographic closeness, and various forms of economic cooperation.
However, there are a number of factors that have the potential to affect
adversely the trade flows to and from East Asia, which include the weak
growth and rising protectionism of the developed markets, instabilities of
the financial systems, exchange rate volatility, weak domestic institutions,
national policy of protection particularly with respect to those ‘sensitive
sectors’, lack of progress in the multilateral trade negotiations and confusion
about forms of forging regional economic cooperation (groupings).
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The emergence of China as a major exporter of manufactures has been
causing anxieties among other East Asian economies. With the rising degree
of interdependence among the East Asian economies, there are also issues
of geopolitics such as Japan-China bilateral relations and their respective
relations with other East Asian economies such as ASEAN.
The regional economies are now at a stage where there is no basis for
confidence that the continued strengthening of an open multilateral trading
system will provide continually expanding access on a non-discriminatory
basis for exports from each Asia Pacific economy’s most productive
industries, as they evolve over time. The old Western Pacific doctrines of
‘open regionalism’, and a conceptual framework within which unilateral
trade liberalisation, regional cooperation within ASEAN and APEC, and
multilateral liberalisation under the aegis of the WTO, have gone, and no
conceptual or institutional alternative has arisen to provide confidence
that the international environment will support continued rapid,
internationally oriented growth. This was pointed out by Garnaut and
Song (2004), who argue the following in responding to the newly resurgent
interest in forming various bilateral and sub-regional trading arrangements.
First, the new pattern of bilateral and sub-regional preferences would
truncate the process of increasingly precise specialisation in the supply of
inputs into final products assembled in one or other of the Asia Pacific
economies, because of the rules of origin.
Second, the contemporary regionalisation and globalisation of
production would also be damaged by the transaction costs associated
with monitoring and enforcing rules of origin, even in cases in which the
domestic-plus-partner value-added were able to meet the tests.
Third, the proliferation of FTAs is a problem for adjustment to the rise
of China, because it concentrates adjustment excessively in countries which
have FTAs with China and also in those which do not have FTAs with
third countries. It denies the great advantage of multilateral trade on a
global basis, in that it diffuses pressures for adjustment throughout the
global economy.
Fourth, using FTAs to separate third countries from East Asian
dynamism, whether in East Asia or adjoining third countries, reduces
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their exposure to opportunities for rising living standards. This is likely to
be most damaging to potential suppliers of the natural-resource based
products in which China’s comparative disadvantage is most pronounced,
and especially of the agricultural industries in which trade distortion is
endemic.
Finally, the trade-off between costs of adjustment and gains from trade
through the rise of China is affected by the presence of FTAs. For the
world as a whole, the trade-off between adjustment costs and gains from
trade is more favourable if the movement is toward specialisation according
to global comparative advantage, as it is modified by growth and structural
change in individual economies.
Multilateral trading arrangements or wider regional groupings, rather
than narrowly focused and complex and discriminatory bilateral trading
arrangements, are conductive to the East Asian objective of sustaining fast
export growth. In the case of China, what it essentially requires is not a
number of narrowly focused bilateral arrangements or exclusive regional
groupings that are discriminatory in nature. What it needs is wider open
trading arrangements, ideally in global scope, that are consistent with
non-discriminatory principles in international trade. As pointed out by
Drysdale (1988), ‘discriminatory trade regimes are likely to be damaging
to the interests of East Asia and Pacific countries’ (Drysdale 1988:36).
Thus, the task of ‘institutional integration’ remains a big challenge for
the East Asian and Pacific economies. We close by quoting the conclusion
by Drysdale in his book entitled, International Economic Pluralism: Economic
Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
the Pacific belongs to no single nation—not Japan, despite its new-found
economic power, nor China, despite the scale of its industrial promise,
nor, any longer, America. The responsibilities of Pacific economic policy
leadership are bound to be developed as shared responsibilities. The
huge and rewarding task of establishing a degree of intimacy among the
heterogeneous nations of the Pacific, upon which confident policy
strategies can be promulgated and executed in support of international
systemic objectives, is a challenge to which Pacific countries are now
fortunately at last beginning to turn (Drysdale 1988:260).
192 JAPAN’S FUTURE IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
References
Asian Development Bank, 2003. Asian Development Outlook, Asian
Development Bank, Manila.
Athukorala, P., 2003. Product fragmentation and trade patterns in East Asia,
Working Paper No. 2003/21, The Australian National University,
Canberra.
Balassa, B. and Noland, M., 1994. ‘Prospects of trade and regional
cooperation of the industrialising economies of East Asia’, in S.C. Yang
(ed.), Manufactured Exports of East Asian Industrialising Economies: possible
regional cooperation, M.E. Sharpe, New York: pp.
Bradford, C.I. and Branson, W. H., 1987. ‘Patterns of trade and structural
change’, in C.I. Bradford and W.H. Branson (eds), Trade and Structural
Change in Pacific Asia, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and
London.
Das, Dilip K., 1998. ‘Changing comparative advantage and the changing
composition of Asian exports’, The World Economy, 21(1):121–40.
Drysdale, P., 1969. ‘Japan, Australia and New Zealand: the prospects for
Western Pacific economic integration’, Economic Record, 45
(111):321–42.
——, 1988. International Economic Pluralism: economic policy in East Asia
and the Pacific, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
Drysdale, P., and Garnaut, R., 1982. ‘Trade intensities and the analysis of
bilateral trade flows in a many-country world’, Hitotsubashi Journal of
Economics, 22(2).
——, 1993. ‘The Pacific: an application of a general theory of economic
integration’, in Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland (eds), Pacific
Dynamism and the International Economic System, Institute for
International Economics, Washington, DC:183–224.
Drysdale, P., 2003. ‘Regional Cooperation in East Asia and FTA Strategies’,
Presentation to IIPS Conference on Building a Regime of Regional
Cooperation in East Asia and the Role which Japan Can Play, Tokyo,
2–3 December.
Findlay, C., 2003. ‘China in the world economy: the FTA strategy’, in R.
Garnaut and L. Song (eds), China: New Engine of World Growth, Asia
Pacific Press, The Australian National University, Canberra:176–88.
193THE DYNAMIC IN EAST ASIAN TRADE
Garnaut, R. and Anderson, K., 1980. ‘ASEAN export specialisation and
the evolution of comparative advantage in the Western Pacific region’,
in R. Garnaut (ed.), ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy,
ANU Press, Canberra:374–412.
Garnaut, R. and Huang, Y., 2000. ‘China and the future of the
international trading system’, in P. Drysdale and L. Song (eds), China’s
Entry to the WTO: Strategic Issues and Quantitative Assessments, Routledge,
London:7–29.
Garnaut, R. and Song, L., 2006. ‘Truncated globalisation: the fate of the
Asia Pacific economies?’, in Hadi Soesastro and Christopher Findlay
(eds), Reshaping the Asia Pacific Economic Order, Routledge,
London:46–81.
Kojima, K., 1964. ‘The pattern of international trade among advanced
countries’, Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 5(1).
Krueger, A.O., 1997. ‘Trade policy and economic development: how we
learn’, American Economic Review, 87(1):1–22.
Leamer, E.E., 1984. Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory
and Evidence, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Li, K., Song, L. and Zhao, X., 2007. ‘Component trade and China’s global
economic integration’, in R. Garnaut and L. Song (eds), China: Linking
Markets for Growth, Asia Pacific Press, The Australian National
University, Canberra: 71–94.
Pearson, C.S., 1994. ‘The Asian export ladder’, in Shu-Chin Yang (ed.)
Manufactured Exports of East Asian Industrialising Economies: Possible
Regional Cooperation, M.E. Sharpe, New York.
Song, L., 1996a. Changing Global Comparative Advantage: Evidence from
Asia and the Pacific, Addison-Wesley, Melbourne.
——, 1996b. ‘Institutional change, trade composition and export supply
potential in China’, in M. Guitian and R. Mundell (eds), Inflation
and Growth in China, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
DC:190–225.
——, 2004. ‘The export competitiveness of ASEAN, China and the East
Asian NIEs, 1987–2000’, paper presented at the international
conference on Rising China and the East Asian Economy, The Korea
Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), Seoul:19–20.
194 JAPAN’S FUTURE IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Xu, X.P. and Song, L., 2000. ‘Export similarity and the pattern of East
Asia development, in P. Lloyd and X.G. Zhang (eds), China in the
Global Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham:145–164.
Yeats, Alexander, 1998. Just how big is global production sharing?, The World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1871, World Bank,
Washington DC.
195THE DYNAMIC IN EAST ASIAN INVESTMENT
Over the last half century, Japan has been the dominant economy in East
Asia and a key source of trade and investment flows to other economies in
the region.1 Japanese investment in East Asia provided capital, technology
and management flows as firms invested to facilitate trade, to secure
resources and energy and to relocate production in response to yen
appreciation, rising labour costs and other constraints in the domestic
economy. Investors sought to maintain their international competitiveness
by relocating production to other East Asian economies as Japan’s
comparative advantage moved from light industrial products to more
sophisticated and higher technology industries such as electronics and
motor vehicles.
Led by the internationalisation of Japanese economy from the 1960s
and the emergence of China as a leading economy three decades later,
East Asia doubled its share of the world economy from 1980 to 2005. A
defining characteristic of East Asian economic dynamism has been the
rapid expansion of regional trade and investment (Drysdale and Garnaut
1993). These ties have been strengthening, and trade flows between Japan
and China exceeded Japanese trade with the United States for the first
time in 2003. East Asia has become more important to Japan with exports
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to the region rising from 20 to over 30 per cent in the decade to the mid
2000s and domestic sales of Japanese affiliates also rising (Farrell 2007).
Flows of direct investment into East Asia created extensive production
and trade networks, especially in ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea and China, which
contributed to growth in these regional economies. Japanese firms, as well
as firms from the United States and other foreign direct investment (FDI)
source countries, invested to ensure access to other markets (market-seeking
FDI); to shift production processes to lower cost locations (efficiency-
based FDI); to avoid barriers to trade (tariff-jumping FDI); or to supply
services. In many cases, investors have multiple objectives in pursuing
foreign direct investment in goods and services industries. In 2000, over
forty per cent of Japanese electronics firms invested in China and ASEAN
to lower their costs, 10–15 per cent sought to source parts and 15–20 per
cent wanted to better secure these markets by establishing local sales or
production facilities (Japan, METI 2002).
By 2005, East Asia had developed as an important production base,
with its trade and investment pattern dominated by electrical machinery
and transport equipment, including parts and components and assembled
products—which accounted for around half of regional trade. Regional
production chains increasingly switched from import substitution strategies
to two-way trade of parts and components produced and assembled in
different countries in order to lower costs. The electronics industry was
restructured through FDI flows from Japan, the United States and Taiwan
and the share of global electronics output of the NIEs and ASEAN
economies tripled to over 25 per cent in the two decades to 2005, while
electronics production in Japan and the United States fell over the same
period.
The pattern of Japanese investment in East Asia reflects Japan’s
comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector; its firms have imported
raw materials, metals and energy as inputs in the production of increasingly
sophisticated products. Up until the 1970s, most manufacturing
investment overseas went to East Asia and was concentrated on standard
products such as textiles, toys, synthetic fibres and consumer electronics—
which had become too costly to produce in Japan. Small to medium
enterprises (SMEs) have been active investors; accounting for over 40 per
cent of Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia.
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Foreign direct investment in East Asia
Investment flows have traditionally focused principally on the
manufacturing sector, because of East Asia’s competitive advantages and
partly because of government restrictions on foreign investment in other
industries in the primary and service sectors. This trend is changing as
deregulation occurs across the region encouraging FDI in the services sector,
such as US acquisitions of Japanese financial institutions. However, the
region is still an exception to the internationally dominant role of services
in global FDI flows. Similarly, indirect or portfolio investment typically
flows to established financial markets in North America and Europe. In
2003, the stock of Japanese FDI in East Asia reached 6.7 trillion yen or
over US$700 billion, but the stock of portfolio investment into the region
was negligible, at around 2.6 trillion yen out of global portfolio investment
of 1,844 trillion yen (Bank of Japan 2004).
Until the 1980s, Japanese manufacturing investment focused on three
economies known as newly industrialised economies (NIEs)—South Korea,
Taiwan and Hong Kong. The focus of investment then shifted to ASEAN
countries, particularly Thailand and Malaysia. From the mid 1990s, China
became an important destination for FDI, with Japanese FDI in China’s
manufacturing sector rising from 5 per cent in 1990 to 43 per cent by
1995. The continual shifting of production bases occurred as host country
costs rose with economic development and other locations became more
cost-competitive. Firms in Japan also sought to diversify sources of supply,
so as to insure against disruptions to their supply chains for raw materials,
energy, parts and components, and assembled goods.
Many host countries offered incentives for Japanese investors, who could
also receive Japanese tax incentives in support of outward FDI from Japan’s
declining industries. Often taxes and regulatory costs were lower than in
Japan and labour costs a fraction of the domestic equivalent. The higher
cost structure in Japan has been less relevant for more technology-intensive
industries and production processes which corporations seek to retain
domestically as part of their regional strategy and to lower the risk of
technology outflow. Continuing changes to costs of production and other
factors in East Asia have led Japanese investors to relocate more labour-
intensive processes from Japan to the NIEs, to ASEAN and to China,
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particularly in response to rising wages, appreciating currencies and the
loss of GSP tariff advantages of some locations.
Firms in Japan’s ‘sunset’ industries, such as textiles, were early investors
in creating foreign affiliates to relocate labour-intensive processes and lower
production costs. Textiles accounted for over 30 per cent of Japanese exports
in 1960, but less than 3 per cent three decades later. To retain
competitiveness, Japanese firms such as Toray shifted their factories to
ASEAN and China—assisted by a range of government assistance measures
including tax concessions and low-interest loans from the Export-Import
Bank—and then exported to the home market.
By 2002, East Asia was the location for about 40 per cent of Japanese
overseas subsidiaries, from a global total of over 19,000 such firms (Table
8.1). Almost 70 per cent of production affiliates were in East Asia,
compared to only one third of sales affiliates. Nevertheless, the region’s
share of Japanese investment by value was lower, because of the higher
incidence of investment by small and medium enterprises in East Asia
and the lower incidence of services investment compared to North America
and Europe (Table 8.2). While one fifth of Japanese affiliates were located
in the United States in 2002, economies in East Asia were important
Table 8.1 Japanese subsidiaries by major country, 1960–2000
Rank Country 1960–70 1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000 Total
1 United States 215 474 1,785 1,191 3,733
2 China - - 249 2,133 2,424
3 Thailand 90 126 490 589 1,306
4 Hong Kong 71 225 372 487 1,176
5 Singapore 20 242 418 471 1,165
6 United Kingdom 17 109 442 328 918
7 Malaysia 14 108 337 375 845
8 Taiwan 109 106 363 257 845
9 Indonesia 71 225 372 377 665
10 Germany 47 122 258 194 632
Note: Table shows the number of Japanese subsidiaries by country.
Source: Calculated from Toyo Keizai Shimposha surveys. Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2003.
Japanese Overseas Investment: a complete listing by firms and countries, Tokyo.
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locations, with 13 per cent in China; 6 per cent in Hong Kong, 7 per cent
in Thailand, 6 per cent in Singapore, 4 per cent in Malaysia and 3.5 per
cent in Indonesia (Toyo Keizai Shinposha 2003).
Overall, Japanese business affiliates around the world employed around
one million persons in 1985, two million in 1995, and 3.7 million a
decade later. Employment increased in subsidiaries in Asia, especially in
the NIE and ASEAN economies. The East Asian region accounted for 60
per cent of global employment in the mid 2000s and ASEAN and China
have been the major centres. By 2005, Japanese subsidiary employment
in China increased by 25 per cent to reach one million, the level reached
by Japanese subsidiaries in ASEAN (Japan, METI 2005).
By 2000, over half of Japanese firms with overseas production had
facilities in China, but many sought to diversify their production bases to
avoid over-reliance on one source in case of supply disruptions or political
tensions (Table 8.3). From the 1990s, both ASEAN and China were
targeted by Japanese medium and small-sized corporations as production,
assembly and processing locations for local supply and export to Japan or
third-country markets. Japanese firms have been notably cautious investors
in China, worried about bilateral political tensions and the possible loss
Table 8.2 Japanese FDI flows by major region, 1951–2004
(share, per cent)
Period North East Europe Middle Oceania Other
America Asia East
1951–60 1.1 17.3 1.1 19.8 0.7 30.0
1961–70 25.0 21.3 19.3 8.4 7.6 18.4
1971–75 24.3 28.1 15.2 18.3 5.3 8.8
1976–80 28.6 27.3 9.5 6.2 7.8 20.6
1981–85 36.4 20.4 13.9 1.5 3.6 24.2
1986–90 32.2 23.3 13.2 3.6 5.1 22.6
1991–95 46.9 12.4 18.7 0.4 4.3 17.3
1996–00 39.1 19.0 26.0 0.4 3.4 12.1
2001–04 24.6 16.1 40.7 0.1 2.3 16.2
Note: Data refers to new investment flows and excludes reinvestment.
Source: Japan Ministry of Finance, annual. Outward Direct Investment (Country and region),
Ministry of Finance, Tokyo. (Available at: http://www. mof.go.jp/english/e1c008.htm).
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of intellectual property. Capital flows began to increase markedly only in
the 2000s after China‘s accession to the World Trade Organization—a
move which significantly liberalised trade and investment flows; set in
train a sequence of further deregulations over time; and enhanced investor
confidence in China.
Japanese manufacturing FDI in East Asia has been focused on ASEAN
and China especially (Figure 8.1) and investors have sought to establish
lower cost production activities in this region (Table 8.4). Reflecting this
investment pattern, the overseas production ratio of Japanese manufacturing
has continued to rise (Table 8.5). The trade pattern in East Asia has been
influenced by the sales and production networks created by FDI inflows—
which have formed regional supply chains for manufacturing industry in
Japan (see Figure 8.2). In the decade from 1995, Japanese manufacturing
Table 8.3 Japanese overseas affiliates, by type of operations, 2004
Location Production Sales Research and Other Total
base base development base base
NIEs 593 927 17 101 1,638
ASEAN 1,146 493 23 93 1,755
China 1,592 599 63 130 2,384
Other Asia 215 108 4 17 344
North America 719 614 76 195 1,604
Latin America 187 140 2 74 403
European Union 444 831 52 113 1,440
Central and Eastern Europe 101 69 7 3 180
Other Europe 15 32 - 2 49
Russia and other 13 21 - 5 39
Oceania 50 104 3 29 186
Middle East and Africa 40 79 2 9 130
Total 5,115 4,017 249 771 10,152
Note: NIEs-3 are Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea; ASEAN-4 are Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines. (b) The JBIC survey covered 939 Japanese manufacturing
companies, each of which had three or more overseas affiliates and at least one overseas
production base, with a response rate of 63.4 per cent in 2004.
Source: Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 2006,  Tokyo.
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industry exports to overseas affiliates rose from 17 to 35 per cent of total
exports from Japan—indicating the trend towards fragmentation within
an intrafirm sales and procurement network in the region. The value of
exports of manufactures to overseas affiliates rose by 22 per cent in 2004,
reaching 20 trillion yen or around US$175 billion. Exports from overseas
affiliates to manufacturing industry in Japan reached 8.7 trillion yen
(US$76 billion).
Similarly, exports from overseas subsidiaries to parents in Japan (‘reverse
imports’) grew from 11.6 per cent to almost 20 per cent of total imports
into Japan. Increasingly, final products such as less complex electronics
goods are produced in East Asia and then imported and sold directly into
the Japanese market by domestic firms. The Asian economic crisis of 1997
led Japanese affiliates to move increasingly towards a greater export-
orientation after the collapse of the regional demand during the crisis.
Another related trend has been increased local sales of Japanese affiliates
in East Asia, which almost tripled after the Asian crisis to 2000 reaching
a new peak as confidence in the ASEAN economies returned. As a result,
local and regional sales of Japanese affiliates in East Asia, plus affiliate sales
to Japan considerably exceeded imports from Japan to the region, signifying
a new maturity in the economic relationship.
Figure 8.1 Japanese manufacturing FDI in East Asia, 1989–2003
(100 million yen)
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003. World investment report,
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Case study of the Japanese electronics industry in
East Asia
Overall, the basic pattern of production and trade for the electronics
industry in East Asia has been for capital and intermediate goods to be
imported from Japan and the United States, processed and assembled in
the region and then exported to the United States and other major
economies—although domestic markets are becoming more important.
The electronics industry comprises a range of labour-intensive and capital-
intensive production processes in the consumer electronics, industrial
machinery and electronics components sub-sectors—which have been
Table 8.4 Motivations for Japanese foreign direct investment in
East Asia, 2000
China                  ASEAN-4                   NIEs-3
(2,631 firms) (3,098 firms) (1,835 firms)
Industry Lower Parts Market Lower Parts Market Lower Parts Market
cost supply share cost supply share cost supply share
Food 33 1 23 26 3 18 20 - 28
Textiles 53 4 10 44 3 18 - 3 18
Wood and pulp 12 22 27 28 8 12 - 25 25
Chemicals 28 5 27 27 11 26 26 6 27
Steel 31 16 32 26 21 30 27 10 25
Non-ferrous 45 15 17 35 18 22 24 29 21
General machinery 44 4 22 46 11 21 28 9 25
Electrical machinery 42 8 21 46 15 14 35 12 23
Transport machinery 28 19 30 34 - - 26 15 27
Precision machinery 54 4 13 60 - - 15 - 25
Oil, coal 15 23 8 17 8 17 33 - 33
Other manufacturing 34 7 24 39 11 18 35 8 22
Note: The MITI survey for 2000 covered 12,243 firms globally, with 7,894 in Asia. The
proportion of subsidiaries established for the purpose of research and development, re-exports,
or to avoid trade conflict, were very low for all locations.
Source: Japan, MITI, 2001. Basic Survey of the Overseas Business Activities of Japanese Firms,
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tokyo.
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Table 8.5 Overseas production ratio of Japanese manufacturing,
1985–2007 (per cent)
Industry 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2007
Food 0.9 1.2 2.6 2.8 4.9 n.a.
Textiles 2.7 3.1 3.5 8.6 8.4 n.a.
Chemicals 2.0 5.1 8.3 13.4 16.9 24.1
Iron and steel 5.3 5.6 9.2 16.3 9.4 n.a.
General machinery 3.4 10.6 8.1 12.1 18.4 25.8
Electrical machinery 7.4 11.4 16.8 21.9 38.8 45.5
Transport machinery 5.6 12.6 20.6 31.1 28.7 35.5
Total manufacturing 3.0 6.4 9.0 13.4 26.1 33.2
Note: Production ratio equals overseas production divided by total production.
Sources: Japan, METI, annual. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  and Japan Bank
for International Cooperation, 2006. Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by
Japanese Manufacturing Companies, Tokyo. .
Figure 8.2 Patterns of Japanese production and trade with East
Asia (trillion yen)
Sources: Japan External Trade Organisation, 2003, Japanese Trade, JETRO, Tokyo; Japan
Bank for International Cooperation, 2006; Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by
Japanese Manufacturing Companies, Tokyo; Japan Ministry of Finance, annual; Outward
Direct Investment (Country and region), Ministry of Finance, Tokyo. Available at: http://www.
mof.go.jp/english/e1c008.htm.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Exports from Japan




















204 JAPAN’S FUTURE IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
relocated according to the labour costs and technological capabilities of
economies in East Asia.
The quarterly survey of Japanese overseas affiliates conducted by METI
(2004) provides an interesting guide to this relocation and upgrading
process (Figure 8.3). In 1997, the year of the Asian economic crisis, around
60 per cent of employees of Japanese electronics affiliates in East Asia were
located in the ASEAN-4 (251,000), with 16 per cent in the NIE-3
(67,000) and 25 per cent in China (108,000). By 2003, the share of the
ASEAN-4 had increased absolutely to 388,000—but this now represented
only 47 per cent of the regional workforce of the Japanese electronics
industry, with China about 45 per cent and the NIE-3 down to 8 per cent.
In this transformation of the Japanese electronics industry’s regional
production and trade network, total East Asian sales, worth almost 8 trillion
yen, grew in both the ASEAN-4 and China at the expense of the NIE-3.
Exports to the Japanese market from Japanese affiliates in East Asia have
grown over the period from 1.3 trillion yen to 2.4 trillion yen from 1997
to 2003, with China’s share rising from 22 to 32 per cent and ASEAN-4’s
share around 47 per cent—although it rose to almost 56 per cent in 1998
as Japanese firms adjusted to the crisis (Japan, METI 2004).
For East Asia as a whole, intra-regional trade in electrical machinery
goods in 2002 reached US$200 billion, which accounted for over half of
total regional exports—indicating high regional trade intensity and
Table 8.6 Foreign assets of Japanese subsidiaries overseas, 1980–
2001 (US$ billion)
Region       1980 1989      1995 2001
East Asia 17,083 60,859 146,140 209,322
North America 24,329 158,022 223,398 299,059
Europe 10,015 130,456 137,848 167,049
Latin America 11,993 14,663 29,175 47,298
Others 9,845 21,710 24,763 3,190
Total 73,265 385,701 561,324 725,918
Source: Japan, METI, 2002. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  and Japan Bank for
International Cooperation, 2006. Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese
Manufacturing Companies, Tokyo, various issues.
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complementarity indexes. However, despite increasing trade and investment
in East Asia by Japanese electronics firms such as Matsushita, Toshiba and
Sony, the profits of these companies have been affected by the rising
competitiveness of other manufacturers in East Asia, including in China.
In response, a number of electronics firms have expanded cutting-edge
electronics investment in Japan, seeking to protect and extend their
technological advantages.
Organisational patterns
The choices of modes for international business expansion generally include
exporting, licensing, joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. Initially,
many Japanese investments from the 1950s to the 1970s were joint ventures
with local partners, with the aim of gaining knowledge of overseas markets
and satisfying restrictions on foreign investment, such as in ASEAN
members Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Gradually, higher levels of
ownership and control came to be preferred by Japanese firms establishing
overseas operations with wholly owned or majority owned unless they
were required to form minority joint ventures by the local regulatory or
Figure 8.3 Japanese electronics industry in East Asia, sales and
exports 1997–2003 (billion yen)
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political environment, as occurred in ASEAN in the 1970s and China in
the 1990s.
In 2000, over 60 per cent of all Japanese subsidiaries in Asia were joint
ventures, a comparatively high share because of the historical legacy of
foreign investment restrictions in East Asia (Table 8.7). Joint ventures
involving small and medium-sized enterprises (with less than 300
employees) were more common than for larger enterprises, due in part to
the greater resources available to the latter group of firms. Around half of
investments by SMEs were joint ventures (RIETI 2003).
From the 1990s, majority or wholly-owned greenfield investments
became more frequent, especially to China and ASEAN, as foreign
investment restrictions were eased. Over the decade, they accounted for
over 50 per cent of investments, compared to an average of around 35 per
cent in the preceding three decades (Delios and Beamish 2002). As China
acceded to the WTO and eased trade and investment barriers, it became
more popular as a target for Japanese investment—as well as for US,
European and Taiwanese investors.
The role of small and medium enterprises
In early 2002, around 60 per cent of Japanese SMEs were established in
Asia, with North America and Europe accounting for a further 29 per
cent of subsidiaries of SMEs. In the early 1990s, China attracted almost
Table 8.7  Japanese FDI, mode by country, 2000
Joint venture US Asia China ASEAN-4 NIE-3 EU Total
<25 per cent 3.3 4.3 3.0 4.5 4.5 2.3 3.8
25–50 per cent 2.8 20.4 15.4 25.8 17.7 4.7 14.4
50 per cent 3.3 6.6 10.0 1.8 9.8 3.1 5.3
50–75 per cent 5.7 18.8 24.1 17.0 12.3 4.3 13.7
75–100 per cent 8.6 15.5 15.6 18.3 13.1 11.2 49.1
100 per cent 76.3 34.4 31.9 32.6 42.7 74.4 37.5
Number of firms (1,166) (3,856) (1,276) (1,478) (919) (786) (6,405)
Source: Japan, METI 2002. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Quarterly Survey of
Business Activities, Tokyo.
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half of SME FDI, followed by Southeast Asia and North America and
Europe. The main motivation for investment in Asia for Japanese SMEs
has been to import lower costs products to Japan or to sell products to
local Japanese affiliates. By contrast, the reason for FDI in Europe and
North America has been to sell manufactured products to local enterprises
(Japan, METI 2004).
The mode and structure of SME foreign subsidiaries has varied
significantly, often reflecting factors such as local foreign investment laws,
concern over technology transfer, and the funding abilities of smaller
companies. A survey in late 2003 by METI found that over half of SMEs
had established independent wholly owned subsidiaries in China and a
quarter had majority-owned joint ventures. In North America, almost 90
per cent of SME FDI subsidiaries involved wholly or majority-owned
Japanese investment (RIETI 2003).
Financing patterns for Japanese FDI
Japanese firms have faced a range of options in financing their overseas
investment, such as using the capital of the parent company, reinvesting
the profits of overseas affiliates, borrowing from Japanese financial
institutions in Japan and the host country, or raising bonds. The choice
between these options depends upon interest rates in Japan and the host
country, foreign exchange risk, the credit rating of the parent and subsidiary,
tax considerations, and the depth of the financial market in the host country.
Significant difference are evident in the profitability of Japanese and
US multinationals around the world (Itagaki 2002). In the 1970s and
1980s, the average profitability of Japanese firms (4–6 per cent) was lower
than for US firms (10–12 per cent) (Porter 2000). This trend has persisted,
and in the early 2000s, for example, profit margins of Japanese-affiliated
companies operating in China or ASEAN averaged about 6 per cent,
compared to over 15 per cent for US-affiliates companies in the same
economies (Japan, METI 2006). The profitability of Japanese firms by
region from 1996 to 2004 is shown in Figure 8.4.
This marked difference in operating profits of Japanese affiliates in East
Asia has been attributed to different business practices adopted by Japanese
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affiliates— such as the slower profits arising from using a ‘greenfield’ model
instead of more flexible merger and acquisition strategies of American
companies, and the lower tax depreciation available for Japanese affiliates.
Another possibility is the reluctance of Japanese managers of affiliates to
transfer management responsibilities to local employees adopting instead
a management structure that is similar to that in their parent companies
(Japan, METI 2006).
In East Asia, funding of Japanese FDI was historically dominated by
equity or loan funding, with reinvestment a comparatively minor factor
until the 2000s when the profitability of affiliates improved markedly,
especially in China. The notable turnaround of the profitability of Japanese
FDI in East Asia may be attributable to new estimates by the Bank of
Japan, based on balance of payments data rather than industry surveys
(Bank of Japan 2006).
Figure 8.4 Profitability of Japanese FDI by region, 1996–2004
(per cent)
Note: Direct investment profit ratios—Profits received on direct investment divided by direct
investment balances.
Sources: Bank of Japan, 2006. International Balance of Payments Statistics, by Region, Bank of
Japan, Tokyo; Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2006. White Paper on
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The extent of China’s recent growth, at average annual increases in
GDP of 10 per cent, is one explanation for the increased profitability of
Japanese affiliates in that country. Another is the greater availability of
local parts and components in China that has encouraged higher ratios of
local procurement and local management of Japanese affiliates, and that
may have contributed to higher profitability (Fukao 2007).
Linkages between FDI and ODA
Since the 1970s, Japan has directed over half of its official development
assistance (ODA) to East Asia, reflecting its close political and economic
relationship with the region (Figure 8.5). Following the rapid appreciation
of the Japanese yen from late 1985, the Japanese government sought to
use its extensive and growing ODA program to facilitate the adjustment
of Japanese firms and industries to the yen-induced decline in their
international competitiveness. As part of this focus, a New Asian Industrial
Development Aid Plan was announced by MITI Minister Tamura in 1987
to assist the relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing to low cost sites
in Asia (Arase 1995).
Japan became the world’s largest aid donor in 1991 and ODA outflows
peaked at US$13 billion in 2000 although fiscal pressures in the 2000s
led to major cuts to the ODA budget. A significant proportion of these
funds were directed to economic infrastructure in East Asia and linked to
increasing trade and investment between Japan and the bilateral recipient.
Yen loans for roads, bridges, ports or hospitals were used to finance the
activities of Japanese construction and engineering firms especially in East
Asia, as well as other regions (Japan, MOFA 2003).
Japanese ODA loans and grants were used in ASEAN economies to
facilitate the start-up of assembly and manufacturing processes by Japanese
firms and local partners. Often government agencies such as MITI
negotiated with host government officials to provide incentives for Japanese
firms to relocate, while JETRO, JICA and other agencies organised packages
of loans, grants and technical assistance that greatly facilitated Japanese
manufacturing and other FDI in East Asia (Arase 1995).
The provision of Japanese government guarantees for trade insurance
and finance and the role of particular agencies in targeting particular
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projects eased the investment decision of many smaller Japanese
manufacturers in industries—such as general machinery and textiles—as
did the profusion of information available from Japanese trade, aid and
business organisations (Solis 2003). These policy measures effectively
represented public subsidies for the internationalisation and relocation of
less competitive industries—a kind of defensive form of FDI—which
contrasts with the comparative lack of assistance for larger, more competitive
firms in the machinery, metals, automotive and electronics industries.
Conclusion
Over the last fifty years, Japanese foreign direct investment has contributed
positively to the East Asian region through the transfer of industrial
capacity, employment, capital and technology, all of which are bound up
in the FDI package. Since Japan accounted for around half of the East
Asian economy for much of this period, trade and investment linkages to
the Japanese market were critical to the growth and development of other
economies in the region. Japanese manufacturing firms have been among
Figure 8.5 Distribution of Japanese ODA, by region, 1970–2001
(per cent)
Source: Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003. Official Development Assistance (ODA)





211THE DYNAMIC IN EAST ASIAN INVESTMENT
the most active investors in East Asia and created sales and production
networks in the NIEs, ASEAN and Chinese economies which developed
into supply chains across the region.
In the future, it is likely that closer integration between Japan and the
rest of East Asia will continue. Already, China is Japan’s major trade partner
and trade is generally expected to grow further, providing further
opportunities for Japanese and other firms in the region. The removal of
remaining barriers to trade in goods and services in East Asia, for example
through the creation of a consolidating free trade area (absorbing existing
FTAs) would further promote closer regional linkages, especially if it
included members of political groupings such as ASEAN+3, such as Japan,
China, Korea and ASEAN (Pangestu and Gooptu 2003).
As noted by Peter Drysdale two decades ago, economic growth and
development has accelerated across the East Asia region as barriers to trade
and investment in goods and services across the region have been gradually
removed, although many still remain (Drysdale 1988). The future
liberalisation of barriers to services trade, for example, would significantly
increase regional investment in industries such as banking and finance,
telecommunications, commerce, real estate and transport and
communications—these are currently inhibited by a range of government
restrictions such as on foreign investment.
Partial deregulation in Japan itself has already led to positive capital
inflows into the restructuring of less competitive firms in the motor vehicle
and financial brokering industries. Similar deregulation, through either
multilateral or bilateral trade or investment liberalisation, especially in
ASEAN and China, would be likely to greatly boost inward flows of
productive foreign direct investment and allow further increases in trade
in goods and services across East Asia, to the benefit of all countries in the
region.
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Notes
1 East Asia is generally defined to include China, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan,
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (JETRO
2003).
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China’s rapid growth and integration into the world economy present
ASEAN countries1 with enormous business opportunities and competition.
China has become a major driver of the region’s growth. Rapid expansion
of China’s industries, exports, and consumer markets has led to a surge of
demand for raw materials, energy, intermediate products, final goods, and
services of all kinds from ASEAN countries. At the same time, the ASEAN
and Chinese economies compete in their home and in third country
markets, particularly in labour-intensive products. In the face of China’s
competition, there is growing consensus that ASEAN’s only viable option
is to undertake further trade liberalisation, industrial restructuring and
improvement of investment climates. ASEAN countries have undertaken
economic liberalisation, including a free trade agreement (FTA) with China,
to enhance their competitive position. Yet responses by individual ASEAN
countries vary, largely a result of their differing domestic policy reforms,
institutional capacity, natural endowment, and business competitiveness.
China’s role in the global economy has increased sharply in the past 25
years. Its GDP has grown at an average annual rate of over 9 per cent,
while its share of world trade has risen from less than 1 per cent to 6.5 per
cent. China is now the second-largest economy on a purchasing power
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parity basis2 and the third-largest trading nation in the world. Since 2003,
China has been the world’s largest destination for foreign direct investment
(FDI), which reached US$60 billion in 2004 (Song Hong 2005).
China’s neighbours, particularly ASEAN countries, have felt strongly
the impact of China’s growth. Through its close bilateral and regional
economic links, China’s rapidly growing domestic market and surging
imports and exports provide ASEAN countries with both opportunities
and competition. China’s sheer size and its growing integration with the
regional economies mean its growth, at whatever rate, will exert significant
influence on ASEAN’s development and external economic relations.
This chapter analyses some of China’s economic impacts on ASEAN
countries, and ASEAN’s policy response. It is based on literature survey,
data analysis and interviews with multilateral agencies, national research
institutes and government organisations in some ASEAN countries. It
ends with some concluding remarks.
Impacts of growth
Rapidly growing bilateral trade relations
China’s growth has led to a rapid expansion of its trade and broader
economic relations with ASEAN countries. Bilateral trade reached more
than US$100 billion in 2004, 100 times its value in 1978, when China
began to open up. Trade volumes have grown on average by more than 20
per cent a year since 1990.
The composition of the bilateral trade between ASEAN and China has
also changed significantly. It has advanced from trade mostly in raw
materials to that of machinery and electrical equipment, clearly indicating
closer economic integration through growing intra-industry trade. In 1993,
for instance, mineral products, wood and wooden articles, and charcoal
occupied about 55 per cent of ASEAN-5 total exports to China. In 2000,
however, machinery and electrical equipment alone accounted for 43 per
cent of ASEAN-5’s exports to China. Machinery, electrical equipment,
and textiles are China’s dominant exports to ASEAN-5, rising from 18 per
cent in 1993 to 43 per cent of China’s total exports to ASEAN (China’s
Customs Statistics 2005).




















Reforms and economic liberalisation have been driving China’s integration
into the world economy, presenting ASEAN and other regional economies
with enormous business opportunities. China’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 has provided further impetus to
ASEAN exports.
Economic globalisation and industrial restructuring in East Asia have
led China to become the region’s final assembly centre, with supply of
intermediate goods increasingly shipped from other Asian countries to
China for re-export to third country markets in Europe, North America
and other regions.
China’s domestic consumer market is rapidly growing, and is now one
of the largest in the world. China’s rising living standard leads to demand
for more agricultural products, consumer goods and services, including
education and tourism, all of which ASEAN countries are well placed to
supply. A more economically integrated Asia also means ASEAN can gain
indirect benefit from the expanding third country markets such as Japan
and Korea that grow together with the Chinese economy.
Figure 9.1 ASEAN-China bilateral trade, 1986–2003 (US$
million)
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2004. Key Indicators, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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An emerging economic interdependence
China is ASEAN’s fourth largest trade partner, while ASEAN has been
China’s fifth largest trade partner in the world since 1990. Since the mid
1990s, bilateral trade has been consistently in ASEAN’s favour. In 2003,
ASEAN overall enjoyed a bilateral trade surplus with China of US$16
billion (ADB 2004). ASEAN’s economic growth has increasingly relied
on China following the East Asian financial crisis.
During the financial crisis, China’s commitment to continue pegging
the yuan against the US dollar eased the downward pressure on Asia’s
currencies and helped them to stabilise macroeconomic conditions. At
that time, the Japanese economy was still stagnant and, in the early 2000s,
the US economy was also mired in the aftermath of its tech bubble burst.
China’s high growth helped lift demand for exports from East Asia and is
thought to have been a key external factor, helping the region pull itself
out of the crisis.
China has since contributed significantly to ASEAN’s export growth.
Between 1998 and 2003, for instance, ASEAN countries’ exports to China
soared three-fold, while its growth to the world rose by less than 47 per
cent. Between 2000 and 2003, China contributed to 46 per cent of












Figure 9.2 ASEAN-China trade, imports and exports, 2002–03
(US$ ‘000)
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ASEAN’s export growth, accounting for 117 per cent of the growth of the
Philippines, 77 per cent of Singapore, 49 per cent of Malaysia, 30 per
cent of Indonesia, and 25 per cent of Thailand (calculations based on
ADB 2004).
Broader economic relations, including investment, have grown rapidly
between ASEAN countries and China. China has been active investing in
ASEAN’s resource sector including fertiliser, chemicals and rubber
production. Investment in machinery production and assembly trade has
also risen in recent years. China has invested in Singapore given its role as
regional hub for financing, marketing and export seeking activities.
At the same time, companies of ASEAN origin have also actively pursued
investment opportunities in China. In 2002, ASEAN collectively invested
a total of US$3.3 billion in China, taking about 4 per cent of China’s total
FDI inflow that year (calculation based on China National Bureau of
Statistics 2004). This places ASEAN behind only Hong Kong, Taiwan, the
EU and the United States as the fifth largest source of FDI for China.
Investment from ASEAN countries would actually be more prominent if
many of the ‘round-trip’ investment from China through Hong Kong
back to China are stripped out from the accounting for China’s inward FDI.
China’s growing competitiveness
ASEAN and China are direct competitors in a wide range of export products.
China’s export sector is a stellar performer, growing by a rate of 17 per
cent per annum in the past twenty-five years. Labour-intensive industries
have driven its export surge to the world, but in recent years, its exports
have also increasingly relied on growing sophisticated capital and
technology-intensive industries. As a result, both the low and middle-
income ASEAN economies feel China’s competitive pressure. China’s cheap
labour on the one hand, and a large pool of skilled engineers on the other,
make competition stiffer for ASEAN economies in both their home and
third-country markets.
ASEAN countries are also generally concerned with the slow inflow of
foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI to ASEAN countries has dropped
significantly in the wake of the Asian economic crisis in 1997–98. Although
slowly recovering, FDI in many ASEAN economies has yet to regain its
pre-crisis level. By contrast, China’s stable macroeconomic environment,
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rapidly growing domestic market, and improved investment climate make
it a magnet for FDI (World Bank 2004).
FDI to China reached US$60 billion in 2004, three times that to ASEAN
countries combined. The fact that FDI to China has surged at the same
time as it has dropped for ASEAN countries leads to a view that FDI
inflow to China is at ASEAN countries’ expense. FDI also brings new
technology and know-how to China and adds to its competitiveness.
Assessing the business competition
Despite rising competition from China, a number of recent studies find
little empirical evidence that China has grown its exports at ASEAN’s
expense (Ahearne et al. 2003; Yang 2003; Weiss 2004; Lee 2004; Australia,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  2003). To the contrary, it appears
that, so far, China’s exports and ASEAN’s exports have been positively
correlated. China’s exports certainly put competitive pressure on ASEAN
countries with similar economic structure and comparative advantage. But
the size and growth of third-country markets are more important, with
ASEAN benefiting from expanding exports to third-country markets such
as Japan, the growth of which has also been strongly stimulated by their
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Figure 9.3 FDI to China and southeast Asia, 1992–2002 (US$
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Studies also show that, so far, there is no evidence of FDI diversion
from elsewhere in the region to China (Weiss 2004). The United States,
the EU, and Japan still invested less in China than in ASEAN countries
(Yang 2003). Surging FDI from China to the ASEAN economies has also
produced beneficial impacts. Transnational companies are the main driving
forces behind FDI, and see China as part of their regional production
chains. Many of their FDI activities in the region have led to the increase
of exports from ASEAN countries to China.
The extent and scope of the competition from China facing individual
countries are also different, due largely to their varying export structures
and industrial competitiveness vis-à-vis China’s. Countries with a more
similar export structure to China’s tend to face fiercer competition. China’s
comparative advantage still lies mainly in its labour-intensive sector, like
clothing, textiles and footwear, electronics, office machines and parts. That
is also where the comparative advantage of most ASEAN countries lies.
ASEAN and China therefore mainly compete in markets for these labour-
intensive products.
Table 9.1 summarises the sectors and extent of the ASEAN–China
business competition, based on a number of studies that examine the
structures of the Chinese and individual ASEAN exports as of early 2000s
(Australia, DFAT 2003; Yang 2003; Lee 2004). Sectoral focus is on labour-
intensive, capital/technology intensive, and resource intensive industries.
Strong, medium and weak are used to describe the extent of competition.
This summary is impressionistic rather than precise.
Singapore’s strong technology-based economy has long moved out of
the more labour-intensive industries in which China has comparative
advantage. Strong complementarity between the Singaporean and Chinese
economies makes the extent of business competition between them relatively
weak. The Philippines is not a strong exporter of labour-intensive products,
but benefits from China’s demand for electronic components.
Indonesia competes against China in almost half of its export markets,
mainly for labour-intensive manufactures. With its strength in primary
commodity exports, however, Indonesia is also complementary with China’s
expanding demand for industrial inputs. Almost two-thirds of Malaysia’s
net exports compete with China’s, including a wide range of electronics.
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Malaysia’s complementarity with China currently is lower than that of
most other regional economies.
Among all the ASEAN-5 countries, Thailand has the most similar net
export profile to China’s and faces competition from China in 70 per cent
of its net export sectors (Australia, DFAT 2003).3 Thailand’s
complementarity with China is the lowest in the region, but is growing
rapidly. While Vietnam’s growing labour-intensive exports (particularly
in clothing, textile and footwear) are in direct competition with China’s,
its exports of fruits and agricultural products have rapidly expanded to
meet China’s rising demand for food.
Cambodia’s exports rely heavily on the clothing, textile and footwear
sector, which has faced growing competition from China due to the expiry
of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). Laos’s comparative advantage lies
in its natural resource base with its rich endowment in forestry, water,
land and mineral resources. Its economy is therefore highly complementary
with the Chinese economy.
Responses from ASEAN countries
Attitudes turning positive
ASEAN members have clearly seen the business opportunities presented
by China’s growth. They have become much more positive about economic
Table 9.1 ASEAN countries’ sectoral strength and extent of
competition from China
Countries Singapore Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam Cambodia   Laos
Sectoral Capital/ Labour Labour Labour Labour Labour Labour Resource
strength technology intensive intensive, intensive, intensive intensive, intensive intensive
intensive resource resource resource
intensive intensive intensive
Extent of Weak Weak to Weak to Medium Strong Medium Medium Weak
Chinese Medium Medium to strong to strong to strong
competition
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relations with China.4 This stands in stark contrast to the general perception
prior to the late 1990s that China could become a serious economic threat.
The positive perception reflects the fact that China is now the main growth
engine of the region. It also reflects a sense of realism that sees globalisation
and trade liberalisation as making competition more intense at home and
in international markets. A growing China is seen as part of this.
Urgency of policy reforms
Many ASEAN countries feel the urgency of undertaking further policy
reforms to develop a more liberal economic system and to promote a
competitive business environment.
A competitive business environment will be key to attracting more FDI
to the region. Traditionally, ASEAN countries have used FDI as an
important source for upgrading technologies and restructuring industries.
FDI as a market-driven decision tends to go where there is are higher
returns and lower risks. The surge of FDI to China and its contrasting
slow recovery in ASEAN gives a very clear signal to ASEAN governments
that the need to undertake further policy reforms to improve their
investment climates to make them comparable to China’s. Delay will only
put them at a greater disadvantage, particularly given China’s advantages
of a huge domestic market, competitive export sector, rapidly improving
infrastructure and an increasingly favourable business environment.
Currently, the sunk cost factor may make some transnational corporations
retain their production sites in some ASEAN countries. The crunch will
come when these transnational corporations make their next round of
FDI decisions.
Improving the investment environment will be key to attracting more
FDI to the region. It is also essential to foster the growth and
competitiveness of domestic firms. However, many ASEAN economies
still treat firms differently, according to whether they are domestic or
foreign, large or small, state or privately owned. Together with some corrupt
business practices, policy discrimination inhibits foreign investors as well
as the domestic private sector and small-medium enterprises (World Bank
2005, World Development Report 2005).
223IMPACTS OF CHINA‘S GROWTH
Economic liberalisation through multiple channels
Increasingly ASEAN countries have pursued economic liberalisation,
through multilateral, regional, bilateral, unilateral, and sub-regional
channels, to achieve growth and business competitiveness.
• The multilateral trade system helps develop a rules-based
economy with business practices conforming to the WTO-based
international principles, norms and practices. Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia are actively seeking to become members of the WTO.
The accession process is helping shape their trade systems and
investment environments.
• Regional integration within ASEAN and with external economies
helps reduce the costs of doing business by enlarging currently
segmented markets. APEC provides an important venue for all
ASEAN countries to engage in dialogue and discussion on
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. It also helps them
understand issues arising from trade liberalisation. Within
ASEAN, the development of ASEAN Economic Community
(AEC) would also help eliminate trade barriers among members
and promote economic integration.
• Bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) can help boost trade and
economic growth in the region, providing they create more trade
than they divert. Some individual ASEAN member countries are
actively pursuing FTAs with external partner countries. The
ASEAN-10+China FTA proposal is one of the most prominent.
• Initiatives for sub-regional growth areas involve two or more
neighbouring countries for freer movement of people, goods and
services, and development of infrastructure and institutions. This
includes Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) covering sub-
national regions in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand
and China. Part of the motive is to capitalise on China’s growth.
Another example is the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and
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Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). Its recent
revival clearly indicates an urgency felt by member states to be
part of East Asian economic restructuring instigated by China’s
growth.
ASEAN-China FTA
Seeing China as an opportunity explains why ASEAN has actively pursued
bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with China since the early 2000s
(Murray 2004).
• In November 2001, ASEAN-10 and China agreed to establish
the world’s largest free trade area, comprising 1.7 billion people,
US$2 trillion GDP and US$1.2 trillion in trade volume. The
FTA will allow all members to enjoy more favourable treatment
in trade and investment than the WTO can offer.
• In November 2002, both sides signed Framework Agreement
that agreed to complete FTA negotiations by 30 June 2004, and
to establish the FTA by 2010.
• In October 2003, both sides also signed ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation that provides for the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes.
• China forgave all or part of the debts of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
and Myanmar, and granted most favoured nation status to non-
WTO members Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
• Both sides signed Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea and the Facilitation of Cross-Border Transport
of Goods and People in the Greater Mekong Region.
• Both sides identified 5 areas for cooperation, including agriculture,
information technology, human resources, direct investment, and
Mekong River Basin.
• Both sides estimated that the FTA, when established, could add
1 per cent to ASEAN’s GDP, 0.3 per cent to China’s GDP, and
50 per cent to ASEAN exports to China.
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Individual countries responding differently
Among ASEAN countries, Singapore and Thailand have been the most
proactive in pursuing a regional FTA with China. For Singapore, this
happens because of trade complementarity and historically close economic
ties. Thailand sees China’s business opportunities and also the need to
adjust as a good option for economic prosperity. Both countries have actively
invested in China, and also instigated policy reforms at home to facilitate
economic restructuring, innovation, specialisation, and a better investment
climate. Thailand, for instance, has put in place a ‘one village one product’
policy that encourages product differentiation in its handicraft industry.
Its ‘one stop shop’ government policy is also aimed to simplify procedures
and process for setting up and doing business.
The Philippines initially was a reluctant participant in the ASEAN-
10+China FTA, as its trade with the United States and Japan was much
bigger and more important. It, however, turned around to embrace the
FTA as a symbol of the Arroyo government’s willingness to have closer
political ties with China. Economically, Philippines has recently benefited
enormously from its trade relations with China, which accounted for all
of its export growth since 2000. In September 2004, during Arroyo’s
state visit to China, the Philippines committed to accelerate the timetable
for its tariff reduction program involving certain agricultural products under
the ASEAN-10+China FTA (Villanueva 2004). Research in the Philippines
has also identified many areas, including agricultural products, tourism
and financial services, that Philippines can exploit from China’s opening
markets. But cumbersome bureaucratic processes makes the Philippines
slow to act, and strong vested interests also share the blame for the stalling
of policy reforms to achieve greater competition and private sector
development. The Philippines’ economic difficulties are also complicated
by its rural poverty, income disparities, and law and order problems
particularly in the south.
Indonesia is the largest country in ASEAN, yet in recent years its
economy and exports have underperformed most of its ASEAN neighbours,
including the Philippines. The new government has been keen to take
advantage of ASEAN’s FTA with China, as part of a push for an export-
oriented growth to power economic development (Asia Times 2004).
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Indonesia’s resource-based economy positions it well to take advantage of
China’s growth. Indonesia has already become a major supplier of raw
materials to China, particularly in oil and gas, coal, rubber, timber, pulp
and paper, palm oil, organic chemicals, fish, electronics, and steel. An
improved political relationship between Jakarta and Beijing in recent years
augurs well for the domestic business in Indonesia and FDI has started
flowing from China to Indonesia, especially in its oil-and-gas sector. But
China is a direct competitor for several of Indonesia’s important exports
such as textiles and apparel. The expiry of the MFA from 2005 makes
competition in third-country markets fiercer. Indonesia’s investment climate
is generally perceived to be poor, as a result of political uncertainties,
together with rising wages, massive reductions on subsidies for water,
telephones, electricity and fuel. A dearth of investment in export
manufacturing and populist labour-market policies contributes to its lack
of export competitiveness, and loss of market share in third-country markets.
Geographical proximity means that Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are
more directly affected by China’s development. One of the central
development activities is the Greater Mekong Subregion growth area. With
funding from the Asian Development Bank, the three Indochina ASEAN
countries and Thailand have closely cooperated with China for the
development of transport and economic corridors, to achieve improvement
in competitiveness and a more integrated regional market (ADB 2005).
In the transport sector, ASEAN and China have made significant progress
in the construction of the Laos section of the Kunming–Bangkok Highway;
the navigation channel improvement project on the upper Mekong River;
and also the feasibility study of the missing link of the Trans-Asian Railway
inside Cambodia (Sun 2004). GMS would particularly provide Laos with
impetus and opportunities for development.
Until very recently, Laos saw itself as a landlocked country with great
difficulty in access to international markets. This partly explains the fact
that about three quarters of its low level of trade is with its neighbouring
countries including China. While it still exhibits a lot of political hesitation
on policy reforms and trade liberalisation, Laos certainly has experienced
rising trade with, and investment from, Thailand, China and Vietnam.
Bilateral trade between Laos and China totalled US$10 million in 2003
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and, according to the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(LNCCI), ‘some 200 Chinese enterprises have invested and opened business
in Laos’ (Bosworth 2005). In 2003, China was the leading investor,
investing in 15 Laos projects worth US$116 million. China is also a source
of significant loans to Laos, and was mentioned as a possible financier and
contractor for the Nam Theun 2 dam project if the World Bank and Asian
Development Bank fail to approve loans and guarantees.5 According to
government of Laos statistics, China’s bilateral ODA disbursements in
2002/03 reached US$30 million, placing it second only to Japan at
US$100 million. While Laos currently has little export capacity, due to
its lack of human resources and production capacity, its growth prospects
are improving, thanks to the GMS and other regional activities.
Cambodia has stalled its reform process in the last three years. In the
past ten years, Cambodia enjoyed GDP annual average growth at 6.5 per
cent, and this gave its leadership a great sense of complacency. Part of its
success came from the garment industry, which accounted for roughly 80
per cent of its export. Cambodia’s garment exports have benefited
enormously from the MFA, which put restrictions on the annual growth
of China’s garment exports to the world markets. Cambodia has legislation
that sets minimum wages. This leads to a belief that Cambodia’s garment
products have carved a niche in the world market for goods that meet
certain labour standards, and are therefore immune from China’s rising
competition. But this belief is misplaced because labour costs in Cambodia
are much higher than those in China. Doing business in Cambodia is also
more costly, due to higher transportation and transaction costs, and
rampant rent-seeking behaviours by government officials. The phasing
out of the MFA, however, will put pressure on Cambodia’s garment exports.
Cambodia’s leadership sees little urgency in preparing for the change.
Despite a relatively liberal investment regime, Cambodia’s domestic
problems, rather than any other external factors, explain its lack of FDI
attractiveness and difficulties in meeting competition in the world garment
market in the future.
China’s impact on Vietnam is reflected in rapidly growing bilateral
trade, which reached US$4.6 billion in 2003, a 40 per cent rise over
2002 (China Commerce Yearbook 2004:482. Available at http://wwww.
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yearbook.org.cn/english). As Vietnam’s exports come from labour-intensive
industries, they will face Chinese competition at home and in third country
markets. Being outside the WTO puts Vietnam in a disadvantaged position.
Government protection has traditionally shielded Vietnam’s state-owned
enterprises from competition. As a result, they are highly inefficient, losing
market share at home and abroad. Intense competition from China and
other countries provides an impetus to SOE reform, and should bring
long-term benefit to Vietnam’s development. According to the ASEAN-
10+China FTA joint study, China’s growth has provided Vietnam enormous
export opportunities. Yet Vietnam is not a big producer in many
manufacturing industries. This has limited its capacity to participate in
the economic restructuring in East Asia that is making China the final
assembling centre. This largely explains why Vietnam, together with the
poorer ASEAN countries Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, has a small
bilateral trade deficit with China. In future, however, Vietnam may well
be able to take part in China’s manufacturing networks, as Thailand has
done, from a low production base.
Table 9.2 summarises the adjustment made by each of the ASEAN
countries in response to China’s competition, as discussed above. Three
levels of adjustment—rapid, medium and slow—are used to describe the
speed of response.
Figure 9.4 combines the impacts on, and the adjustment made by,
ASEAN members, arising from China’s growth. It combines the main
features summarised in Table 9.1 and Table 9.2. Again, the diagram is
illustrative of China’s impacts and ASEAN members’ responses. The latter
are, of course, part of their more general adjustment to economic
globalisation.
Conclusion
China has been the region’s growth engine since the Asian economic crisis,
and ASEAN members have felt strongly China’s impacts, through their
growing trade, investment and other commercial ties. China’s growth
presents ASEAN countries with both enormous business opportunities
and competition. China’s growth has also obliged ASEAN members hastily
to take necessary steps for trade and policy reforms. Yet individual countries
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Table 9.2 Effectiveness in ASEAN countries’ adjustment to
China’s impacts
Countries Singapore Malaysia Thailand Vietnam
Response Rapid Rapid Rapid Rapid
Strong sense Political Political Policies in
of urgency commitment, commitment, line with
to anticipate competitive institutional broader
change and business, capacity, reform and
take action, need to market- opening,
institutional address friendly need for
facilitation, issues in policies for further
competitive education competition state sector
business and and reform
investment development and PSD
Countries Philippines Indonesia Cambodia Laos
Response Medium Medium Slow Slow
Determinants Political Resolving Reforms Lack of
commitment, political stalled, leadership,
cumbersome uncertainty, complacent institutional
bureaucratic weak on past capacity,
process, economic record, human
weak and financial formal resources
institutional institutions, sector and
capacity, regulatory rigidity, infrastructure,
strong vested distortion, rampant but
interests and lack of rent-seeking geographical




have responded differently, due largely to their different trade structures,
business competitiveness and domestic institutions.
Four observations are as follows. First, relative trade structures underpin
the nature of China-ASEAN economic relations, whether competitive or
complementary. Singapore, Laos and, to a lesser extent, Philippines and
Indonesia are well positioned to take advantage of China’s rapid industrial
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expansion and urbanisation, due largely to their complementary trade
relations with China. China’s comparative advantage still lies in labour-
intensive sectors. Its exports compete directly with manufacturing
industries in Thailand, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam, as each
country relies heavily on labour-intensive exports. Cambodia also faces
looming competition from China in clothes, textiles and footwear exports.
Second, while competition matters, market growth and competitiveness
matter more. Numerous studies find that, so far, the exports from both
ASEAN members and China have grown rapidly. This suggests that China’s
economic expansion, East Asian industrial restructuring, and the growth
of third-country markets are more important factors, offsetting some
possible negative impacts from China’s competition.
Third, policy reforms for trade liberalisation and investment climates
go hand-in-hand with enhancing business competitiveness. Political
commitment and institutional capacity underpin the success of policy
reforms. This, to a large extent, explains why Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia
and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam can act fast and effectively in adjusting to
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external impacts. On the other hand, stalled policy reforms in Cambodia
mean the country may face greater challenges in sustaining its previous
record of export growth.
Last but not least, each ASEAN country faces different tasks in policy
reforms, due to different domestic circumstances. WTO accession is a
critical step in trade liberalisation for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and
will push their trade systems into line with international norms and practice.
Vietnam and Laos also have to reform their state sector, including state-
owned enterprises and financial systems, to foster private sector
development and business competition. Lack of institutional and
production capacity and human resources hampers Laos from taking up
external opportunities. Changing populist labour-market policies and
encouraging investment are critical to improving Indonesia’s export
competitiveness.
Notes
1 In this chapter, ASEAN or ASEAN-10 refers to the ten member countries of Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, including Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, (also referred as ASEAN-5), and Brunei, Myanmar, Vietnam, Lao DPR and
Cambodia. Unless specified, discussion in this chapter does not cover Myanmar and
Brunei.
2 China is the world’s sixth-largest economy at market exchange rates.
3 The use of net exports (or imports) is an effort to capture the value-added items in a
country’s exports (or imports) amidst growing intra-industrial trade among East Asian
countries.
4 Our interviews in Bangkok, Manila and Singapore reveal an overwhelming view that the
impact of China’s growth overall is positive for ASEAN countries. Such unanimous
agreement by a diverse range of organisations and countries is noteworthy.
5 The World Bank reported on 31 March 2005 that it had approved the loan guarantees
in support of the Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric project.
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The return of a world power
Economic growth in China in the last two decades has been most
spectacular. With annual growth of about 9 per cent, China has attracted
tremendous attention worldwide. Few would dispute that China is now
one of the important engines of growth in the world economy.
Perhaps less well known is the fact that China had been the most
powerful and biggest state in the world for nearly two millenniums. Until
the nineteenth century, China’s share of world GDP was higher than that
of all of Western Europe combined. China accounted for about a quarter
of the world GDP from the beginning of the first millennium and has
remained as dominant player until Western Europe caught up in the mid-
nineteenth century (Figure 10.1). Western Europe started its rapid catch-
up with China from the fifteenth century and surpassed China in the
eighteenth century. In fact, China was a victim of its own success, as it
indulged itself in its technological prowess and demonstrated no interest
at all in the rapid technological development of Western Europe since the
fifteenth century. According to Angus Maddison:
10 CHINA: WHERE WILL THE CONTEST
FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP END?
Yiping Huang and Xinpeng Xu
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A British mission in 1793 tried to open diplomatic relations and
demonstrate the attractions of western science and technology with 600
cases of presents (including chronometers, telescopes, a planetarium,
chemical and metal products). The official rebuff stated ‘there is nothing
we lack—we have never set much store on strange or ingenious objects,
nor do we want any more of your country’s manufactures’. China did not
start establishing legations abroad until 1877 (Maddison 2002:117).
China had become an increasingly inward-looking economy. Even worse
was a whole series of internal rebellions such as the Taiping rebellion (1851–
1864). Plagued with war and foreign intrusion since 1840s, China’s share
of world GDP had declined sharply from almost one-third to about five
per cent (see Figure 10.1). During the same period, western economies
experienced extraordinary expansion as a result of the industrial revolution.
It is not just the economic size of China that was bigger than that of the
Western Europe—per capita GDP in China had also been higher until
the sixteenth century (Maddison 2002). Thereafter, Europe took the lead
and China started to lag behind (Figure 10.2). China’s per capita GDP in
the early 1950s was less than its 1820 level. In sharp contrast was the
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Figure 10.2 Comparative GDP per capita China and Western
Europe, 50–1998 (1990 international $)
Note: The vertical axis is in natural logarithm.
Source: Maddison, A. 2002. Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, OECD
Development Centre, Paris. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, 1998, OECD
Development Centre, Paris.
tripling of both Western Europe’s and Japan’s income per capita and an
increase of more than eight-fold in the US GDP per capita during this
period. When other countries in the world were charging ahead, China
was in decline. The three decades since 1950s saw a five-fold increase in
Japan’s per capita income, from $2,351 (1990 international dollars) to
$11,581 (1990 international dollars), while China’s per capita just falls
short of doubling under central planning (Maddison 1998).
China started to emerge from its century-long decline only after the
economic reforms and opening up that have taken place since 1979. China
is now established as an engine of growth in East Asia and beyond, through
its rising share in regional production and trade, and its close structural
links with other economies in the region. The economic size of China
measured in terms of current output has been rising, and the Chinese
economy is now almost one-third of the size of that of Japan—even based
on market exchange rate calculated output measures (Figure 10.3). The
contrast is even more striking if the comparison is based on purchasing
power parity (PPP) calculated output measures, by which China has already
surpassed Japan and, after 1993, become the second largest economy in
the world (Figure 10.4). With growth rates averaging close to 10 per cent
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Sources: Drysdale P. and X.P. Xu, 2004. ‘Taiwan’s role in the economic architecture of East Asia
and the Pacific’, Pacific Economic Papers No. 343, Australia-Japan Research Centre, The
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Figure 10.4 China and East Asia in the world economy, output
share, 1980–2003 (per cent)
Figure 10.3 China and East Asia in the world economy, output
share, 1980–2003 (per cent)
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per annum since 1990, China has been, and is expected to continue to
be, the most important new player in the regional and the world economy.
China’s global significance is seen almost everywhere. During the last
couple of years, China contributed roughly one-third of global economic
growth. It accounts for about 20 per cent of world’s total labour-intensive
exports and more than 60 per cent of total Asian electronic exports. Large
volumes and low prices of such products earned China reputations such
as ‘a global manufacturing centre’ or ‘exporter of global deflation’. Many
also regard the ‘China factor’ as the key driving force behind skyrocketing
commodity prices.
China has even become an important force in the international capital
markets, despite China’s own capital account controls. Renminbi exchange
rate policy is a key factor influencing global currency markets. In early
2007, corrections of the domestic A-share markets sent shockwaves across
global equity markets.
Can China’s rapid growth continue?
According to Maddison’s prediction, China will overtake the United States
to become the world’s largest economy by 2030. Whether or not such
prediction will materialise depends on China’s ability to translate its recent
success into sustainable growth of output in the future. To answer this
question, we employ a simple yet conventional approach, that is, a growth
accounting approach, to look into this important question. According to
growth accounting theory, economic growth depends on an accumulation
of factors, mainly capital stock and labour, and increase in total factor
productivity (TFP). In mathematical form, the growth accounting equation is
y = δ + αk + (1 – α)l
where y, δ, k, and l, represent, growth in output, total factor productivity,
capital stock and labour, respectively. α refers to the share of capital in
total output or, technically speaking, elasticity of output with respect to
capital. We assume α to be 0.4, which is somewhat higher than the usual
0.35 as in Bosworth and Collins (2003). We believe that capital may be
more important (productive) in a large developing country like China
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where labour is relatively abundant. Assuming production technology
exhibits constant return to scale, we obtain (1–α) as the share of labour in
total output or elasticity of output with respect to labour. Mathematically,
TFP is a residual, by subtracting contributions of capital and labour from
output growth.
It is a well-known fact that data for China’s agriculture and service
sectors are difficult to come up with and even there are some estimates
around they are prone to criticism. Together, China’s agriculture and service
sectors account for about one-third of the total national output.
Interestingly, agricultural sector has been growing slowly while the services
sector has developed rapidly in the past decade. For a country that is
experiencing rapid industrialisation, it may not be too unreasonable to
assume that on balance China’s agriculture and services sectors grow at
the same rate as that of the manufacturing sector. And by such an
assumption we can focus on the manufacturing sector where relatively
high-quality data are available.
Table 10.1 shows a growth accounting decomposition for China’s
manufacturing sector, with detailed construction of capital stock and labour
working hours in Wu and Xu (2004). In the past two decades, China’s
capital stock grew at a rate of about 10 per cent per annum, contributing
to output growth by about 4.3 per cent. We expect this trend to continue
for two reasons. First, the returns to investment will remain high as China
carries out its reform in the state-owned sector and the government sector,
which boosts up productivity. It will not run into diminishing returns for
a long period of time as both labour force participation and productivity
are increasing. Second, the accumulation of capital in China will not run
into the ‘financing constraint’ as China has the world’s highest saving
rate. More importantly, China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation
delivers a significant long-term commitment to economic liberalisation,
which has attracted a huge inflow of foreign capital, already averaging
around US$45 billion annually over the past few years (Woo 2001).
Growth of labour working hours has been low in the last decade, thanks
to the reform in state-owned enterprises that shed away huge number of
redundant workers. The private sector will continue to expand and become
the major sector that provides employment. Given the huge surplus workers
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in China, in both rural and urban sectors, we expect that labour working
hours will grow at least by 2 per cent per annum, contributing to output
growth by 1.2 per cent.
The above findings on productivity growth in China are consistent
with the results of some recent analyses. Bosworth and Collins (2007), for
instance, found that between 1993 and 2004 total factor productivity
contributed more than 40 per cent of GDP growth (about 4 percentage
points) or 56 per cent of industrial production growth (about 6.2
percentage points).
We are more optimistic about China’s total factor productivity growth
than some researchers. We think there is great upside potential for TFP to
grow. Maintaining a 2.5 per cent growth annually should be a conservative
estimate, given that the TFP growth in the past decade has been increasing
at an average of 3.2 per cent per annum.
 Recent studies by development economists have identified three factors,
namely openness, institutions and geography, as fundamental forces that
drive economic growth (Rodrik et al. 2002). It is China’s commitment to
liberalisation, reform and openness that draws it politically as well as
economically closer to the world’s major centres of economic power in
North America, Europe and East Asia and that provides the foundations
for substantial and sustainable economic growth at home.
Specifically, there are several factors that point to this upside potential.
First, continued institutional reform, especially after China’s accession to
Table 10.1 Growth accounting for Chinese manufacturing sector,
1980–2000 (per cent)
Growth of Growth of Growth of Contribution Contribution Total factor
output capital labour of capital of labour productivity
1980–1991 8.8 10.7 5.5 4.3 3.3 1.2
1992–2000 9.3 10.6 –0.1 4.3 - 5.0
Note: Estimation in this table assumes output elasticity of capital and labour at 0.4 and 0.6,
respectively.
Source: Wu Harry X.  and Xinpeng Xu ‘A fresh scrutiny of productivity performance in
Chinese manufacturing, 1952–2000’. Asia Pacific Productivity Conference, 2004
Conference, Brisbane.
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the WTO, would promise higher quality of institutions in China, which
would lead to higher TFP. According to Rodrik and Subramanian (2004),
China has been performing very well (above the ‘regression line’) in the
past two decades given its relatively low quality of institutions and will
‘regress’ back to normal growth rates warranted by its quality institutions.
This may be the case if reform in China stalls. But we have seen rapid
improvement in the reform of previously highly protected sectors, for
example privatisation of state-owned enterprises and gradual removal of
monopoly powers in sectors like electricity, transportation,
telecommunication, wholesale and retail, and banking, etc. We expect the
quality of institutions in China will continue to improve.
Second, China will continue to take advantage of the technological
backwardness as it moves towards the frontier of world technology. Even
though China is already a major player in the world economy, its GDP
per capita is still well below US$2,000, which is not only substantially
lower than those in the advanced economies but also below those in most
of its East Asian neighbours. Experiences of other rapidly industrialising
economies suggest that, when an economy is far away from the frontier of
world technology, it is easier for it catch up by copying existing
technologies. In this regard, integration with the international market
through trade and investment provides golden opportunities. Productivity
gains flow from trade gains through cheaper imports and their impact on
import and export sector efficiency and also from the technology spillover
through foreign investment.
Third, China’s high levels of human capital will be an important source
of TFP growth. Chinese have traditionally paid attention to human capital
development. The return to schooling has been increasing, compared to
the case in the 1980s. More investment in human capital has now been
observed in coastal cities and will soon spread to other part of the countries,
which will lead to higher accumulation of human capital. Moreover, as
incomes rise and opportunities grow within China, more overseas educated
people will return to China, in contrast with the case in the 1980s when
the return to education was low and many young Chinese left for the
United States and Europe, which once caused a ‘brain drain’ alarm.
Taken together, we suggest that an annual growth of 8 per cent should
be sustainable for China for a significant period of time. With this annual
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growth rate, China would be able to double its income in every nine
years. While the above is our base case scenario, it is by no means a
guaranteed outcome. In fact, the Chinese economy still faces numerous
risks and problems, which include unemployment, income disparity and
political uncertainties. The biggest risk, however, lies in inefficiency of
capital allocation.
Inefficiency of capital allocation is reflected in a number of ways.
Functioning of the financial intermediation remains sub-optimal. In the
banking sector, for instance, while the authorities and the banks recently
stepped up efforts in improving their competitiveness, progress so far appear
to be limited. Though average non-performing (NPL) ratio in the banking
sector declined to 7.2 per cent at the end of 2006 from 23 per cent at the
end of 2002 (Figure 10.5), overall the NPL outlook is not optimistic.
First, many recently revealed bank scandals raise the question about the
size of hidden ‘black holes’ in the state banks. Second, while most
commercial banks have implemented the international standard five-
category loan classification system, definition for each category was actually
left to individual commercial banks. And, third, the fact that about half of
the existing outstanding loans, which is about 65 per cent of GDP, was
extended during the past three to four years certainly points to potential
risks going forward. This is particularly the case as we expect the government
continues to tighten and the macroeconomy gradually takes a downturn.
Meanwhile, capital is substantially under-priced in China, which leads
to further problems of inefficiency. In 2006, for instance, nominal GDP
increased by close to 14 per cent, but the one-year base lending rate was
only 6.11 per cent (which increased to 6.39 per cent in March 2007 after
another rate hike), and five-year government bond yield was well below 4
per cent. A number of factors are responsible for capital being too cheap
in China, including a high savings ratio in relation to low consumer
confidence, capital account controls restriction capital outflows, inefficient
banks and capital markets, and an undervalued exchange rate encourage
capital inflows.
Therefore, resolving the capital inefficiency problem requires systemic
policy actions. And this is probably the biggest hurdle that China faces in
sustaining its rapid growth.
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Economic impacts on the region
Even though China is still at the early stage in its re-emergence, its impacts
on the global economy, especially the regional economy, are already
phenomenal. In fact, today China is one of the hottest subjects of economic
discussion in almost every economic centre around the world. China’s
global influences are primarily reflected in the following areas—strong
demand for commodities, extraordinary expansion of exports, rapid growth
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and choices of exchange rate policy.
Global commodity prices rose significantly in recent years and one of
the major driving forces was very strong demand in China. In 2003, China
accounted for large shares in world consumption of a number of
commodities—33 per cent in coal, 23 per cent in steel, 20 per cent in
aluminium, 10 per cent in alumina, 11 per cent in copper (Figure 10.6).
In some markets where China’s overall shares are still small, its contribution
on the margin is already quite significant. For instance, while China’s
consumption of crude oil was only about 8 per cent of the world total in
Figure 10.5 Average non-performing loan ratios in the Chinese
banks, 2002–2007 (per cent)
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2004, it contributed about half of the incremental demand in the world
crude market.
China’s extraordinary commodity consumption, which is disproportional
to its economic size, was at least in part related to the over-investment
problem. Therefore, there is a question if the current momentum can be
sustained over time as China slows the pace investment expansion to achieve
more sustainable growth. However, the expected rapid growth of the
economy, continued industrialisation process and new waves of urbanisation
in the coming decades are likely to underpin strong demand for
commodities in China. In fact, commodity producers in Latin America,
Australasia, Middle East, Central Asia and Africa have made macroeconomic
development in China as a key factor in their corporate planning.
The impacts of Chinese economic expansion on other Asian economies
have been even clearer. Economic recoveries of most Asian economies from
2002 were led by export growth. Intra-regional trade expanded rapidly in
East Asia, primarily because of increasing roles played by China (Figure 10.7).
Today, China is already the largest export market for Korea and Taiwan
Source: Citi Investment Research estimates using data from World Bureau of Metal
Statistics, CRU Group Reports, London Metals Exchange, British Petroleum, Tex Report
and China Nonferrous Metals Industry.
Figure 10.6 China’s share of world consumption/production of
metal products, 2003 (per cent)
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and is one of the most important export markets for many other Asian
economies including Japan. Japan’s exports to China have also increased
significantly since 2001, while its total exports only rose 25 per cent during
the same period. China has been a true engine of growth for the region.
China’s growing importance in regional and global trade also increased
the openness of its own economy. The share of exports in GDP climbed
from 22 per cent in 2001 to nearly 35 per cent in 2004, a path that is
very similar to those travelled by other East Asian economies in earlier
years. Naturally, a more open China and, particularly, rapid rise of Asian
exports to China led to greater degree of intra-regional trade in Asia. More
interestingly, changes in China in recent years have shifted gradually the
supply chains in some industries, especially in the tech sector. Many Asian
economies, including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and
Philippines, specialise in production of electronic and technology products.
In the past, these economies exported large volumes of tech products to
America and Europe. In recent years, however, China begins to dominate
labour-intensive segment of the technology industries. As a result, those
Figure 10.7 Growing intra-regional trade in East Asia, 1998–2006
(US$ billion)
Note: Asian economies here exclude China and Japan.
Source: CEIC Data, Hong Kong and Citigroup estimates in Citi Investment Research,
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Figure 10.8 China’s changing bilateral trade balances with USA,
European Union, Japan and East Asia, 2001–2006
(US$ billion)
Sources: CEIC Data, Hong Kong and Citigroup estimates in Citi Investment Research,
Asian Economic Outlook and Strategy, Hong Kong (various issues).
other Asian economies export relatively more sophisticated intermediate
goods to China and then China exports finished goods to America and
Europe.
One side-effect is the rapid increase in China’s bilateral trade surpluses
with the United States and Europe (Figure 10.8). In fact, the growing
trade imbalance between China and the United States has become a serious
political issue. According to the Chinese statistics, China’s bilateral trade
surplus against the United States rose from US$28 billion in 2001 to
US$80 billion in 2004, a net increase of US$52 billion.1 Similarly, China’s
trade surplus against the European Union economies increased US$30
billion during the same period. However, China’s trade balances fell by
US$23 billion against Japan and US$68 billion against the other East
Asian economies. In fact, China’s overall trade balances were reasonably
stable, fluctuating between US$22 billion and US$32 billion, during
those years. Thus, it would be too simple-minded to argue that
deterioration of the US bilateral trade relation with China was caused by
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Figure 10.9 FDI inflows to China: total amount of utilised FDI and
its share in gross capital formation, 1984–2004
(US$ billion and per cent)
Sources: CEIC Data, Hong Kong and Citigroup estimates in Citi Investment Research,
Asian Economic Outlook and Strategy, Hong Kong (various issues).
The situation of FDI is perhaps more complicated. In the short-term,
especially right after China’s WTO entry, competition between FDI going
into China and that into other Asian economies was quite clear. Some
investors even reportedly closed their operations in Philippines, Thailand
and Malaysia to move to China. However, taking a longer-term perspective,
the benefits of growing Chinese markets to other Asian economies are
clear, especially if they can integrate into a unified market (see Farrell and
Pangestu, Chapter 8 for an alternative view).
Finally, choices for China’s exchange rate policy reform going forward is
probably one of the most important factors affecting the global financial
markets today. For example, the offshore non-deliverable forward (NDF)
market moves quickly following news flows and policy statements (Figure
10.10). On July 21, 2005, the Chinese authorities finally gave up the
seven-year old de facto peg to the US dollar and introduced the managed
float system with reference to a basket of currencies. The new regime turned
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introduced. However, by the end of March 2007, renminbi had appreciated
by 6.8 per cent against the dollar or by half that on real effective exchange
rate terms. Going forward, renminbi is likely to maintain a steady
appreciation trend given rapidly accumulating foreign reserves, persistent
trade surpluses, resultant excess liquidity in the domestic system, and
growing external pressures for currency appreciation from the major trading
partners. However, drastic currency appreciation still looks unlikely as
China’s policymakers are still deeply concerned about the potential
adjustment costs in terms of jobs and growth.
Reform of the Chinese exchange rate policy was at least in part responsible
for a turning point in the global currency markets. In 2003 and 2004,
real depreciation of the US dollar was accompanied by real appreciation of
the euro and the Japanese yen. The year 2005 represented a turning point
when the US dollar, euro and yen all depreciated in real terms. The
currencies which shouldered the burden of adjustments are those from
emerging Asian economies. This new trend continued in 2006 and is
likely to remain in 2007. The fact that the turning point in global exchange
rates occurred in the same year as China’s exchange rate policy reform was
Sources: CEIC Data, Hong Kong and Citigroup estimates in Citi Investment Research,
Asian Economic Outlook and Strategy, Hong Kong (various issues).
Figure 10.10 Expected revaluation of the Chinese currency within
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Figure 10.11 Changes in real effective exchange rates, 2003–2007
(per cent)
Source: Citigroup estimates in Citi Investment Research, Asian Economic Outlook and
Strategy, Hong Kong (various issues).
probably not accidental. The renminbi exchange rate has already become
an important benchmark for Asian monetary policymakers in managing
their own exchange rate policies.
Prospects for a China-Japan partnership
China’s former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, the architecture of
China’s reform policy, once laid down an important strategy for new
generations of the Chinese leaders—keeping low profile in international
affairs and developing the economy. And, in this spirit, the former President
Jiang Zemin coined the term ‘peaceful ascendancy’.
But ascending peacefully is by no means an easy task. An increasingly
powerful China inevitably causes some uneasiness among its small
neighbours. But most importantly, it makes the United States, the only
super power of the world today, feel under threat. China bashing is a
frequent phenomenon in the United States, on issues of human rights,
arms sales, intellectual property rights, trade imbalances and exchange
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the next forty years. But in reality, there is still a very long way to go
before China can challenge the United States on any real terms.
In the coming decade or so, competition is likely to concentrate in the
East Asian region, especially in the race for regional leadership. As the
region’s most important economic power, Japan has been a regional leader
for several decades, especially on certain economic initiatives, such as the
APEC. But Japan’s leadership role suffers from a number of drawbacks.
First, as on most foreign policy issues Japan follows closely the US position,
so it acts more like a branch office of the United States rather than an
independent regional leader. Second, Japan’s economy was stagnant for
more than a decade, reducing its economic influence in the region. And,
finally, Japan still suffers from its own war-time legacy issues, especially in
dealing with its close neighbours such as China and Korea.
This was probably why, from time to time, Japan exercised leadership
role from behind, which led to the prominence of the Japan-Australia
relationship in the regional affairs in the 1980s and early 1990s. But by
late 1990s, it had become clear that even such a leadership pattern was no
longer sustainable. This was in part because of Japan’s reduced influence
and in part due to deeper integration among ASEAN economies. In
addition, Australia drifted away from the centre of Asian affairs.
During the first half of the 21st Century, accommodating the rising
China is likely the most important challenge for the East Asia region.
Before the middle of that period, China will probably overtake Japan as
the region’s largest economy. While the relationship between the two
regional powers will be tricky, the China-Japan partnership is the key to
the continuation of prosperity in Asia.
It is not difficult to predict China’s growing economic importance to
the region. For instance, China is now already Japan’s largest trading partner.
But when it comes to exercising a leadership role in Asia, China also faces
certain constraints, including historical problems with India, Korea and
Vietnam. Most importantly, China’s Communist Party-dominated
authoritarian political system leaves many doubts and suspicions among
its neighbours, especially in regard to predictability of its behaviour in
regional and global affairs. Thus, political reforms will be critical for China’s
eventual ascendancy to a global leadership role.
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For the time being, the China-Japan partnership plays a very important
role. Given the recent deadlocks in the Sino-Japanese relations, especially
the mass protests against Japan in major Chinese cities such as in 2005, it
is difficult for a close partnership to emerge between the two any time
soon. Indeed, numerous conflicts or disagreements exist between the two
countries, including
• disagreements over Japan’s recognition of its wartime crimes, especially
in relation to China’s continuous demand for an apology from Japan,
the Japanese Prime Minister’s annual visits to Yasukuni shrine and
controversial revisions of textbooks in Japan
• claims of sovereignty by both countries over islands, called ‘Senkaku’
by the Japanese and ‘Diaoyu’ by the Chinese, and the rights to exploit
natural gas resources in the East China Sea
• Japan’s demand to become a permanent member of the expanded
Security Council of the United Nations, which is opposed by China
• the US–Japan security understandings that refer to the stability of
the Taiwan Strait as key interests for the two parties. In response
to this, China passed its anti-secession law in 2005 allowing the
government to use military force as a last resort to achieve reunification.
Pessimists may conclude that it would be impossible for the two countries
to work together. But we easily forgot that there were times in the history
when they worked very closely with each other, first time about two
thousand years ago during the Tang Dynasty and the most recent time in
the 1980s when Hu Yaobang was the General Secretary of the Communist
Party. What it takes is political leaders’ vision and courage.
Of all the difficult issues currently facing the two countries, the most
challenging one is the Taiwan issue. In a worst-case scenario, a war between
China and Japan may be possible—once China launches a war against
Taiwan, Japan is obliged to help the United States who will probably help
defend Taiwan. But judging from the recent developments across the Taiwan
Strait, we believe that military action is certainly not inevitable.
It is a long shot to call for a China-Japan partnership. But with the
region’s two most important economies constantly in conflict with each
other, it is difficult to expect an effective framework for regional
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development and cooperation. The visits to China by Japanese Prime
Minister Abe in late 2006 and to Japan by Chinese Premier Wen in early
2007 generated some hopes for establishing more normal working relations
between the two countries. But only history can tell how this relationship
will evolve, which will have significant implications for the region and the
world.
Notes
1 The numbers cited here are for illustration purpose only, as US officials would argue that
the Chinese official statistics substantially underestimate China’s bilateral trade surpluses
against the United States. The differences between the Chinese and American data are
caused mainly by treatment of Chinese re-exports to the United States through Hong
Kong.
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